United States v. Francis ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 22 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 00-1429
v. (D.C. No. 98-CR-224-D)
TONY S. FRANCIS, (D. Colorado)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Janine Yunker, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Michael G. Katz, Federal
Public Defender, with her on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Andrew A. Vogt, Assistant United States Attorney (Richard T. Spriggs, United
States Attorney, with him on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before HENRY , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and ROGERS ,
Senior District Judge. **
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Richard D. Rogers, United States Senior District Judge for
the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
-1-
Tony Francis appeals his conviction and sentence for violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1791(a)(2) (possession of escape paraphernalia in prison). Mr. Francis asserts
that the district court erred in (1) instructing the jury that the prosecution needed
to disprove only any one of the elements of the duress defense in order for the
jury to reject that defense; (2) failing to direct a verdict of acquittal on the escape
paraphernalia charge, given that the jury invoked the duress defense in order to
acquit on another count, violation of 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) (attempted escape); and
(3) failing to grant a reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility,
pursuant to § 3E1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Exercising
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we affirm both the
conviction and the sentence.
I. BACKGROUND
Following his escape from prison, the television show “America’s Most
Wanted” incorrectly described Mr. Francis as a leader of the Aryan Brotherhood,
a prison gang preaching white supremacy. Once recaptured, Mr. Francis found
himself housed in the federal penitentiary in Florence, Colorado; Mr. Francis
developed anxiety about his incarceration in this prison for at least two reasons.
First, Mr. Francis feared the reaction of African-American prisoners because at
least some of those prisoners had, in all likelihood, heard the claim of Aryan
-2-
Brotherhood membership made by “America’s Most Wanted.” Second, Mr.
Francis feared the reaction of members of the Aryan Brotherhood because, in
reality, he was not a member of that prison gang.
In 1997, prison authorities became concerned about growing racial tension
in the Florence penitentiary; beginning on September 3, 1997, prison authorities
“locked down” the penitentiary for ten days. Rec. vol. XI, at 483 (testimony of
Mark Gaytan). Immediately after prison authorities lifted the lock-down, three
African-American inmates threatened Mr. Francis. The inmates approached Mr.
Francis, told him that they had seen him on “America’s Most Wanted,” and
offered a warning to the effect that: “When the shit jumps off, you know what
time it is” – i.e., a race war was brewing and Mr. Francis was a target. Rec. vol.
XV, at 1294-95 (testimony of Mr. Francis); see also Rec. vol. XIV, at 1209
(testimony of Mr. Francis).
Mr. Francis declined to seek the aid of the prison authorities. According to
Mr. Francis, seeking such assistance would have labeled him a snitch and thereby
placed him in further danger. Additionally, again according to Mr. Francis,
because the special housing units were far from free from violence, placement in
protective custody would also have proven of limited benefit. In short, Mr.
Francis argues that consultation with prison officials was not a reasonable
alternative.
-3-
Mr. Francis concluded, instead, that his only option was to escape. Mr.
Francis thus began to make plans for an escape – including, with the help of his
friend and co-defendant Robert Haney, 1 obtaining a variety of escape
paraphernalia. On September 26, 1997 – approximately two weeks after the
initial threat – Mr. Francis was shown a “kite” (a note) in which an inmate
commented that Mr. Francis was still considered a target. Id. vol. XIV, at 1170
(testimony of Joseph McGee). This threat provided renewed impetus for the
escape attempt.
On the night of October 3, 1997, Mr. Francis and Mr. Haney gathered the
collected escape paraphernalia and hid in the prison yard. As they hid, however,
Mr. Haney endeavored to convince Mr. Francis that an escape attempt was
imprudent; Mr. Haney argued, in effect: “[T]he best possible solution would be to
get caught trying to escape, thereby getting placed into disciplinary segregation
without having to report the death threats to prison officials.” Aplt’s Br. at 14;
see, e.g., id. vol. XV, at 1425-27 (testimony of Mr. Haney). Mr. Francis
ultimately agreed. After two hours of strewing the yard with the escape
paraphernalia, the two inmates were finally caught.
The United States charged Mr. Francis with (1) violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1While Mr. Francis and Mr. Haney were tried jointly, we have considered
and decided Mr. Haney’s appeal separately. See United States v. Haney, No. 00-
1421, — F.3d —, 2002 WL — (10th Cir. 2002).
-4-
1791(a)(2) (possession of escape paraphernalia in prison) and (2) violation of 18
U.S.C. § 751(a) (attempted escape). The jury convicted Mr. Francis of possessing
escape paraphernalia but acquitted Mr. Francis of attempting to escape. The jury
premised the attempted escape acquittal on an express finding of duress. See Rec.
vol. I, doc. 218 (verdict form).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Disproving Duress
Mr. Francis first insists that the district court erred in failing to require the
government to disprove every element of the duress defense; the district court
instead instructed the jury that, if the government proved, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the absence of any one of the three elements of duress, the jury must reject
that defense. We review de novo the propriety of particular jury instructions. See
United States v. Wolny, 133 F.3d 758, 765 (10th Cir. 1998) (“We review the jury
instructions de novo to determine whether, as a whole, they adequately apprised
the jury of the issues and the governing law.”). Finding no error in the district
court’s jury instruction, we reject Mr. Francis’ argument.
The duress defense requires:
1) A threat of immediate infliction, upon the defendant, of death
or bodily harm;
2) The defendant’s well-grounded fear that the threat will be
-5-
carried out; AND
3) The defendant’s lack of a reasonable opportunity to otherwise
avert the threatened harm.
See United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1409 (10th Cir. 1997) (listing the
necessary elements of the duress defense); United States v. Scott, 901 F.2d 871,
873 (10th Cir. 1990) (same). Because the three elements of the duress defense are
joined by the conjunction “and” rather than the disjunction “or,” we conclude
that, as a matter of the most elementary logic, the district court acted correctly in
instructing the jury that the government’s disproof, beyond a reasonable doubt, of
any single element of the duress defense necessarily would preclude application
of that defense. See United States v. Toney, 27 F.3d 1245, 1248, 1252 (7th Cir.
1994) (“Once the defendant has made a preliminary showing and the judge has
found that a [duress] instruction is warranted, the burden switches to the
government to prove the absence of [duress]. The government may do so by
disproving beyond a reasonable doubt any of the elements of [duress].”)
(emphasis added); United States v. Amparo, 961 F.2d 288, 291 (1st Cir. 1992)
(“The government can overcome [the defendant’s invocation of the duress
defense] . . . by showing that no threat occurred, or that the defendant’s fear was
unreasonable, or that the defendant had an opportunity to escape but did not
exercise it.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Mitchell, 725 F.2d 832, 836 (2d
-6-
Cir. 1983) (“[I]n federal criminal trials[,] the Government’s burden in disproving
at least one element of duress should be proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”)
(emphasis added).
B. Motion for Acquittal
Mr. Francis next insists that because the jury, in regard to the charge of
attempted escape, acquitted on the basis of the duress defense, the court
necessarily should have granted a directed verdict as to possession of escape
paraphernalia. Neither logic nor the law, however, dictates such a result.
We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. See
United States v. Austin, 231 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2000). In so doing, we
“view[] the evidence in the light most favorable to the government in [order to]
determin[e] if there is substantial evidence from which a jury could [have found]
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 1283. We will reverse
only where “no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453,
1462-63 (10th Cir. 1996).
Here, the government presented evidence by which a rational jury could
have applied the duress defense to the attempted escape while declining to apply
that defense to the possession of escape paraphernalia. As noted above, the
-7-
duress defense requires, among other elements:
2) The defendant’s well-grounded fear that the threat will be
carried out
See United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1409 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Scott, 901 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1990). This second element contains, then,
two components: (a) the defendant must actually possess a fear that the threat will
be carried out and (b) that fear must be well-grounded. Cf. Rec. vol. I, doc. 219,
at instruction 34 (jury instructions) (describing the second element of the duress
defense as requiring “possess[ion of] a well-grounded fear that the threat would
be carried out”) (emphasis added). Here, the jury could have concluded that,
immediately following the first threat, Mr. Francis did not actually possess a fear
that the threat would be carried out. Accordingly, the jury could have declined to
apply the duress defense to Mr. Francis’ possession of escape paraphernalia
(because the second element remained unsatisfied), while still applying the duress
defense to the attempted escape (because, at this later date, the jury may have
concluded that, particularly in light of the renewed threats, Mr. Francis now
actually possessed a fear that the threats would be executed). Since a rational
jury could have applied the duress defense to Mr. Francis’ benefit as to the
charged attempted escape while simultaneously convicting Mr. Francis of
possessing escape paraphernalia, the district court committed no error in declining
-8-
to grant Mr. Francis’ motion for acquittal.
C. Acceptance of Responsibility
Finally, Mr. Francis insists that the district court misapplied United States
Sentencing Guideline § 3E1.1(a); § 3E1.1(a) provides for a two-level decrease in
offense level where the defendant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility.” Mr. Francis insists that the district court made a mistake of law
in failing to realize that the court maintained discretion to grant a § 3E1.1(a)
reduction even where Mr. Francis asserted the affirmative defense of duress rather
than plead guilty to the offense of possession of escape paraphernalia.
“We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the
sentencing guidelines de novo, and review the court’s factual findings for clear
error.” United States v. McAlpine, 32 F.3d 484, 487-88 (10th Cir. 1994). Mr.
Francis’ claim contests the district court’s awareness and application of correctly
interpreted law; Mr. Francis’ claim is thus subject to de novo review. See id. at
487-88.
Section 3E1.1(a) directs the sentencing court to “decrease the offense level
by two levels” if “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility
for his offense.” Application Note 2 to § 3E1.1 explains:
This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the
government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential
-9-
factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and
expresses remorse. Conviction by trial, however, does not
automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a
reduction. In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an
acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he
exercises his constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for
example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues
that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g. to make a constitutional
challenge to a statute or a challenge to the applicability of a statute to
his conduct). In each such instance, however, a determination that a
defendant has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon
pre-trial statements and conduct.
Here, Mr. Francis did put the government to its burden of proof by declining to
plead guilty; Mr. Francis insisted on proceeding to trial. However, as the
Guideline Commentary makes clear, Mr. Francis remained eligible, at the
discretion of the district court, for the § 3E1.1(a) reduction. See also United
States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1172 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that “a § 3E1.1
reduction is not per se unavailable just because the defendant [chose] to go to
trial solely on an [affirmative] defense.”).
We conclude that the record adequately demonstrates the district court’s
awareness of this discretion. At the joint sentencing hearing, counsel for Mr.
Francis’ co-defendant read from the Commentary to § 3E1.1(a): “‘Conviction by
trial . . . does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such
a reduction.’” Rec. vol. XIX, at 19 (Sentencing Hr’g, dated Dec. 28, 2000)
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2). The court clearly understood, itself
-10-
reiterating: “‘In rare situations, a defendant may clearly demonstrate acceptance
of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his
constitutional right to a trial.’” Id. at 22 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2).
The court specifically noted: “[T]his application [U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2]
doesn’t limit the availability of acceptance of responsibility to only someone
who’s challenging the constitutionality [of the statute charged].” Rec. vol. XIX,
at 14-15 (Sentencing Hr’g, dated Dec. 28, 2000). The government responded:
“No, it doesn’t, your Honor. It doesn’t.” Id. at 15.
The district court proceeded to question counsel regarding application of
the reduction, particularly inquiring as to pretrial statements and conduct. See,
e.g., Rec. vol. XIX, at 15-22 (Sentencing Hr’g, dated Dec. 28, 2000) (“What
pretrial statements and conduct would support the fact that acceptance of
responsibility is appropriate here?”); cf. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2 (specifically
directing that, where a defendant proceeds to trial, “a determination that [the]
defendant has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial
statements and conduct.”). The district court concluded: “So in looking at this, I
don’t believe this is a rare situation contemplated by the [G]uidelines where when
someone goes to trial with a duress defense . . . they’ve accepted responsibility
within the meaning of the [G]uidelines.” Rec. vol. XIX, at 22-23 (Sentencing
Hr’g, dated Dec. 28, 2000). The record provides ample evidence that the district
-11-
court understood the court’s power to grant the acceptance of responsibility
reduction in offense level, weighed the appropriate factors in considering exercise
of that discretion, and concluded, simply, and in proper exercise of the court’s
discretion, that, on the facts presented, Mr. Francis should not benefit from that
reduction. Cf. United States v. Urcino-Sotello, 269 F.3d 1195, 1196-97 (10th Cir.
2001) (concluding that a district court adequately recognized that court’s
complete discretion over a particular sentencing matter even where the district
court observed, incorrectly, “I believe that my discretion is very limited.”).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, we AFFIRM Mr. Francis’ conviction and
sentence.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
-12-