Sanders v. Yeager , 57 F. App'x 381 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 3 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DOYLE MICHAEL SANDERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 01-7159
v. D.C. No. 01-CV-100-P
(E.D. Oklahoma)
HOUSTON YEAGER,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , EBEL , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Doyle Michael Sanders, proceeding pro se, appeals from the grant
of summary judgment in favor of defendant in this civil rights suit brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff, formerly a prisoner in the Hughes County, Oklahoma
jail, sued defendant Houston Yeager, Hughes County Sheriff, alleging that his
rights were violated by a lack of medical care, by interference with his mail, and
by the unsafe and unsanitary conditions of his confinement. On cross-motions for
summary judgment, the district court ruled in favor of defendant, denying
plaintiff’s motion without discussion.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the district court should not have granted
summary judgment for defendant because there are disputed issues of material
fact to be tried. He does not assert that his own motion for summary judgment
should have been granted.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard the district court applied under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). O’Toole v.
Northrop Grumman Corp. , 305 F.3d 1222, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002). A summary
judgment is warranted “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admission on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56(c). Because plaintiff appears pro se, his
-2-
pleadings must be read liberally. Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)
(per curiam).
The district court properly granted judgment to defendant on plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim alleging the delay and denial of medical care and we
affirm on that point for the reasons stated by the district court. The district court
also properly held that because plaintiff was transferred away from the Hughes
County jail, his claims for injunctive relief regarding his mail and the conditions
at the jail are moot.
The only question in this appeal is whether plaintiff has a surviving claim
for damages. In his complaint, plaintiff sought only injunctive relief. See R.,
doc. 1, at 6. He never formally sought to amend his complaint to add a claim for
damages. However, in his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff “request[s]
this court to grant his summary judgment as to Defendant[’]s liability for
damages.” Id. , doc. 24, at 1. In addition, the document labeled “affidavit” 1
attached to plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment states that he “seeks
compensation damages of $1,000 a day compensation [sic] for pain, agony and
degrading conditions he was and is forced to suffer” and “punitive damages
against Defendant in the amount of $200,000.” Id. , att. 1, at 3.
1
The document is neither sworn nor is plaintiff’s signature attested, so it is
not a proper affidavit. See United States v. Berisford , 750 F.2d 57, 58 (10th Cir.
1984) (per curiam).
-3-
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(f), “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do
substantial justice.” Thus, the caption on a pleading does not constrain the
court’s treatment of a pleading. N. Alamo Water Supply Corp. v. City of San
Juan, Tex. , 90 F.3d 910, 918 (5th Cir. 1996); Hamlin v. Warren , 664 F.2d 29, 30
(4th Cir. 1981). Our question is therefore whether the district court should have
given the plaintiff an opportunity to amend his complaint to add claims for
compensatory and punitive damages before entering summary judgment against
him.
We believe the court should have done so. Plaintiff prayed for relief in the
form of a judgment against defendant for damages, and identified both the kind
and amount of damages he sought. See R., doc. 24, at 1, att. 1, at 3. The court, in
responding to these summary judgment orders, had to consider all the record
before it, and thus was on notice of the plaintiff’s intention to seek damages. The
lack of a formal motion is not sufficient ground for the district court to grant
summary judgment without leave to amend, since plaintiff here made clear his
willingness to amend. Reynoldson v. Shillinger , 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir.
1990). Our holding in this regard is consistent with the majority of the other
circuit courts. See e.g. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 109 & n.9
(3d Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court should have informed pro se
plaintiff of his right to amend after defendant filed motion to dismiss).
-4-
Under Rule 15(a), a party may amend his complaint once as a matter of
course before the defendant files a responsive pleading, and may amend his
complaint with the court’s permission after that. Even where the court’s
permission is required, leave to amend “shall be freely given when justice so
requires.” Id. And, the court should ordinarily allow amendment if, by doing so,
plaintiff can cure the defect. See Curley v. Perry , 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied , 122 S. Ct. 274 (2001); Reynoldson v. Shillinger , 907 F.2d 124,
126 (10th Cir. 1990); Triplett v. LeFlore County, Okla. , 712 F.2d 444, 446 (10th
Cir. 1983). Thus, we first must determine whether plaintiff’s allegations are
sufficient to state a claim for compensatory or punitive damages.
We conclude that plaintiff’s allegations, as a whole, suggest that he likely
will be able to plead a claim for compensatory damages and punitive damages if
given a chance to file an amended complaint. Under the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, “[n]o Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail,
prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while
in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); see
Searles v. Van Bebber , 251 F.3d 869, 875-77 (10th Cir. 2001), cert. denied , 122
S. Ct. 2356 (2002). However, “punitive damages may be recovered for
constitutional violations without a showing of compensable injury.” Searles , 251
F.3d at 880. To obtain punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must
-5-
show that defendant’s conduct was “‘motivated by evil motive or intent, or . . .
involve[d] reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of
others.’ Whether the evidence was sufficient is a question of law which we
review de novo .” Id. at 879 (quoting Smith v. Wade , 461 U.S. 30, 56 (1983)).
Plaintiff asserted in his opposition to defendant’s motion for summary
judgment that he was physically injured when he slipped in a pool of water on the
floor. See R., doc. 23, at 2. Plaintiff also asserts that defendant allows “sewage
from [the] toilet leaving a constant pool of stinking water in the floor,” id. , doc.
1, at 7, keeps plaintiff locked up twenty-four hours a day without sunshine,
television, radio, newspapers, magazines, a commissary, or use of the telephone,
see id. at 2, and intercepts and opens plaintiff’s legal mail, see id. at 3, 7.
We remand for the district court to allow plaintiff the opportunity to amend
his complaint to add claims for compensatory and punitive damages. The
judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and the case is REMANDED for
further proceedings. Plaintiff is reminded that he remains obligated to continue
making payments toward the appellate filing fee until it is paid in full. The
mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
-6-
01-7159, Sanders v. Yeager
O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.
I agree that, for the reasons clearly stated by the district court, summary
judgment was properly entered against Mr. Sanders on his claims for delay and
denial of medical care and his claims for injunctive relief. I also agree the only
remaining question is whether he has surviving claims for damages. Unlike the
majority, I would demand that to pass muster his claims need be clearly stated or
at least readily ascertainable, based upon sound legal theory, and supported by the
record. In his complaint he asked only for injunctive relief and he never sought,
directly or in any other reasonably identifiable way, to amend his complaint to
add damage claims. Understandably the district court concluded: “A review of
the record indicates plaintiff is seeking only injunctive relief in this action and
has requested no compensatory or punitive damages.”
Accommodating him too much, the majority points, selectively, to part of
his motion for summary judgment as providing sufficient notice of his true, but
late blooming and imprecise, causes of action. Troubling is that his motion for
summary judgment, here produced less selectively, “request[s] this court to grant
his summary judgment as to Defendant[’]s liability for damages alledging [sic]
illegal and unlawfull [sic]; (1) opening of legal mail, delaying and detaining mail.
(2) Unsafe and unsainitary [sic] Housing (3) Lack of Medical care. (4) See
Plaintiffs brief and affidavit in support.” Those issues were all, properly by our
review, resolved against him. It is difficult to hang much more on those bare
bones. But, because an “affidavit” attached to Mr. Sanders’ motion (which the
majority concedes was improper (majority opinion, p. 3 n.1)) states that he “seeks
compensation damages of $1,000 a day compensation [sic] for pain, agony and
degrading conditions he was and is forced to suffer” and “punitive damages
against Defendant in the amount of $200,000,” the majority concludes the district
court was “on notice” of his “intention to seek damages.” Majority opinion, pp.
3-4. That simple conclusion imposes much upon the trial judge. Apparently
being “on notice” requires him to comb the record, supply legal theories
supporting Mr. Sanders’ “intention to seek damages,” justify those theories under
existing law and, accordingly, deny the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment. That expectation, effectively and improperly, makes the trial judge an
advocate. An example is revealing.
Mr. Sanders complains vociferously and generally about the living
conditions and accommodations in the jail, but his complaints focus on alleged
failure to provide timely and adequate medical care. It is in his “affidavit” with
its litany of complaints about medical care that he requests actual and punitive
damages. Since the district court disposed of the medical care issues contrary to
his position, and correctly by our lights, I am hard pressed to understand how
those same complaints can be construed to state a more generalized and undefined
-2-
claim for damages. In addition to medical complaints the “affidavit” states Mr.
Sanders was injured in two falls: one in the drunk tank in 2000 and one in the
day room in 2001. The treatment he received for those falls was within
constitutional norms. Nevertheless, recognizing Mr. Sanders’ need to show
physical injury as a predicate to any claim of mental and emotional injury, the
majority stretches to supply it stating that he asserted physical injury “when he
slipped in a pool of water on the floor” and implying that the falls are somehow
coupled with his allegations that a leaking toilet left a pool of “stinking water” in
the “underground dungeon where [he] . . . was being held.” R., doc. 1 at 3. The
reasonable inference is the opposite. There is no reason to assume that the water
problem in his cell had anything to do with his falls in the drunk tank or the day
room; certainly he has not identified the link. The district court ought not be
burdened with the task of sorting out ill defined theories from undifferentiated
factual allegations and complaints.
Neither plaintiff’s summary judgment motion nor the “affidavit” attached to
it were effective to amend the complaint. Neither document contains language
that could be construed to request leave to amend the complaint to add a claim for
damages. Rather, in each document, plaintiff asserts claims for damages that he
did not raise in his complaint. Even on appeal, plaintiff does not argue that he
amended the complaint or attempted to do so. Rather, he asserts that he raised his
-3-
claim for damages in the settlement conference. There is nothing in the record to
confirm this assertion.
“Although we construe [plaintiff’s] pleadings liberally because he is a pro
se litigant, he nevertheless must follow the same rules of procedure that govern
other litigants.” Green v. Dorrell , 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992). Under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) and 15(a), plaintiff was obligated to seek leave to amend
his complaint, if he wished to add claims for damages, supply relevant factual
allegations and identify a sound legal basis (but without the precision expected of
an attorney) justifying the relief sought. For the sake of clarity and regularity in
the proceedings and despite the fact that plaintiff is pro se, we may not read into
his summary judgment pleadings a request for leave to amend his complaint and
we ought not consider his improper “affidavit.” See Grayson v. Mayview State
Hosp. , 293 F.3d 103, 109 n.9 (3d Cir. 2002). Because he did not amend, either
explicitly or by reasonable inference, he does not have a claim for either
compensatory or punitive damages, and none of his claims survive the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant.
-4-