United States v. Tyler , 42 F. App'x 186 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 21 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
Nos. 00-6284, 00-6341
(D.C. No. CR-99-216-M)
CHRISTOPHER JAMES TYLER and
(W.D. Oklahoma)
DARRELL WAYNE COLLINS,
Defendant - Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and EBEL,
Circuit Judge.
Defendants-Appellants Christopher Tyler and Darrell Collins raise a
multitude of issues arising from their convictions and sentences for their part in a
cocaine distribution ring. The only error in the proceedings below stems from the
district court’s finding that Collins qualifies as a career offender, as the record
does not adequately establish the violent nature of the crime relied on as a
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
predicate offense by the district court. All of the remaining issues raised by Tyler
and Collins are without merit.
I. Bill of Particulars
Tyler challenges the district court’s denial of his motion for a bill of
particulars and argues that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair when the
Government changed its theory of the case during trial. He claims that the
Government’s key witness, Darrell James, testified that the drug transactions at
issue occurred at locations different from those alleged in discovery. Because of
this change, Tyler contends that he was unable to defend himself. “We review the
denial of a motion for a bill of particulars for abuse of discretion,” United States
v. Ivy, 83 F.3d 1266, 1281 (10th Cir. 1996), and will not disturb it “unless the
defendant shows that he was actually surprised at trial and thereby incurred
prejudice to his substantial rights.” United States v. Kunzman, 54 F.3d 1522,
1526 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In response to Tyler’s motion for a bill of particulars, the Government
referred to the materials already provided to Tyler through discovery, including
the FBI 302 evidence forms. Although Tyler failed to include those forms in the
record, he contends that one of the forms indicated that James had told the FBI
that he gave Tyler two ounces of crack cocaine on October 7, 1999, when “the
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two met riding horses.” Also, an FBI agent apparently testified before the grand
jury that James had told the agent that, after Tyler had used the telephone to order
crack cocaine at 5:53 p.m. on October 7, James delivered the drugs to Tyler later
that same evening. Based on this evidence, Tyler had constructed his defense to
show that he had not been riding horses on October 7.
At trial, however, James testified that the exchange of crack cocaine on
October 7 took place at “the center, Minnis Lakeview; it is a basketball
gymnasium in Spencer.” Tyler objected, and the prosecutor admitted that “I, for
the first time today have heard this. I am stuck with the witness’s answer, as
well.” Tyler requested: 1) that James be prohibited from testifying about the new
location and whatever events allegedly happened there; 2) that the Government
respond to the bill of particulars on this point, and for additional time; or 3) that
the court declare a mistrial. The district court instructed the jury to “disregard
any testimony of this witness pertaining to anything that happened at a Minnis
Lakeview location.” Because the district court granted Tyler’s requested relief, it
is unclear what ground he has for urging that the court abused its discretion.
According to Tyler, however, the unfair surprises continued, as James
testified that the transaction occurred “later on [October 7] or that next morning.”
And because the Government phrased its questions to James regarding location in
the most general terms – given that James was prohibited from testifying about
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the Minnis Lakeview location – Tyler argues that he could not defend against the
vague assertion that the transaction occurred somewhere within the Western
District of Oklahoma.
“The purpose of a bill of particulars is to inform the defendant of the
charge against him with sufficient precision to allow him to prepare his defense.”
Ivy, 83 F.3d at 1281 (internal quotation marks omitted). If “the indictment sets
forth the elements of the offense charged and sufficiently apprised the defendant
of the charges to enable him to prepare for trial,” a bill of particulars is not
necessary. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Significantly, a defendant “is
not entitled to notice of all of the evidence the government intends to produce, but
only the theory of the government’s case,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted),
for a bill of particulars “is not a discovery device.” United States v. Dunn, 841
F.2d 1026, 1029 (10th Cir. 1988).
Tyler does not argue that the vagueness of the indictment mandated a bill of
particulars. In any event, the indictment’s substance precludes such an argument,
as it charges a group of defendants with drug crimes, and includes several
allegations targeting Tyler specifically. The indictment:
• alleges that James provided cocaine to Tyler, and that Tyler re-distributed
the cocaine to customers;
• lists some of the customers’ names;
• lists several of the storage and distribution locations;
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• alleges that Tyler used a telephone in Choctaw, Oklahoma, to facilitate
drug distribution on October 7, 1999 at about 5:53 p.m., on October 26,
1999 at about 9:16 p.m., on November 2, 1999 at about 1:47 p.m., and on
November 16, 1999 at about 7:07 p.m.;
• alleges that Tyler possessed with intent to distribute two ounces of crack on
October 7, 1999, three ounces on October 27, 1999, and one ounce on
November 2, 1999, all in Choctaw, Oklahoma.
Tyler did not include his motion for a bill of particulars in the record, so we
have no way of knowing what additional information he requested. Nevertheless,
case law establishes that, in light of the information set forth in the indictment,
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. In United
States v. Barbieri, 614 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980), for example, the defendant
moved for a bill of particulars setting forth “[t]he specific event, facts, conduct,
or circumstances upon which the allegations in the indictment are based.” Id. at
719. This court upheld the district court’s denial of the motion, reasoning that,
because “[t]he indictment was sufficiently complete and precise to enable Barbieri
to prepare a defense and avoid prejudicial surprise at trial,” the motion “appears
to be an improper request for evidentiary detail.” Id.Similarly, in Wyatt v. United States, 388 F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1968), a
defendant charged with liquor law violations moved for a bill of particulars
setting forth “information as to whom the non-tax-paid whiskey was sold to, who
sold it to this person, and also where the whiskey was manufactured.” Id. at 397.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion, this court
held, because “the charges in the indictment set out the specific date, the specific
amount of non-tax-paid whiskey involved and that the event occurred on or about
a public street in Guthrie, Logan County.” Id. The failure to identify the
purchaser of the whiskey did not render “the indictment so vague” as to require a
bill of particulars. Id. Likewise, the indictment in this case identified the
quantity of drugs, the dates of the alleged offenses, and the general location of the
offenses. A bill of particulars was not required.
Tyler, however, is not simply arguing that the indictment’s deficiency
warranted a bill of particulars. Rather, he seems to claim that the surprise
testimony offered by James somehow renders erroneous the district court’s earlier
denial of the motion for a bill of particulars. However, the alleged change in
testimony did not go to a key allegation or to a central theory of the Government’s
case. James’s trial testimony that the October 7 drug transaction occurred at a
basketball court allegedly contradicted James’s earlier statement to the FBI that
the transaction occurred riding horses. It is true that Tyler did not have an
opportunity to refute directly James’s basketball court reference, but the district
court remedied that potential prejudice by instructing the jury not to consider the
reference. As for the fact that James’s abandonment of the “riding horses”
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allegation rendered Tyler’s planned defense to that allegation irrelevant, Tyler
could have attempted to take strategic advantage of James’s changing testimony.
The same analysis applies to the extent that James contradicted earlier
statements as to timing by testifying that the October 7 transaction occurred “later
on that day or that next morning.” The district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying the motion for a bill of particulars simply because the trial testimony
of a witness for the Government contradicted his earlier statements.
II. The Admission of Tape Recordings
Tyler vaguely objects to the district court’s ruling that certain tape
recordings offered by Tyler were inadmissible. The recordings were intended to
impeach James, but they apparently were no longer impeaching given the change
in James’s testimony. If the tapes were no longer impeaching – a fact Tyler does
not seem to dispute – then they were not admissible for impeachment purposes.
III. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Tyler argues that his right to a fair trial was violated by four types of
prosecutorial misconduct: improper leading questions, improperly shifting the
burden of proof, vouching for witnesses, and cumulative misconduct. We review
the district court’s denial of Tyler’s motion for a new trial based on prosecutorial
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misconduct for abuse of discretion. United States v. Maynard, 236 F.3d 601, 605
(10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1642 (2001).
A. Improper Leading Questions
According to Tyler, the prosecutor’s leading questions caused undue
prejudice to Tyler because the prosecutor “ended up, in essence, testifying,” and
the questions “enabled the witnesses to mold their testimony in exact accordance
with the government’s theory of the case.”
Appellate courts have shown “an almost total unwillingness to reverse for
infractions” of the rule against leading questions. United States v. DeFiore, 720
F.2d 757, 764 (2d Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
Federal Rule of Evidence 611(c) prohibits the use of leading questions on direct
examination of a witness “except as may be necessary to develop his testimony.”
This Rule vests broad discretion in trial courts. Accordingly, we reverse on the
basis of improper leading questions only if the judge’s action amounted to, or
contributed to, the denial of a fair trial.
Against this background, Tyler has failed to show that his trial was
rendered unfair by the Government’s leading questions. Tyler contends that the
direct examination of James was full of leading questions, and cites two questions
as especially prejudicial to Tyler’s defense:
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Q: Did [Tyler] talk to you about other people in fact coming in from out
of town?
....
Q: That crack cocaine that you were going to supply him would be for
the people that [Tyler] had coming in.
The court sustained Tyler’s objections to both questions, but Tyler claims that
James was already tipped off to link his supply to Tyler with Tyler’s subsequent
re-distribution to out-of-town customers.
The context of these questions shows that they caused Tyler little prejudice.
James knew that customers came from out of town, and it would not have
required a leading question for him to divulge that information. After the court
sustained Tyler’s leading objection, the Government asked where the customers
came from, and James identified another city where he thought at least one
customer came from. The previous leading question certainly did not provide
James with that specific information. The fact that a previous question was
improperly leading does not somehow taint all of the information independently
obtained through subsequent non-leading questions.
As for the question leading James to link his supply to Tyler with “the
people that [Tyler] had coming in,” there was already properly elicited testimony
suggesting as much. The following exchanges drew no objections from Tyler,
and occurred before the question at issue:
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Q: Did [Tyler] have some concerns that he voiced towards the end of the
conversation with regard to some of his people?
A: Yes, he was mentioning his buddies coming, that he had people
coming down here that he would like to be ready for.
....
Q: Based upon what [Tyler] told you about these people coming, did
you, at your end of the conversation, believe he needed crack
cocaine?
A: Yes, ma’am.
The question at issue did not add much to this testimony.
The frequency of other leading questions in the direct examination of
James, while perhaps indicative of less-than-exemplary examination skills, do not
appear too far out of the ordinary. The district court sustained Tyler’s objections
– Tyler claims that he made 18 such objections – and in several instances,
admonished the Government. Such actions cannot be considered an abuse of
discretion on the district court’s part.
Finally, Tyler claims that he was prejudiced by the Government’s comment
in the following exchange before the jury:
Q: In your debriefings, you were the one that has informed the
Government of these other transactions; is that correct?
[Objection, Leading]
A: Yes.
The Court: Ms. Maye, this witness does not need to be led.
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Q: Mr. Owens, have you told the Government about your other drug
transactions?
The Court: Why don’t you ask, “What have you told the
Government?”
Ms. Maye: We would be here all day.
The Court: Well, that’s all right; don’t ask leading questions.
Tyler then requested a bench conference, and expressed his concern that the
comment, “We would be here all day,” might suggest to the jury that the facts
contained in the leading questions are true and that the Government was simply
trying to save time. Tyler asked “that the jury be admonished that leading
questions are improper.” The court admonished the jury as requested. There is
no basis for concluding that Tyler’s right to a fair trial was violated.
B. Shifting the Burden of Proof
Tyler argues that the Government improperly shifted the burden of proof
with the following comment in closing arguments:
The only interpretation of that deuce – and it is uncontroverted – is that
it was two ounces of crack cocaine that then Darrell James delivered to
Chris Tyler. That came from Christopher Tyler’s mouth, not from a
snitch.
Tyler’s objection to the comment was sustained. He also contends that two other
comments shifted the burden of proof. First, the Government argued that “[t]here
is no evidence that [Tyler] used crack cocaine so anything and everything that he
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bought from Darrell James was resold.” Second, the Government argued that
“there is no evidence that [James] did not deliver that three ounces and put it in
the feed bucket for Chris Tyler.” Tyler did not object to these comments, but he
contends that they amount to plain error.
Because the Government, according to Tyler, changed its theory of the case
during trial, the only evidence available to refute the changed theory was Tyler’s
own testimony. By commenting on the “uncontroverted” evidence and the lack of
evidence, Tyler insists that the Government was improperly commenting on
Tyler’s failure to testify.
The test to determine whether a prosecutor’s remarks constitute an
impermissible comment on the accused’s failure to testify is “whether the
language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury
would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the
accused to testify.” United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1533 (10th Cir. 1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The reviewing court “must examine the
prosecutor’s remarks in the context of the entire record” to determine if they
constitute prejudicial error. Id.None of the three comments challenged by Tyler would lead the jury to
“naturally and necessarily” conclude that the Government was commenting on
Tyler’s failure to testify. The first comment – asserting that the interpretation of
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“deuce” as two ounces of crack was “uncontroverted” – is based on a tape
recording of a phone call between Tyler and James. Tyler was not the only person
who could have cast doubt on the Government’s interpretation – James could have
as well, whether on direct or through cross-examination. In any event, Tyler’s
objection was sustained, and the comment was rephrased. Second, the assertion
that there was “no evidence” that Tyler used cocaine personally could have come
from anyone who knew or observed Tyler, including James, and did not require an
admission from Tyler himself. Finally, evidence that the cocaine was not left in
the feed bucket could have been supplied by James on cross-examination, by other
participants in the drug scheme, or by other eyewitnesses. Whether or not Tyler
was the most logical person to refute all of the Government’s assertions does not
mean that the Government was commenting on his failure to testify by making the
assertions in the first place.
In any event, the district court instructed the jury that “[t]he fact that a
defendant did not testify must not be discussed or considered by the jury in any
way when deliberating and in arriving at your verdict,” and that “[n]o inference of
any kind may be drawn from the fact a defendant decided to exercise his privilege
under the Constitution and did not testify.” This cured any prejudice resulting
from the prosecutor’s comments.
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C. Improper Vouching
Tyler contends that the prosecutor committed plain error in his closing
argument by telling the jury that the Government’s witnesses: (1) had given
“truthful testimony”; (2) did not “lie”; and (3) were “credible and believable.” In
addition, in her second closing argument, the prosecutor argued that the witnesses
“have provided honest and truthful testimony of their drug dealing and they have
personal knowledge because they dealt with Darrell Collins and Christopher
Tyler.” Tyler objected to this final comment, but was overruled. According to
Tyler, these comments improperly vouch for the credibility of the Government’s
witnesses. “[V]ouching by an attorney as to the veracity of a witness is improper
conduct and an error which this court will carefully review.” United States v.
Swafford, 766 F.2d 426, 428 (10th Cir. 1985).
The Government was attempting to rebut Defendants’ arguments that the
Government’s witnesses were lying in order to benefit themselves. For example,
Collins’s counsel stated in his opening that “[t]he Government will rely primarily
on testimony of charged co-defendants who have cut a deal. Listen to their
testimony carefully and evaluate what is in it for them.” Tyler’s counsel cross-
examined James by focusing on the benefit he would receive from the
Government by gaining convictions through his testimony, and in his closing, he
focused on the self-serving nature of the witnesses’s testimony. One factor in
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determining whether improper vouching has occurred “is the extent to which the
witness’s credibility was attacked.” See, e.g., United States v. Rudberg, 122 F.3d
1199, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, attacking
the credibility of the Government’s witnesses was a focus of Defendants’ case.
Further, any vouching statements must be judged against the context of the
entire proceeding. In her closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that
“[y]ou saw [the witnesses] on stand. You can determine their honesty.” And the
court instructed the jury extensively on evaluating witnesses’ credibility, and told
them that “[y]ou, as jurors, are the sole and exclusive judges of the credibility of
each of the witnesses called to testify in this case and only you determine the
importance or the weight that their testimony deserves.” The jury was also
cautioned that the statements of the lawyers are not evidence. Even assuming that
the prosecutor’s statements were improper, these measures were sufficient to cure
any error. United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1144 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting
that “the prosecutor explicitly disclaimed any ability to vouch for witness
credibility, and the judge’s instructions to the jury cured any error”).
D. Cumulative Misconduct
We find meritless Tyler’s assertion that the prosecutor’s cumulative
misconduct entitles him to a new trial.
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IV. Admission of Title III Evidence
Both Tyler and Collins argue that the district court erred by denying their
motion to suppress certain Title III evidence – specifically, tape recorded
telephone conversations. Defendants contend that the Government’s failure to
provide them with copies of the court order and accompanying application
authorizing the recording more than ten days prior to trial requires suppression of
the recordings. On a review of a motion to suppress, the district court’s factual
findings will be accepted unless clearly erroneous, questions of law are reviewed
de novo, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. United States v. Edwards, 69 F.3d 419, 428 (10th Cir. 1995).
The statute at issue provides that:
The contents of any wire, oral, or electronic communication intercepted
pursuant to this chapter or evidence derived therefrom shall not be
received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding in a Federal or State court unless each party, not less
than ten days before the trial, hearing, or proceeding, has been
furnished with a copy of the court order, and accompanying application,
under which the interception was authorized or approved. This ten-day
period may be waived by the judge if he finds that it was not possible
to furnish the party with the above information ten days before the trial,
hearing, or proceeding and that the party will not be prejudiced by the
delay in receiving such information.
18 U.S.C. § 2518(9).
The purpose of the 10-day requirement “is to give the defendant an
opportunity to make a pretrial motion to suppress wiretap evidence.” United
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States v. Caro, 965 F.2d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1992). In order to justify the
reversal of a conviction, the violation of § 2518(9) must have caused the
defendant prejudice. United States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1154 (1st Cir.
1981).
In this case, the district court agreed with Defendants’ contention that the
Government had failed to comply with § 2518(9)’s 10-day requirement. On the
first day of trial, during the first witness’s direct examination, Defendants
objected to the introduction of the tape recordings. The court ruled that the
statute had been violated, and ordered a continuance of the trial to allow
Defendants to file a motion to suppress. The motion was ultimately denied, and
trial was resumed six weeks later.
Defendants contend that they were prejudiced simply by the fact that, at the
time their trial began, they had not been provided with the required materials
more than ten days previously. Defendants knew that wiretap evidence was going
to be used against them – they simply had not been given copies of the wiretap
application or the court order authorizing the wiretap. The district court stopped
the trial before any of the wiretap evidence was introduced and gave Defendants
more than ten days to file their motions to suppress based on the materials
disclosed by the Government. Trial did not resume until weeks later, when the
motions had been fully briefed and ruled upon. Defendants’ position would not
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only convert § 2518(9) into a strict liability statute, but it would mean that once
the provision is violated, the underlying evidence could never be used.
Defendants offer no legal support for such an interpretation, and we reject it.
In a cursory statement, Tyler also contends that the Title III intercepts from
Darrell James’s mobile phone should have been suppressed because the
Government failed to prove necessity. In its order denying the motion to
suppress, the district court devoted five pages to detailed findings as to why the
wiretaps were necessary. The district court’s analysis is more than sufficient,
especially given Tyler’s failure even to hint at how the court might have erred.
V. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Tyler argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal
because the evidence was insufficient to support Tyler’s convictions. After
reviewing the record in this case, we find this argument meritless.
VI. Right to Confront Witnesses
Tyler argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was
violated when the district court restricted his ability to cross-examine Darrell
James by precluding Tyler’s use of two tape recordings. Because Tyler failed to
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raise adequately this issue below, we review for plain error, and find that both
tapes were properly excluded.
VII. Government’s Use of Tyler’s “Mug Shot” and Admission of Cocaine
In its opening statement, the Government used a demonstrative chart
labeled “Organization Drug Flow Chart,” which included photos of the alleged
co-conspirators, including Tyler. Tyler objected to the chart’s use of the word
“drug,” and to the photographs, which he argued were “mug shots,” and thus
unduly prejudicial. The district court ordered the Government to cover the words
“Organization Drug Flow Chart,” but allowed use of the chart because it could
not determine whether the photos were mug shots, rather than simply “close-up
face shot[s].” Because Tyler did not include a copy of the chart in the record,
there is no reason to question the district court’s conclusion.
Tyler also objects to the admission of seized crack cocaine, contending that
it was “never connected to Tyler.” There is no dispute, however, that it was
seized from participants in the conspiracy during the course of the conspiracy.
Given that the Government established that Tyler was part of the conspiracy, he
has no ground to object to the evidence’s admission.
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VIII. Evidence of Previous Drug Activities
Collins contends that the district court abused its discretion under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 404(b) by allowing co-conspirator Herman Owens to
testify about the nature of his relationship with Collins in the years before the
period covered by the indictment. Specifically, the Government questioned
Owens about his past involvement with Collins in the distribution of drugs. After
Collins objected, the Government argued that the line of questioning “provides a
background and the basis for this witness to have the knowledge of the facts that
he is going to be testifying about,” and that, through discovery, Collins had notice
that these prior acts would be introduced. The court allowed the questioning, but
warned the Government not to “dwell on it.”
On appeal, the Government first contends that Collins waived this issue by
not objecting at trial in specific enough terms. The basis of Collins’s argument
on appeal is Rule 404(b), which allows evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts
where offered to establish proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
However, Collins objected to the line of questioning at trial on the grounds of
relevance and that “[a]ny probative value is extremely outweighed by prejudice.”
Because Collins did not invoke Rule 404(b) or otherwise refer to its substance,
the district court’s ruling is subject to plain error review. See Smith v. Atlantic
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Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1486 (10th Cir. 1987) (“[A] specific overruled
objection protects the record to the extent of the ground specified, but does not
avail the party of other grounds that could have been raised but were not.”). In
any event, whether the district court’s ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion
or plain error, Collins’s argument fails.
Collins focuses on determining whether the testimony was admissible under
Rule 404(b). That determination is governed by four factors: whether the
evidence is offered for a proper purpose; whether the evidence is relevant;
whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by the potential for unfair
prejudice; and whether the district court offered a limiting instruction.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 691-92 (1988).
First, it is not clear whether Rule 404(b) even applies to the line of
questioning at issue, for evidence “relevant to establish how the conspiracy came
about, how it was structured, and how each appellant became a member,” is “not
extrinsic to the conspiracy charged,” even if it predates the time period set forth
in the indictment. United States v. Lokey, 945 F.2d 825, 834 (5th Cir. 1991). See
also United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1372 n.5 (10th Cir. 1989)
(recognizing that Rule 404(b) is inapplicable where uncharged act is “is
inextricably intertwined with the charged crime such that a witness’ testimony
would have been confusing and incomplete without mention of the prior act”
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(internal quotation marks omitted)). The testimony at issue concerned how
Owens and Collins established their relationship and began to distribute drugs
together, which led to their involvement in the conspiracy charged in the
indictment.
Even if Rule 404(b) applies, the Rule is satisfied because the evidence “was
relevant for purposes other than to show criminal character; as permitted by Rule
404(b), it was relevant to show the formation of the conspiracy and its operating
procedures,” as well as “appellants’ knowledge of the conspiracy and their intent
to engage in the transactions listed in the time frame of the conspiracy.” Lokey,
945 F.2d at 835. Collins has offered no basis for concluding that the district
court abused its discretion in finding that the testimony’s probative value
outweighed its potential for unfair prejudice.
IX. Exclusion of Tyler’s Investigator From Defense Table
Tyler argues that he was unduly prejudiced by the district court’s refusal to
allow Tyler’s investigator to sit at the defense table during trial. The court
excluded the investigator because Tyler planned on calling him to testify. Federal
Rule of Evidence 615 provides:
At the request of a party the court shall order witnesses excluded so that
they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses, and it may make the
order of its own motion. This rule does not authorize exclusion of (1)
a party who is a natural person, or (2) an officer or employee of a party
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which is not a natural person designated as its representative by its
attorney, or (3) a person whose presence is shown by a party to be
essential to the presentation of the party’s cause, or (4) a person
authorized by statute to be present.
Tyler contends that the investigator was “essential to the presentation of Tyler’s
case” because he had worked with Tyler and the defense counsel in sorting
through the Government’s telephone recordings and could have helped with
impeachment efforts based on some of those recordings.
There is no basis for concluding that the district court abused its discretion
in determining that the danger of the investigator shaping his testimony based on
the testimony of other witnesses outweighed Tyler’s need to have the investigator
at the defense table. Presumably, the investigator would have helped identify the
potentially impeaching recordings prior to trial. There is no reason to doubt the
ability of Tyler’s counsel to utilize those recordings as needed during the trial.
X. Firearm Sentencing Enhancement
Tyler argues that the district court committed clear error by finding that “a
non working, old shot gun with missing parts found in the crawl space in the attic
qualified as an enhancement” under section 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.
The crawl space apparently adjoined the bedroom where Tyler stored drugs.
In applying the firearm enhancement, the “initial burden is on the
government to prove possession of the weapon by a preponderance of the
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evidence, which may be satisfied by showing mere proximity to the offense.”
United States v. Humphrey, 208 F.3d 1190, 1210 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The burden then shifts to the defendant to “prove that
it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the offense.” Id.At the sentencing hearing, the district court ruled that Tyler failed to carry
his burden of showing that the firearm enhancement was inappropriate:
[P]ursuant to Section 2D1.1 of the Guidelines, particularly Application
Note 3, which cites that this application should be applied unless it is
clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense, it
is certainly the Defendant’s burden to prove otherwise and the Court
finds that whether or not the shotgun was working is not known; that
there certainly is a sufficient nexus between where the marijuana was
found in the home and the location of the gun, even though the gun was
upstairs, behind a bedroom door, up in an attic, but that attic was
connected to a bedroom where the marijuana was found, both in that
bedroom and in the purse of Mrs. Tyler. The Court finds that this
enhancement certainly appears to be warranted.
Tyler insists that the enhancement is inappropriate in light of the example
offered by Note 3 of section 2D1.1, which provides that “[t]he adjustment should
be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the
weapon was connected with the offense. For example, the enhancement would
not be applied if the defendant, arrested at his residence, had an unloaded hunting
rifle in the closet.” According to Tyler, the facts of this case mirror the example
of the unloaded hunting rifle.
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Tyler overlooks the fact that his wife – who provided the only testimony on
the issue – stated that she did not know whether the shotgun worked or not.
There is no other evidence that the shotgun was unusable, nor is there any
indication that the shotgun was intended for recreational use (in contrast to the
hunting rifle referenced in the Guidelines’ example). And Tyler offers no
evidence to counter the district court’s conclusion that the shotgun’s location was
sufficiently connected to the bedroom where Tyler stored drugs. The district
court’s findings on this issue cannot be considered clearly erroneous. Humphrey,
208 F.3d at 1211 (applying clearly erroneous standard to factual findings
underlying firearm enhancement).
XI. Career Offender Sentencing Enhancement
Collins challenges the district court’s finding that he was a career offender
for purposes of sentencing. The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a defendant
shall be sentenced as a career offender if: “(1) [he] was at least eighteen years old
at the time he committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense
of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense; and (3) [he] has at least two prior felony convictions of either
a crime of violence or a controlled substances offense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
Collins contends that the third requirement was not met because his previous
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burglary conviction does not constitute a crime of violence. “Crime of violence”
is defined as an offense punishable by more than one year in prison that:
(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2.
The district court relied on a second-degree burglary conviction in
Oklahoma state court to classify Collins as a career offender. The only evidence
that the offense qualified as a violent crime came in the indictment, which alleged
that Collins broke into a person’s house. The district court found that Collins
“has a conviction for the burglary of a dwelling and that there is sufficient
information for this Court that has been made a part of this record to support the
enhancement for career offender status.”
Collins does not dispute that the indictment alleges a violent crime, but
argues that, in light of his subsequent plea bargain, the indictment is not evidence
that he was ultimately convicted for a violent crime. He contends that the
indictment charged him with both first- and second-degree burglary, but since he
ultimately pled guilty only to second-degree burglary, the indictment’s factual
allegations are irrelevant to determining the nature of the offense for which he
was convicted. He also argues that the statutory elements of second-degree
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burglary do not qualify as a violent crime. Collins thus contends that the
Government failed to carry its burden of proving the applicability of the career
offender provision.
“Whether a defendant was erroneously classified as a career offender is a
question of law subject to de novo review.” United States v. Bennett, 108 F.3d
1315, 1316 (10th Cir. 1997). The Government bears the burden of proving that
sentence increases are appropriate, and the career offender provisions are to be
interpreted narrowly. Id. “In determining whether a predicate offense qualifies
as a crime of violence, courts in this circuit are limited to examining the statutory
elements of the crime and the record of the prior proceeding.” Id. at 1317.
Collins rests his argument on Bennett, in which the court held that the fact
that a defendant was charged with first-degree burglary, which qualifies as a
violent crime, does not mean that he was convicted of a violent crime for
purposes of career offender status. The court observed that whether a defendant
“was charged with a crime of violence . . . is not dispositive for sentencing
purposes.” Id. Rather, the focus must be placed on the conduct that was the
subject of the conviction. Because, like Collins, the defendant in Bennett pled
guilty to second-degree burglary – not the first-degree burglary charged in the
indictment – the allegations of the indictment were of limited relevance unless the
indictment was amended to reflect the allegations to which the defendant pled
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guilty. See id. at 1317-18. The court observed that, because the record was
ambiguous as to whether the indictment was amended, and because the statutory
elements of second-degree burglary encompass non-violent forms of burglary, the
defendant should not have been sentenced as a career offender. See id. at 1319.
The Government does not dispute that the indictment charged Collins with
first-degree burglary, nor that Collins pled guilty to second-degree burglary.
Nevertheless, the Government insists that the indictment’s allegations are
sufficient to establish the offense’s violent nature. The Government does not
attempt to distinguish Bennett from this case, but simply looks to the Bennett
court’s statement that “charging papers” from the previous conviction could be
considered by a sentencing court in determining career offender status. Id. at
1317. Under this reasoning, according to the Government, the district court was
justified in looking to the first-degree burglary indictment in finding that Collins
was convicted of a violent crime. The Government is only partially correct – as a
general rule, courts can look to the indictment as evidence of a crime’s violent
nature. But the question here is whether the indictment is even relevant, as it
apparently set forth an offense (first-degree burglary) of which Collins was not
ultimately convicted. See United States v. Hill, 131 F.3d 1056, 1061 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (“[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty to a lesser included offense of the
offense charged in the indictment and the statutory definition of the lesser offense
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allows conviction for conduct that does not meet the definition of a ‘crime of
violence,’ the indictment alone does not provide a sufficient basis for designating
an offense a ‘crime of violence.’”). The Government implicitly concedes that
second-degree burglary is not necessarily a violent crime under Oklahoma law.
The Government has not carried its burden of proving that Collins qualifies
as a career offender. The underlying indictment was not included in the record,
so we have no way of determining whether the original or superseding
indictments alleged – as part of the second-degree burglary charge – that Collins
broke into a dwelling. If such an allegation was not included in the second-
degree charge, then there is no apparent basis for applying the enhancement to
Collins. We therefore vacate Collins’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
XII. Cumulative Error
Tyler argues that all of the errors discussed above cumulatively deprived
him of a fair trial. For the reasons noted above, we find this argument meritless.
CONCLUSION
We REMAND with instructions that the district court vacate the sentence
of Collins and resentence Collins consistent with this opinion. Collins’s and
Tyler’s convictions and Tyler’s sentence are AFFIRMED in all other respects.
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Collins’s Motion to Supplement Appellant’s Brief In Light of the United States
Supreme Court’s Decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey and Jones v. United States
is DENIED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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