Paul v. Reid , 50 F. App'x 954 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 13 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ANTHONY PAUL,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 02-1122
D.C. No. 01-M-1620
ANTHONY REID and (D. Colorado)
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , HENRY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Anthony Paul, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests 1) a certificate of
appealability (a “COA”) to appeal the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas
petition and 2) authorization to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the
reasons stated below, we deny a COA, deny IFP status, and dismiss the appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Paul was convicted by the State of Colorado for the crimes of
intimidating a witness and child abuse resulting in injury. Mr. Paul, represented
by counsel, filed a direct appeal. On direct appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals
affirmed his convictions. Subsequently, the Colorado Supreme Court denied Mr.
Paul’s petition for a writ of certiorari.
Mr. Paul then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court in Colorado. In his habeas petition, Mr. Paul raised six primary claims:
(1) the jury instructions did not specify the victim of the
witness intimidation count;
(2) the trial court allowed the prosecution to amend the
information at trial;
(3) the trial court presented evidence of his bad
character;
(4) insufficient evidence supports his convictions;
(5) the prosecution committed several instances of
misconduct; and
(6) cumulative error infected his trial.
See Rec. vo1. 1, doc. 3 (Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed Aug. 17,
2001). Each of these claims had been presented in his direct appeal as an alleged
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state law violation, but not as an alleged error in violation of the United States
Constitution.
The district court denied the habeas petition, holding that “there is . . . a
failure to exhaust available remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1).”
Rec. vol. 1, doc. 17, at 2 (District Court Order, filed Feb. 6, 2002). The district
court also stated that “[e]ven if this court were to review this application on the
merits the application must be dismissed [for failure to satisfy the standard of 28
U.S.C. 2254(d)].” Id.II. DISCUSSION
For several reasons, we construe the district court’s ruling to be based
solely on failure-to-exhaust grounds, a procedural holding. First, the district
court’s statement that Mr. Paul did not satisfy the standards for habeas relief was
conditional. Further, the district court provided no analysis of the merits of Mr.
Paul’s claim and the government did not request that the district court reach the
merits. Finally, the district court made no finding on, nor has either party
submitted briefing on, whether Mr. Paul would be procedurally barred from
exhausting his claims in the Colorado courts. Compare Smallwood v. Gibson ,
191 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that “dismissal . . . for failure to
exhaust state remedies is not appropriate if the state court would now find the
claims procedurally barred”).
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Because the district court’s ruling was on procedural grounds, Mr. Paul
may obtain a COA only if he shows that “jurists of reason would find it debatable
[1] whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right”
and [2] “whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Applying that standard, Mr. Paul has not demonstrated that the correctness
of the district court’s procedural ruling is debatable among jurists of reason. As
a state prisoner bringing a federal habeas action, Mr. Paul shoulders the burden of
showing that he has exhausted all available remedies. See Miranda v. Cooper ,
967 F.2d 392, 398 (10th Cir. 1992). To satisfy this requirement, Mr. Paul must
show that he presented as federal constitutional issues “to the highest state court,
either by direct review of the conviction or in a postconviction attack,” those
issues that he raises in his federal habeas petition. Dever v. Kansas State
Penitentiary , 36 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1994). Because Mr. Paul never filed
for post-conviction relief in Colorado, the question is whether Mr. Paul satisfied
the state exhaustion requirements through his direct appeal. Mr. Paul need not
have invoked “talismanic language,” or have cited “book and verse of the federal
constitution,” but he must have on direct appeal presented the “substance” of each
of the federal constitutional claims raised in his federal habeas petition. Nichols
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v. Sullivan , 867 F.2d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Mr. Paul did not do so. On direct appeal, he did not present any of the
claims that he raised as violations of federal constitutional law, relying
exclusively on Colorado authority. Arguably, his two due process claims – the
cumulative error and insufficient evidence claims – were properly postured for
federal habeas review because although Mr. Paul on direct appeal briefed his
claims only by reference to Colorado law, the substance of Colorado’s due
process standard follows the federal standard. See Kogan v. People , 756 P.2d
945, 950 (1988) (applying federal constitutional standard to evaluate Colorado
due process claim). However, because the other four claims raised in Mr. Paul’s
state papers were not presented as claims of federal constitutional law or argued
under a standard that is identical or even extremely close to a federal standard, the
remaining claims are clearly not exhausted.
Thus, even assuming that Mr. Paul has exhausted certain of the issues
raised in his habeas petition, his petition is, at best, a “mixed petition” containing
both exhausted and unexhausted claims. Harris v. Champion , 48 F.3d 1127, 1131
n.3 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Rose v. Lundy , 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982)). A district
court generally “must,” as the district court in this case did, “dismiss habeas
petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims.” Harris , 48 F.3d at
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1131 (quoting Rose , 455 U.S. at 522). Mr. Paul therefore has not shown that
“jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in
its procedural ruling.” Slack , 529 U.S. at 484.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Paul’s request for a COA, DENY
the request to proceed IFP, and DISMISS the appeal. 1
Mr. Paul is reminded that
he must pay the $105.00 filing fee in full to the Clerk of the District Court for the
District of Colorado.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
Because the district court did not identify whether the dismissal of Mr.
1
Paul’s habeas petition was with prejudice or without prejudice, we construe the
dismissal to be without prejudice. See Demarest v. Price , 130 F.3d 922, 939
(10th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[g]enerally, when a habeas petitioner has failed to
exhaust his state court remedies, a federal court should dismiss the petition
without prejudice so that those remedies may be pursued.”).
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