United States v. Barbieri , 49 F. App'x 824 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 22 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 02-3179
v. D.C. No. 98-CR-10060-01-JTM
(D. Kansas)
MICHAEL JAMES BARBIERI,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, LUCERO and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
In January of 1999, Defendant Michael J. Barbieri was sentenced to
eighteen months of confinement and two years of supervised release following his
conviction for one count of wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. (ROA I
at Doc. 20.) On June 5, 2000, defendant began his term of supervised release.
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be
cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
(ROA II at 2.) On May 13, 2002, a warrant was issued for his arrest alleging that
he had violated the conditions of that release. (ROA I at Doc. 23.)
At the revocation hearing held on May 22, 2002, defendant admitted to six
Grade C violations of his supervised release, including leaving the judicial district
without the permission of the court or his probation officer and lying to his
probation officer. (ROA II at 4-12.) For these violations, defendant could have
faced up to two years in prison. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The applicable
sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a), recommended three to nine months.
The district court sentenced defendant to 12 months (ROA II at 21), stating that
such a sentence would “provide some deterrence from subsequent behavior and
certainly, I think, Mr. Barbieri, will provide some punishment in a way that you
haven’t quite experienced in this case.” (ROA II at 14.) Defendant appealed.
(ROA I at Doc. 37.)
On appeal, defendant does not dispute that he violated the terms of his
supervised release. Rather, he contends that the district court, in making its
sentencing determination, wrongly relied on undisclosed evidence. His argument
is based on the following two comments made by the district court prior to its
sentencing of defendant:
I understand there’s a possibility of another investigation based on some of
the transfers that have been made. There’s information that’s not contained
in the violation report at the request of your family because they didn’t
want it being part of the record here. So, frankly, Mr. Barbieri, it’s my
-2-
intention, having considered the nature and circumstances of your
violations and the way that you have continued to operate virtually since
the time that you went on supervised advised release, to revoke you and to
incarcerate you for 12 months and after that time to release you with
absolutely no restrictions at all.
(ROA II at 13.)
Mr. Barbieri, to be perfectly candid with you, my primary concern is that
you kind of viewed this process as some challenge. I think Probation was
just lucky when it chanced upon some of the information that it got. I
mean, what I’m telling you–I’m not revoking you based on this thought, but
it certainly colors my thinking with respect to you. I just have this sense
that there were other financial transactions that Probation’s not aware of,
that I’m not aware of. I can’t use those, as I say, as a basis for your
disposition here, but you were around money long enough that I think you
know how to deal with it in ways that you’re not going to be detected very
easily. I am concerned, given some of the financial information that’s been
available, that maybe you’re drinking more than you ought to be. I’m
concerned that perhaps you have a gambling problem. I can’t explain some
of the things that appear in the report, but, again, those aren’t factors in
where we are today. They’re just things that are kind of ringing in the back
of my mind as I think about what to do with you.
(ROA II at 19.)
We review a district court’s decision to revoke supervised release for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Disney, 253 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.
2001). If the district court imposes a sentence that exceeds the applicable
Sentencing Guideline, “we will not reverse if it can be determined from the record
to have been reasoned and reasonable.” United States v. Hurst, 78 F.3d 482, 483
(10th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
-3-
We are troubled by the district court’s comments. The Supreme Court has
flatly stated that a defendant confronting the revocation of his probation has a
right to “written notice of the claimed violations of his probation” and “disclosure
of the evidence against him.” Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 612 (1985)
(emphasis added). It would be neither constitutional nor “reasoned and
reasonable” for a district court to rely on evidence outside the record when
terminating a defendant’s supervised release and resentencing him to
incarceration. If we believed that the district court did, in fact, base its decision
on such reasoning, we would vacate its decision and remand for resentencing. 1
After a careful review of the record, however, we are convinced that the
district court’s comments do not indicate that the court based its decision on
matters outside the record. The defendant admitted to six violations of the terms
of his supervised release; on that basis alone, it was “reasoned and reasonable”
for the court to impose the sentence that it did.
The court’s own statements bolster this conclusion. Before making the first
of its two questionable statements, the court said, “Having reviewed this report,
seen what your history is, Mr. Barbieri, I am not satisfied that you would not act
in exactly the same manner if I continue your supervised release for some very,
We do not here address whether such error could be harmless under
1
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), as the government failed to raise that
argument in its brief on appeal.
-4-
very lengthy period of time. I think it would be the same thing over and over
again.” (ROA II at 12-13.) Then, shortly after making that first questionable
statement, the court repeated its concern that defendant would not honor the terms
of supervised release: “You weren’t free, but you tended to act like you were. I
don’t have any reason to think that you would do otherwise in the future.” (Id. at
14.) These statements indicate that the court based its decision not on
undisclosed evidence, but on a legitimate concern–based on defendant’s confessed
six violations of his first release–that defendant would not honor the terms of
another supervised release.
When it made the second questionable statement regarding its belief that
the defendant might have violated more terms of his supervised release than his
probation officer was aware of, the court specifically noted that “I can’t use
those, as I say, as a basis for your disposition here” and “those aren’t factors in
where we are today.” That indicates that the court’s musings, although improper,
did not constitute the basis of its decision. Finally, after it made that statement
and while it delivered its final ruling, the court said that defendant had committed
enough violations to “show enough of a pattern to me to give me concern about
your ability to toe-the-line for any period of time should you be placed back on
supervised release. So, it is my intention still to put you in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons for 12 months.” (Id. at 20.) Again, we believe this statement
-5-
demonstrates that the court based its decision about defendant’s possible
recidivism on the uncontested six violations of his release, not on evidence
outside the record.
In conclusion, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion and
that its decision was “reasoned and reasonable.” We AFFIRM the decision of the
district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
-6-