United States v. Contreras-Castellanos , 56 F. App'x 904 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 18 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 02-8062
D.C. No. 01-CR-0131-08-J
ANGEL CONTRERAS- (D. Wyoming)
CASTELLANOS, also known as
Alonzo Martinez,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Angel Contreras-Castellanos appeals his conviction for conspiring to
possess with the intent to distribute in excess of 500 grams of methamphetamine
and cocaine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and 846, challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict. Upon review of the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient, and we therefore affirm his
conviction. 1
I. BACKGROUND
Because the parties are familiar with the relevant facts, we summarize them
only briefly, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government. See
United States v. Voss , 82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir. 1996). In April 2001,
law enforcement officials in Casper, Wyoming began using a confidential
informant to buy methamphetamine from individuals suspected of conspiring to
distribute the drug. At the time, Mr. Contreras-Castellanos was living in an
apartment there.
On April 5, 2001, Martin Jimenez-Oliva and Aurelio Topete-Plascencia met
with the confidential informant and offered to sell the informant one pound of
methamphetamine. The confidential informant ordered four ounces of
methamphetamine. Messrs. Oliva and Topete then drove to Mr. Contreras-
Castellanos’s apartment. Mr. Oliva entered the apartment, remained for fourteen
minutes, returned to a prearranged meeting place, and delivered four ounces of
methamphetamine to the confidential informant. Mr. Oliva supplied the informant
1
After examining the record and the parties’ briefs, this panel has
determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f).
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with a phone number for someone named “Angel” and stated that the informant
could obtain more methamphetamine from Angel if Mr. Oliva was unavailable. He
also told the informant that he could pay Angel for the four ounces that had just
been delivered. This sequence was repeated on April 13, 2001 and again on May
4, 2001: the informant ordered methamphetamine, Mr. Oliva or Mr. Topete
traveled to Mr. Contreras-Castellanos’s apartment, one of them entered the
apartment, and one of them then met with the informant and delivered
methamphetamine.
On August 19, 2001, an undercover agent from the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency (DEA) met with Mr. Oliva and Mr. Topete and ordered a half
pound of methamphetamine. Mr. Oliva and Mr. Topete drove to a trailer house to
which Mr. Contreras-Castellanos had moved. They entered the trailer, stayed for
nine minutes, and then delivered half a pound of methamphetamine to the
undercover DEA agent. On August 28, 2001, the undercover agent negotiated the
purchase of an additional two ounces of methamphetamine. Mr. Oliva and Mr.
Topete again drove to Mr. Contreras-Castellanos’s trailer, entered briefly, and
returned to the undercover agent with the requested amount of the drug.
At trial, Lorenzo Delgado (one of the individuals charged in the conspiracy)
testified about Mr. Contreras-Castellanos’s role in the distribution scheme. Mr.
Delgado testified that between March 2000 and the summer of 2001, he observed
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Mr. Contreras-Castellanos obtain one-half pound of methamphetamine from Mr.
Oliva on two occasions. Mr. Delgado also reported that he saw Mr. Contreras-
Castellanos obtain several ounces of methamphetamine from Mr. Contreras-
Castellanos’s brother and ten ounces of methamphetamine from Mr. Laurencio
Jimenez-Oliva. Additionally, Mr. Delgado stated that in August or September
2001, he observed Mr. Oliva deliver a half pound of methamphetamine to Mr.
Contreras-Castellanos at Mr. Delgado’s house. Finally, Mr. Delgado reported that,
on one occasion in the summer of 2001, he observed Mr. Contreras-Castellanos,
Mr. Topete, and two other men deliver cash to a methamphetamine source whom
he knew as “Negro.”
In addition to the conspiracy count, the government charged Mr. Contreras-
Castellanos with distribution of methamphetamine, a violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and unlawful entry after prior deportation,
a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2). Mr. Contreras-Castellanos pleaded guilty to
the § 1326(a)(2) violation. The jury acquitted him of the distribution charge but
convicted him of the conspiracy charge. The court sentenced him to 188 months’
imprisonment on the conspiracy count and twenty four months on the § 1326(a)(2)
count, to be served concurrently.
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II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Mr. Contreras-Castellanos challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the conspiracy conviction. He argues that one of the law
enforcement officers who conducted surveillance outside Mr. Contreras-
Castellanos’s apartment and trailer admitted that he never directly observed Mr.
Contreras-Castellanos to be present on the date of the charged transactions. Mr.
Contreras-Castellanos adds that the confidential informant testified at trial that the
informant never met him until the trial began. Mr. Contreras-Castellanos concedes
that Mr. Delgado testified that he was directly involved in obtaining and selling
methamphetamine. However, according to Mr. Contreras-Castellanos, “Mr.
Delgado is an admitted alcoholic who passed out numerous times from drinking
beer and an admitted liar.” Aplt’s Br. at 12.
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Mr. Contreras-Castellanos
faces a high hurdle: we must examine the record de novo, asking only whether the
evidence—both direct and circumstantial—together with the reasonable inferences
to be drawn therefrom and viewed in the light most favorable to the government,
permits a reasonable jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Voss , 82 F.3d at 1524-25. “Rather than examining the evidence in bits and pieces,
we evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence by considering the collective
inferences to be drawn from the evidence as a whole.” United State v. Wilson ,
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107 F.3d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations marks omitted). We may reverse
his conviction “only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Wacker , 72
F.3d 1453, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1995).
In order to convict Mr. Contreras-Castellanos of the conspiracy charge, the
government was required to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable
doubt: “(1) an agreement with another person to violate the law, (2) knowledge of
the essential objectives of the conspiracy, (3) knowing and voluntary involvement,
and (4) interdependence among the alleged conspirators.” United States v. Carter ,
130 F.3d 1432, 1439 (10th Cir. 1997). “Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
prove a conspiracy.” United States v. Pretty , 98 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir.
1996); see also United States v. Brown , 200 F.3d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1999)
(“Circumstantial evidence is often the strongest evidence of conspiracy.”).
Moreover, “[t]he defendant’s participation in or connection to the conspiracy need
only be slight, so long as sufficient evidence exists to establish the defendant’s
participation beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Johnston , 146 F.3d
785, 789 (10th Cir. 1998).
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the evidence from law
enforcement agents, the confidential informant, and Mr. Delgado is sufficient to
support Mr. Contreras-Castellanos’s conspiracy conviction. Even though the law
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enforcement agents did not directly observe him to be present during specific
transactions, the evidence noted by the government, including the repeated use of
his apartment and his trailer to accomplish the transactions, Mr. Oliva’s reference
to “Angel” (Mr. Contreras-Castellanos’s given name) as a person who could
obtain methamphetamine for the confidential informant, and Mr. Delgado’s direct
testimony as to Mr. Contreras-Castellanos’s role in the distribution scheme allows
a reasonable jury to find the elements of the conspiracy charge beyond a
reasonable doubt. Mr. Delgado’s alleged alcoholism and his possibly untruthful
statements about other matters need not preclude a reasonable juror’s believing his
testimony about Mr. Contreras-Castellanos’s conduct. See Tapia v. Tansy , 926
F.2d 1554, 1562 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Confused, self-contradicting testimony by a
drug addict does not make the witness’s testimony inherently incredible.”); see
also United States v. Martinez , 877 F.2d 1480, 1482 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that
impeachment of a witness as a drug addict or as having a history of emotional
problems is a question of credibility for the jury).
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III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we AFFIRM Mr. Contreras-Castellanos’s conviction for
conspiring to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), and 846.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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