United States v. Guerrero-Correa , 43 F. App'x 185 ( 2002 )


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  •                                                                            F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAY 8 2002
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.                                                    No. 01-4162
    (D.C. No. 00-CR-616-B)
    CARLOS GUERRERO-CORREA,                                (D. Utah)
    also known as Roberto Rojas-Flores,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT           *
    Before PORFILIO , ANDERSON, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Appellant was indicted for and pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry
    into the United States after deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    maximum sentence penalty under the statute is two years’ imprisonment.
    Subsection (b) of the statute increases the maximum possible penalty to twenty
    years’ imprisonment if the defendant was convicted of an aggravated felony
    before deportation.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). The district court sentenced
    appellant to eighty-four months’ imprisonment followed by three years of
    supervised release. This sentence included an enhancement based on a prior
    aggravated felony conviction.
    On appeal, appellant    1
    argues the maximum prison term to which he is
    subject is two years. He argues this limit is consistent with the maximum penalty
    contained in § 1326(a), which was the offense alleged in the indictment and the
    offense to which he pleaded guilty. His argument rests on the United States
    Supreme Court’s decision in       Apprendi v. New Jersey , 
    530 U.S. 466
    (2000).
    In Apprendi , the Court held “ [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction   ,
    any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
    maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
    
    Id. at 490
    (emphasis added). As appellant acknowledges, and as the language
    1
    Counsel for appellant filed a brief pursuant to    Anders v. California ,
    
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967), and appellant filed a     pro se response, in which he requests
    appointment of new counsel and an extension of time within which he may find
    new counsel.
    -2-
    quoted above makes clear, the      Apprendi rule is subject to an explicit exception
    for prior convictions.
    Appellant states he brings his appeal in part to preserve an argument for
    the Supreme Court. He has done so.        At this time, however, appellant’s   argument
    based on Apprendi is without merit.
    In his pro se notice of appeal, appellant asserts several additional
    arguments. First, he argues he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
    Ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral
    proceedings rather than on direct appeal.     See United States v. Galloway ,
    
    56 F.3d 1239
    , 1240 (10th Cir. 1995).
    Second, appellant argues the district court subjected him to double
    punishment in violation of the United States Constitution by imposing a sentence
    for the instant offense based on his prior aggravated felony conviction, for which
    he already served four years in prison. However, the sentencing guidelines
    require a judge to consider a prior conviction when calculating an offense level
    and a criminal history category.     See United States v. Florentino   , 
    922 F.2d 1443
    ,
    1447 (10th Cir. 1990).
    Third, appellant argues the current form of 8 U.S.C. § 1326 was enacted
    after his deportation in 1985, and therefore, he cannot be punished for re-entry
    after deportation. However, the event for which appellant was sentenced was his
    -3-
    re-entry, not his deportation, and his re-entry occurred after enactment of the
    current form of § 1326.
    The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah
    is AFFIRMED. Appellant’s     pro se requests for an extension of time and for
    appointment of counsel are DENIED.
    Entered for the Court
    John C. Porfilio
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-4162

Citation Numbers: 43 F. App'x 185

Judges: Porfilio, Anderson, Baldock

Filed Date: 5/8/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024