Crawford v. State of Oklahoma , 56 F. App'x 877 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 22 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MANUAL CRAWFORD,
Petitioner - Appellant,
Nos. 02-6354 and 02-6371
v. D.C. No. CIV-02-831-C
(W.D. Oklahoma)
STATE OF OKLAHOMA,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before KELLY, BRISCOE, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Petitioner Manual Crawford, a state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate
of appealability (COA) to appeal the federal district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254habeas corpus petition. We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
In 1993, Crawford was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine after former
conviction of two or more felonies, and was sentenced to 90 years’ imprisonment. He did
not file a direct appeal but on June 30, 1995, he filed a request for post-conviction relief
in state court, seeking an appeal out of time. The state court denied relief on July 18,
1995, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed on August 15,
1998. Crawford filed a second application in state court on December 5, 1996, and a
third application in state court on February 12, 2002. Both applications were denied and
the OCCA affirmed.
Crawford filed his § 2254 petition on June 17, 2002, alleging he was denied his
right to appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court adopted the
magistrate’s findings and denied the petition as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
The district court found that no equitable tolling excused the untimeliness of the petition.
Where, as here, a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds
without reaching the underlying constitutional claims, a COA should issue if the
petitioner demonstrates “that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
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McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).
On April 24, 1996, Congress amended what had been “the long-standing prior
practice in habeas corpus litigation that gave a [state] prisoner virtually unlimited
amounts of time to file a habeas petition in federal court,” and “established a one-year
period of limitations for [federal] habeas petitions.” Hoggro v. Boone, 150 F.3d 1223,
1225 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)). By statute, the one-year period of
limitations generally begins running from “the date on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review.”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). For prisoners whose convictions became final prior to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) effective date (April 24,
1996), the limitations period commences on April 24, 1996, and expires one year later.
See Hoggro, 150 F.3d at 1225-26. Under the AEDPA, the one-year limitations period is
tolled while a defendant pursues state post-conviction relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),
and we have held that the one-year limitations period “may be subject to equitable
tolling.” Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). Equitable tolling of the
one-year statute of limitations is available only “in rare and exceptional circumstances.”
Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000).
Having carefully examined the record on appeal, we conclude the district court
was correct in finding the § 2254 petition was untimely. Crawford’s conviction became
final prior to the effective date of the AEDPA. However, his second state post-conviction
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application was filed on December 5, 1996, thus tolling the one-year limitations period
which had begun on April 24, 1996, until the OCCA affirmed the denial on April 11,
1997. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Easterwood v. Champion, 213 F.3d 1321, 1323-24
(10th Cir. 2000). Therefore, Crawford’s one-year period of limitations began running
again on April 12, 1997, and expired on August 29, 1997. Crawford did not file his
federal habeas petition until June 17, 2002, almost five years after the expiration of the
limitations period. Crawford asserts that the limitations period should be equitably tolled
based on his incompetency and lack of access to adequate library facilities and trained
law clerks. We find his assertions insufficient to warrant equitable tolling. Further, we
agree with the district court that Crawford has failed to demonstrate that he diligently
pursued his federal habeas claims, thereby preventing him from relying on any type of
equitable tolling theory. See Miller, 141 F.3d at 978 (noting equitable tolling applies only
when inmate diligently pursues claims).
The application for a COA is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED. The
mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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