Jones v. Barnhart ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 13 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MARVIN F. JONES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-6115
(D.C. No. CIV-00-1649-R)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (W.D. Okla.)
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and HARTZ ,
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Claimant Marvin Jones appeals from an order of the district court affirming
the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration denying disability
benefits. Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s decision, and because that decision was reached in accord with
relevant legal standards, we affirm.
Mr. Jones filed his application for disability insurance benefits in 1993,
alleging inability to work due to pain in his back, legs and right shoulder, carpal
tunnel syndrome in both hands, and vision and mental problems. That application
was denied initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing in 1994, an
administrative law judge (ALJ) found Mr. Jones was not entitled to benefits. In
1995, the Appeals Council granted a remand based on Mr. Jones’s submission of
new evidence of his disability.
Following a second administrative hearing in 1996, a new ALJ issued her
decision denying disability benefits to Mr. Jones. In that decision, the ALJ found
that Mr. Jones suffered from diabetes mellitus, degenerative disc disease, and
dysthymia and anxiety, secondary to a substance abuse disorder. The ALJ found
that Mr. Jones’s capacity to work was limited to light and medium jobs that require
only limited use of judgment, occasional and superficial contact with others, and
occasional stooping and crouching. The ALJ concluded that despite these
limitations, Mr. Jones was capable of performing his past relevant work as an
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automobile assembly worker and as a cleaner. Thus, the ALJ found that Mr. Jones
was not disabled at step four of the Commissioner’s five-step process for
determining disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). The burden of proving a
prima facie case of disability at steps one through four is borne by the claimant.
See Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 751 (10th Cir. 1988). The district court
affirmed the denial of benefits, and this appeal followed.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the relevant
findings are supported by substantial evidence in light of the entire record, and to
determine whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. Hargis
v. Sullivan , 945 F.2d 1482, 1486 (10th Cir. 1991). “Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Id. “Evidence is insubstantial if it is overwhelmingly contradicted
by other evidence.” O’Dell v. Shalala , 44 F.3d 855, 858 (10th Cir. 1994). In the
course of this review, we may “neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our
judgment for that of the [Commissioner].” Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991).
Although he has been represented by counsel at various times throughout
this proceeding, Mr. Jones is appealing this matter pro se. Due to his pro se
status, we have read Mr. Jones’s brief on appeal with tolerance, affording
Mr. Jones a great deal of leniency in articulating his arguments of error.
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Nevertheless, Mr. Jones’s obvious dissatisfaction with the outcome of his
administrative proceeding does not persuade us that the Commissioner erred in
making her determination. With the benefit of counsel, Mr. Jones raised a number
of claims before the district court, which were thoroughly reviewed and found
meritless. Our repetition of the legal and factual analysis of that court at this time
would be unproductive and superfluous.
We note only that Mr. Jones’s reliance on separate disability determinations
by the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Court and the Veteran’s Administration
as a basis for his social security claim is unhelpful to his appeal. Just as the
former determinations did not preclude Mr. Jones from attempting to obtain
disability benefits from the Commissioner, neither did they compel the
Commissioner to automatically grant those benefits. Simply put, the workers’
compensation and veterans administration proceedings are entirely different and
separate from a claim under the Social Security Act, with different parties,
different evidentiary standards, and different bodies of law governing their
outcomes. Compare Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 22 (schedule of disability compensation
under Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act), and 38 C.F.R. § 4 (Department of
Veterans Affairs schedule for rating disabilities), with 20 C.F.R. § 404, subpt. P
(social security regulations for determining disability and blindness). While
disability determinations by other agencies should be considered, see Baca v.
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Dep’t of Health & Human Services , 5 F.3d 476, 480 (10th Cir. 1993), they are not
binding on the Commissioner, s ee 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504.
We have carefully reviewed the appellate record and we agree with the
district court that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that although
limited, Mr. Jones is not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 1
Thus, for substantially the same reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation dated September 28, 2001, and the district court’s order dated
February 1, 2002, the judgment of that court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
1
This court received the administrative record on appeal on May 31, 2002.
We have reviewed appellee’s supplemental appendix and note that it is a
duplication of the record already on file. Therefore, appellee’s motion for leave
to file a supplemental appendix is denied.
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