Yarbrough v. Ray ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 9 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LARRY YARBROUGH,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 02-6125
v. D.C. No. CIV-01-1421-L
(W.D. Oklahoma)
CHARLES RAY, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner-Appellant Larry Yarbrough, a state inmate appearing pro se,
seeks an appeal from the dismissal of his habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as
time-barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). To appeal, Mr. Yarbrough must be
granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A).
Because the district court’s ruling was based upon procedural grounds, Mr.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Yarbrough must demonstrate “that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and
that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Mr. Yarbrough was convicted in Oklahoma state court of trafficking in
narcotics after former conviction of two or more felonies and was sentenced to
life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Mr. Yarbrough’s conviction was
affirmed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) on August 28,
1998. The first federal habeas petition was filed on May 11, 1999, and was
dismissed by the district court on November 30, 1999, for failure to exhaust as to
certain claims. An application for post-conviction relief to the Oklahoma state
courts was denied by the OCCA on September 8, 2000. A pro se motion to amend
the 1999 habeas petition and a “Motion to Resume Habeas Review” filed in
federal district court on October 2, 2000, were denied with the advice that Mr.
Yarbrough must file a new habeas petition. The most recent federal habeas
petition was then filed with assistance of counsel on September 10, 2001.
Adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge, the district court dismissed
the petition as time-barred under the one-year limitation provision of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d).
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Pursuant to AEDPA, a state prisoner generally has one year from the date
his conviction becomes final to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (“A 1-year period of limitation shall
apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”). The AEDPA one-year limitation
period is tolled during the time in which a “properly filed application for State
post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The one-year statute of limitations
may be equitably tolled, although only “when an inmate diligently pursues his
claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary
circumstances beyond his control.” Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th
Cir. 2000). Mr. Yarbrough has the burden of demonstrating that equitable tolling
should apply. See Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998).
Approximately 16 months–already four months longer than the one-year
AEDPA limitation–elapsed between the date Mr. Yarbrough’s conviction became
final (November 26, 1998, 90 days after the OCCA affirmed his conviction) and
his filing for post-conviction relief in Oklahoma state court (March 31, 2000).
The time between filing of Mr. Yarbrough’s first federal habeas petition and its
dismissal without prejudice (November 30, 1999) does not toll the AEDPA
limitation under the rule of Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181-82 (2001)
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(holding “an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application
for State post-conviction or other collateral review’ within the meaning of 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),” and that therefore the section does “not toll the limitation
period during the pendency of [a petitioner’s] first federal habeas petition.”).
Nonetheless, Mr. Yarbrough argues, in part, that “‘equitable tolling’ should
be allowed in individual cases where the effects” of the rule in Duncan are
“particularly unfair.” Aplt. Supp. Br. at 8. It is true that Duncan, while clarifying
that a federal petition is not tolled under § 2244(d)(2), did not address the
availability of equitable tolling under appropriate circumstances. See Duncan,
533 U.S. at 183 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[N]either the Court’s narrow holding
[in Duncan], nor anything in the text or legislative history of AEDPA, precludes a
federal court from deeming the limitations period tolled for such a petition as a
matter of equity.”). We agree with the district court that the lack of diligence in
this case, notwithstanding Mr. Yarbrough’s other arguments, precludes equitable
tolling. See Miller, 141 F.3d at 978. “[T]he principles of equitable tolling . . . do
not extend to what is at best a garden variety claim of excusable neglect.” Irwin
v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
Mr. Yarbrough also argues that the 2001 petition should relate back to or
amend the prior habeas petition. Aplt. Br. at 7. We have already considered and
rejected just such an argument. See Marsh, 223 F.3d at 1220 (“[A] habeas
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petition filed after a previous petition has been dismissed without prejudice for
failure to exhaust state remedies does not relate back to the earlier petition.”).
The 1999 petition was dismissed for failure to exhaust, and this subsequent
habeas petition may not be viewed as part of the 1999 petition. Given that this
petition was not filed until September 2001, the petition is time-barred.
Accordingly, we GRANT Mr. Yarborough’s motion to file a supplemental
brief, DENY a COA, and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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