Colorado Springs Fellowship v. Harper ( 2022 )


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  • Appellate Case: 21-1269     Document: 010110695792      Date Filed: 06/13/2022   Page: 1
    FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         June 13, 2022
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    COLORADO SPRINGS FELLOWSHIP
    CHURCH; DAVID A. ZIRPOLO; DAVID
    BANKS; CLINTON A. STEWART;
    DEMETRIUS K. HARPER,
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                                          No. 21-1269
    (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-02024-WJM-KMT)
    (D. Colo.)
    E. WILLIAMS; JASON HENDERSON;
    HUGH HIRWITZ, Acting Director,
    Federal Bureau of Prisons, in their official
    capacity, jointly and severally; JOHN
    OLIVER,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    _________________________________
    Before MATHESON, KELLY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Plaintiffs Colorado Springs Fellowship Church, David A. Zirpolo, David
    Banks, Clinton A. Stewart, and Demetrius K. Harper sued several officials of the
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    Appellate Case: 21-1269     Document: 010110695792        Date Filed: 06/13/2022       Page: 2
    Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) for alleged violations of their First Amendment
    rights and under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C.
    §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4. The district court dismissed all claims, and the Plaintiffs
    appeal. Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Plaintiffs Zirpolo, Banks, Stewart, and Harper (“Individual Plaintiffs”), all
    members of the church, were incarcerated at the Federal Prison Camp in Florence,
    Colorado. The church attempted to send DVD’s directly to the Individual Plaintiffs
    in violation of BOP policy. That policy prohibits sending personal property,
    including religious items, directly to inmates. As an accommodation, however, the
    policy allows religious organizations to send religious materials to the BOP, which
    then makes those materials available to all inmates.
    Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit alleging that by prohibiting the Individual Plaintiffs
    from keeping the DVD’s, BOP officials violated RFRA and Plaintiffs’ free exercise
    and free speech rights. They also asserted state-law claims under the Colorado
    Constitution. The church additionally asserted an Establishment Clause claim.
    Defendants filed dispositive motions, which the district court granted. The
    district court held the Individual Plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their claims as
    required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). As for the church’s claims, the district court
    dismissed its First Amendment and RFRA claims without prejudice, and its state-law
    claims with prejudice. The church then filed an amended complaint again asserting
    RFRA and First Amendment claims. The church’s supporting allegations were
    2
    Appellate Case: 21-1269    Document: 010110695792         Date Filed: 06/13/2022     Page: 3
    virtually identical to the previous iteration, except for the addition of two new
    defendants.
    Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint, and the district court
    granted the motion, this time with prejudice. On the church’s free exercise and free
    speech claims, both parties acknowledged that Turner v. Safley, 
    482 U.S. 78
     (1987),
    provided the applicable standard, which is that any restrictions be “reasonably related
    to legitimate penological interests,” 
    id. at 89
    . The district court held the church’s
    allegations did not satisfy Turner. The district court dismissed the church’s
    Establishment Clause claim because the church failed to plausibly allege that the
    BOP’s policy prevented the church from providing religious materials to inmates
    while allowing other religious groups to do so, as required by Cutter v. Wilkinson,
    
    544 U.S. 709
    , 723-24 (2005). This appeal followed. 1
    II. DISCUSSION
    On appeal, the church argues that the district court erred in applying the
    Turner standard to its free exercise and free speech claims. It asserts that Turner
    does not apply to claims brought by non-prisoners. But the church did not make this
    argument before the district court. Indeed, the briefing below confirmed that the
    church acknowledged Turner’s applicability to its free speech and free exercise
    claims. Aplees. App., vol. 2 at 465.
    1
    The district court also dismissed the church’s RFRA claim, which the church
    does not challenge on appeal.
    3
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    Because the church conceded Turner’s applicability to its free exercise and
    free speech claims before the district court, it cannot now claim on appeal that the
    district court erred in applying Turner. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 
    634 F.3d 1123
    , 1127 (10th Cir. 2011) (“If the theory was intentionally relinquished or
    abandoned in the district court, we usually deem it waived and refuse to consider
    it.”). We therefore consider the argument waived. 2
    The church also challenges the district court’s dismissal of its Establishment
    Clause claim, contending the district court incorrectly applied the Turner standard to
    their claim. The district court did no such thing. Instead, it applied the standard set
    forth in Cutter, 544 U.S at 723-24, which, as characterized by the district court,
    required the church to allege that the BOP’s policy “impermissibly prevented it from
    providing religious materials to inmates while allowing other religious groups to do
    so.” Aplees. App., vol. 2 at 515. The district court found the church failed to
    plausibly make such an allegation. The church did not challenge that conclusion in
    its opening brief but attempted to do so in its reply brief. We therefore consider it
    waived. See Star Fuel Marts, LLC v. Sam’s East, Inc., 
    362 F.3d 639
    , 647 (10th Cir.
    2004) (“Generally, arguments raised for the first time on appeal in an appellant’s
    reply brief are waived.”).
    2
    Even if the church had only forfeited the argument through neglect rather
    than an intentional waiver, “a newly raised legal theory . . . may form a basis for
    reversal only if the appellant can satisfy the elements of . . . plain error.” Id. at 1130
    (italics omitted). The church, however, made no effort to do so. See id. at 1131 (“the
    failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal—surely marks the end of
    the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court”).
    4
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    Finally, although the Individual Plaintiffs are ostensibly appellants in this
    matter, their briefing does not challenge or otherwise address the district court’s
    reason for dismissing their claims: that they failed to exhaust their administrative
    remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). We therefore summarily affirm the
    district court’s conclusion. Cf. Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 
    784 F.3d 1364
    , 1366
    (10th Cir. 2015) (explaining that appellant’s “first task” is “to explain what was
    wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision”).
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    5