Weibley v. Kaiser ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
NOV 6 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RUSSELL N. WEIBLEY, JR.,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 02-5063
v. D.C. No. 00-CV-789-K
(N.D. Oklahoma)
STEPHEN KAISER, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , LUCERO , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Pro se petitioner Russell Weibley, an Oklahoma state prisoner, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) to challenge
the district court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as time-
barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), and to challenge the district court’s denial of
his “Motion to Set Aside Order, Amend Findings and to Grant Relief from
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Judgment Entered Herein.” We conclude that petitioner has not demonstrated
extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling of the period of
limitation, and we deny a COA.
Weibley was convicted of First Degree Murder and received a life sentence
without the possibility of parole. He appealed his conviction to the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) and on July 8, 1998, the OCCA upheld his
conviction and sentence. Weibley filed a pro se petition for rehearing that was
denied by the OCCA on August 11, 1998. He attempted to file a “Motion to
Reconsider” but it was returned to him with an advisement that “the mandate
issued on 8-14-98, and it is a final order so I am returning your motion as I can
not file anything after the mandate.” (R. Doc.15 at Exhibit E.) Weibley did not
file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court.
Weibley filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the OCCA on
September 18, 1998, and by order dated October 2, 1998, the OCCA declined
jurisdiction over it because he had failed to file his petition in the appropriate
state district court. After his request for “case records” and “transcripts of
arraignment hearings” was denied by the state district court, Weibley filed a
petition for writ of mandamus in the OCCA. On April 27, 1999, the OCCA
declined jurisdiction.
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Weibley filed an application for post-conviction relief in state court on
August 30, 1999, which was denied on February 7, 2000. Over a month later, on
March 28, 2000, he appealed to the OCCA, but the OCCA dismissed the appeal
as untimely on April 27, 2000. Subsequently, the OCCA granted Weibley’s
request for a post-conviction appeal out of time, but affirmed the state district
court’s denial of post-conviction relief on July 31, 2000. Weibley filed his
federal habeas application on September 5, 2000. 1
The district court dismissed
his § 2254 petition as time-barred and denied his motion to set aside the order.
We may issue a COA only if an applicant “has made a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Meeting this
standard requires “a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable
jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should
have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were
‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.’” Slack v. McDaniel ,
529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle , 463 U.S. 880, 893
(1983)). We review the legal conclusions of a district court in a habeas
proceeding de novo. Martin v. Kaiser , 907 F.2d 931, 933 (10th Cir. 1990).
1
Weibley’s federal habeas application was received by the district court on
September 11, 2000, but pursuant to the ‘mailbox rule’ announced in Houston v.
Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988), a pro se prisoner’s papers are considered filed
when given to prison authorities for mailing to the appropriate court.
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Because Weibley filed his application for a COA pro se, we construe his petition
liberally. Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972) (per curiam).
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), prisoners generally have one year from the date on which their
convictions become final to petition for federal habeas corpus relief. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d)(1). A conviction becomes final “by the conclusion of direct review or
the expiration of the time for seeking such review.” § 2244(d)(1)(A). The one-
year period of limitation is tolled or suspended during the pendency of a state
application for post-conviction relief properly filed during the limitations period.
§ 2244(d)(2). Also, the one-year period is subject to equitable tolling in
extraordinary circumstances. Miller v. Marr , 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998).
For purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A), Weibley’s conviction became final at the
latest on November 10, 1998, ninety days after the OCCA denied his petition for
rehearing. See Locke v. Saffle , 237 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a conviction becomes final for habeas purposes when the ninety-day period
for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court has
expired); Sup. Ct. R. 13. 2
Absent tolling, Weibley’s application for habeas
2
Weibley argues that the three motions he filed between July 1998 and
October 1998 tolled the statute and that the relevant starting date for the one- year
period is January 2, 1999, which is ninety days after the OCCA refused
jurisdiction of his state habeas petition on October 2, 1998. This argument has no
(continued...)
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corpus had to be filed within one year, by November 10, 1999, in order to be
timely under AEDPA. Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), however, the limitations period
was tolled between August 30, 1999, when Weibley properly filed his state
application for post-conviction relief, and March 8, 2000, thirty days after
Weibley could have filed an appeal of the state court’s denial of his application.
See Gibson v. Klinger , 232 F.3d 799, 804 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
statute is tolled for the thirty days during which petitioner could have filed an
appeal of the state court’s denial of his application for post-conviction relief).
Thereupon the limitations period resumed running, but pursuant to § 2244(d)(2)
it was again tolled from May 8, 2000, when Weibley filed a request for an appeal
out of time, until July 31, 2000, when the OCCA affirmed the denial of his
application. Weibley thus had to file his petition by August 11, 2000, to meet the
one-year deadline imposed by § 2244. Because he failed to file his federal
habeas petition until September 5, 2000, absent equitable tolling his petition was
untimely.
2
(...continued)
merit, however, because there is nothing to toll before November 10, 1998. As
our citation to Locke v. Saffle, 237 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001), above,
makes clear, ninety days are tacked on from the date a petitioner can file for a
writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which in this case was
August 11, 1998.
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In his “Application for COA and Opening Brief,” Weibley argues that we
should “ignore the procedural bar that has been attached to this case” and remand
the case back to the federal district court. (Opening Br. at 2.) Because Weibley
is proceeding pro se, we liberally construe his arguments as a claim that the one-
year period of limitations should be equitably tolled. See Haines , 404 U.S. at520–21. Weibley’s arguments for equitable tolling boil down to the following:
(1) his attorney “jumped ship” on July 8, 1998, after the OCCA upheld his
conviction (Opening Br. at 10); (2) he was “continually denied” his legal records
and transcripts from December 9, 1999 to August 23, 2000 ( id. at 17); (3) he had
only limited access to a law library; (4) the OCCA “held control over the case”
after he failed to include an affidavit for in forma pauperis status and thus he was
ultimately prevented from filing an appeal in time ( id. at 24); and (5) he is
actually innocent of his crime of conviction.
His first argument—that his attorney “jumped ship”—fails because
Weibley merely expresses disenchantment with the fact that his attorney did not
represent him during his post-conviction appeals. Weibley’s “allegation” is
simply not an extraordinary circumstance that might warrant equitable tolling,
particularly because there is no federal constitutional right to counsel in collateral
proceedings. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987).
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Weibley’s second argument—that prison officials withheld his legal
materials—is better analyzed as an impediment under § 2244(d)(1)(B) (providing
that the limitations period commences on “the date on which the impediment to
filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing
by such state action .” (emphasis added)). Weibley’s claim is insufficient because
he does not allege specific facts that demonstrate how his alleged denial of these
materials impeded his ability to file a federal habeas petition. See also Miller ,
141 F.3d at 978 (rejecting § 2244(d)(1)(B) claim of impediment to legal materials
because of lack of specificity with regard to alleged lack of access).
His third argument—that he had insufficient library access—must also fail
because allegations regarding insufficient library access, standing alone, do not
warrant equitable tolling. See id. at 978 (finding that lack of access to case law
does not warrant equitable tolling).
Weibley’s fourth argument—that the OCCA maintained “control” over his
case and delayed his filing of an appeal—fails because we cannot fathom how
OCCA’s “control” of his post-conviction appeal might be an exceptional
circumstance warranting equitable tolling of the limitations period. Pursuant to
§ 2244(d)(2), a habeas petitioner is statutorily entitled to tolling of the limitations
period where he has “properly filed” an application for state post-conviction
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relief. It would be odd indeed if we were to equitably toll the limitations period
during the pendency of an improperly filed application—as Weibley asks us to do
here with respect to his improperly filed appeal to the OCCA. We decline
Weibley’s request in this regard. Moreover, we note that any delay was due
solely to Weibley’s own error. Cf. Gibson , 232 F.3d at 808 (“Equitable tolling
would be appropriate, for example . . . when an adversary’s conduct—or other
uncontrollable circumstances—prevents a prisoner from timely filing . . . .”).
Weibley’s final argument—that he is actually innocent—fails because he
does not make a colorable claim of actual innocence. Weibley makes only
conclusory allegations regarding his innocence and provides no analysis or
specific facts to warrant equitable tolling. See Schlup v. Delo , 513 U.S. 298, 324
(1995) (holding that a petitioner must support his allegations of innocence with
“new reliable evidence—whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence,
trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence—that was not
presented at trial”).
Weibley does not allege circumstances warranting equitable tolling, and we
conclude that his federal habeas petition is time-barred. Because reasonable
jurists could not debate whether his petition for habeas relief should have been
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resolved in a different manner, his application for a COA is DENIED , and this
matter is DISMISSED . 3
The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
3
Weibley’s “Request for Leave to Supplement the Appeal Brief and
Certificate of Appealability” is denied. He alleges that he has been isolated in a
segregation cell and was forced to handwrite his argument without the assistance
of a law library or legal personnel. However, Weibley does not explain how
additional time to supplement his brief would buttress his arguments regarding
tolling of the statute of limitations.
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