Cole v. Townsend ( 2002 )


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  •                                                                          F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 10 2002
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    GARY ANTHONY COLE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    No. 02-1253
    v.                                                 D.C. No. 01-Z-2506
    (D. Colorado)
    MARY ANN TOWNSEND,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
    determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
    determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
    The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    This is an appeal of the denial of a prisoner civil rights complaint pursuant
    to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 
    403 U.S. 388
     (1971). Appellant alleges that Appellee Deputy Regional Commissioner
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    for Social Security made false statements and presented false documents as a
    witness in Appellant’s criminal case. Based on these allegations, Appellant
    claims violations of his First, Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and
    seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. The district court dismissed the
    complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim for which relief can be
    granted. The district court subsequently denied Appellant’s motion to reconsider.
    Appellant appealed both the dismissal of his case and the denial of his motion.
    We review the dismissal of the complaint de novo and the denial of the
    motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. See Hunt v. Uphoff, 
    199 F.3d 1220
    ,
    1223 (10th Cir. 1999); Committee for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 
    962 F.2d 1517
    , 1523 (10th Cir. 1992).
    Appellant’s success on the merits of this case would necessarily imply the
    invalidity of his criminal conviction. In Heck v. Humphrey, 
    512 U.S. 477
    , 486-87
    (1994), the United States Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages
    for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
    caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
    invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
    reversed on direct appeal,” or otherwise declared invalid, called into question by
    the issuance of a habeas writ, or expunged. Heck, 
    512 U.S. at 486-87
    .
    Appellant has failed to show that his conviction has been reversed or
    -2-
    declared invalid. He points to the fact that the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
    court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion. However, that decision merely
    sent the case back to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
    Texas for development of the record and a potential evidentiary hearing
    concerning Appellant’s competence and his claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel. See United States v. Cole, 
    135 F.3d 1410
     (5th Cir. 1997) (unpublished).
    Neither that decision nor any other has invalidated or reversed Appellant’s
    conviction. Appellant has, pursuant to Heck, failed to state a claim for which
    relief can be granted.
    Based on our conclusion that the dismissal was not in error, we further
    conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s
    motion to reconsider. During the pendency of this appeal, we received a letter
    from Appellant requesting that he be permitted to withdraw his appeal and refile
    it at a later date once he obtains counsel. Because we are simply affirming a
    dismissal without prejudice, our affirmance will not produce any further prejudice
    in bringing a subsequent action. We therefore DENY his request.
    AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-1253

Judges: Kelly, McKAY, MeKAY, Murphy

Filed Date: 12/10/2002

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024