United States v. Williams ( 2022 )


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  • Appellate Case: 21-3157     Document: 010110701210       Date Filed: 06/24/2022   Page: 1
    FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            June 24, 2022
    _______________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    No. 21-3157
    v.                                          (D.C. No. 2:14-CR-20030-KHV-3)
    (D. Kan.)
    ALLEN J. WILLIAMS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    _______________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    ________________________________________
    Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.
    ________________________________________
    This appeal involves interpretation of a district court’s explanation
    of the length of supervised release. The written judgment itself is clear.
    But the defendant argues that this written judgment conflicts with the
    district court’s oral pronouncement at sentencing.
    *
    Oral argument would not help us decide the appeal, so we have
    decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. See Fed. R.
    App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
    Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
    under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
    But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
    otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
    Appellate Case: 21-3157   Document: 010110701210   Date Filed: 06/24/2022   Page: 2
    If the defendant is right, the oral pronouncement would control. So
    the defendant moved for the district court to make a clerical correction to
    the written judgment. The district court denied the motion for clerical
    correction, viewing the oral pronouncement as ambiguous (rather than
    inconsistent with the written judgment). We agree with the district court.
    1.    The court was orally clear on its intent, but was unclear on how
    to carry out that intent.
    The confusion stemmed from dual proceedings against the defendant
    in the Western District of Missouri and the District of Kansas. The
    Western District of Missouri imposed a prison sentence and supervised
    release for three years.
    The defendant was then sentenced in the District of Kansas. That
    sentence included prison terms and supervised release for two counts. The
    court explained that it intended for the defendant to serve a total of six
    years on supervised release, including the three years imposed in the
    Western District of Missouri.
    At the sentencing, the court in the District of Kansas discussed two
    ways of getting to a total of six years. The court first proposed a term
    that’d run consecutively to the term imposed in the Western District of
    Missouri. But the court then changed the breakdown, stating that the new
    term of supervised release would run concurrently with the Western
    District of Missouri’s three-year term. Both ways, the defendant would
    2
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    serve a total of six years on supervised release, including the terms
    imposed in the two courts. At the end of the proceeding, however, the court
    suggested that it could adhere to the initial proposal. That suggestion
    sparked confusion.
    The court’s initial proposal was to make the supervised release terms
    in Kansas consecutive to the term imposed in the Western District of
    Missouri. Because the Western District of Missouri had imposed a three-
    year term of supervised release, the District of Kansas would impose a
    total of three years’ supervised release. So the district court initially
    proposed three years’ supervised release on each of the two counts (to run
    concurrently with each other and consecutively to the three-year term
    imposed in the Western District of Missouri). This way, the defendant
    would serve three years of supervised release in the Western District of
    Missouri and three years of supervised release in the District of Kansas.
    In imposing the sentence, however, the district court decided to
    change the breakdown for the six years of supervised release. This time,
    the court said that it would run the supervised release term concurrently,
    rather than consecutively, with the supervised release term imposed in the
    Western District of Missouri. Because the defendant was already serving
    three years’ supervised release in the Western District of Missouri, the
    court would need to impose a total of three more years. The court would
    get to the three-year total by imposing two terms of supervised release,
    3
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    with both running concurrently with the Western District of Missouri’s
    three-year term. For the first count, the term would be five years; for the
    second count, the term would be one year. So after completing the Western
    District of Missouri’s three-year term, the defendant would again serve
    three more years in the District of Kansas.
    At the end of the sentencing, however, the court broached the
    possibility of returning to the initial proposal of a three-year term that runs
    consecutively to the Western District of Missouri’s three-year term: “[O]r
    we could say three years on each count, but neither one of them starts to
    run until he’s off oof supervision in the Western District of Missouri.” 1
    The court reiterated, though, that its intent was for the defendant to serve a
    total of six years, including the Western District of Missouri’s three-year
    term. 2
    2.    The written judgment implemented the second way of getting to a
    six-year total.
    Despite broaching the possibility of returning to the initial proposal,
    the district court issued a written judgment implementing the second way
    to obtain a six-year total of supervised release:
    Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on
    supervised release for a term of five years on Count 1, and one
    year on Count 2, to be served consecutively to Count 1. This term
    1
    R. vol. 4, at 22.
    2
    Id.
    4
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    of supervised release shall run concurrently with the supervised
    release term previously imposed in the Western District of
    Missouri. 3
    So for the first count, the defendant received a five-year term of supervised
    release. For the second count, the defendant received another one-year
    term of supervised release, to run consecutively to the five-year term on
    the first count. The total (six years) in the District of Kansas would run
    concurrently with the three-year term in the Western District of Missouri.
    The result was a total of six years of supervised release in the two
    districts.
    3.    The defendant invoked the power to make clerical corrections to
    the judgment.
    The defendant sought clerical correction under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36,
    which allows the court to correct clerical errors in the judgment. 4 Invoking
    this rule, the defendant argued that the written judgment had improperly
    changed the terms of the sentence. The district court denied the motion,
    reasoning that
          the oral explanation had been ambiguous and
          the written judgment accurately reflected the sentence imposed.
    3
    Id. vol. 1, at 66.
    4
    United States v. Blackwell, 
    81 F.3d 945
    , 948–49 (10th Cir. 1996).
    5
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    4.    We need not decide the standard of review.
    The threshold issue is the standard of review. We’ve not issued a
    published opinion stating the standard for review of motions for clerical
    correction. Other circuits differ on whether to apply the de novo standard,
    the abuse-of-discretion standard, or the clear-error standard. 5 We need not
    decide the applicable standard of review because we’d affirm under any of
    these standards.
    5.    An ambiguity existed in the oral pronouncement.
    When orally explaining the sentence, the court made it clear that it
    was intending to require six years of supervised release between the two
    5
    Compare United States v. Vanderhorst, 
    927 F.3d 824
    , 826 (4th Cir.
    2019) (legal issue reviewed de novo), United States v. Mackay, 
    757 F.3d 195
    , 197 (5th Cir. 2014) (de novo review), United States v. Robinson, 
    368 F.3d 653
    , 655–56 (6th Cir. 2004) (reviewing de novo the district court’s
    legal conclusion that a clerical error existed), United States v. Portillo,
    
    363 F.3d 1161
    , 1164 (11th Cir. 2004) (conducting de novo review of the
    district court’s application of Rule 36 to correct clerical errors in its
    judgment), and United States v. Burd, 
    86 F.3d 285
    , 287 (2d Cir. 1996)
    (reviewing de novo the district court’s application of Rule 36 to undisputed
    facts), with United States v. Bergmann, 
    836 F.2d 1220
    , 1221 (9th Cir.
    1988) (applying the clear-error standard to determine whether the clerk had
    erred in describing the sentence and applying de novo review over legal
    questions), with United States v. Niemiec, 
    689 F.2d 688
    , 692 (7th Cir.
    1982) (applying the abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing the
    denial of a motion for clerical correction), and United States v. Martinez,
    
    613 F.2d 473
    , 482 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that the district court had
    discretion under Rule 36 to correct the clerk’s clerical error in cancelling a
    bond).
    6
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    districts. 6 To reach the six-year total, however, the court voiced two
    different sets of terms. The first set involved a term of supervised release
    that would run consecutively to the term already imposed in the Western
    District of Missouri; the second set involved a term of supervised release
    that would run concurrently with the Western District of Missouri’s term.
    Though the two sets created the same duration of supervised release (six
    years), the breakdown differed in the district court’s two articulations at
    the sentencing.
    Though the defendant denies ambiguity, he relies solely on the
    court’s initial proposal. This proposal was clear, but the court later
    changed the breakdown of the supervised release terms in imposing his
    sentence:
    The Court: Earlier I said three years, but I think the way we’ll
    do it is to say six years. The first five years of that will run
    concurrently with the supervised release that the western District
    of Missouri has imposed and the -- and there will be one
    additional year that will be served concurrently to that process.
    So the overall term of supervised release – wait.
    [Defense counsel]: Consecutively you meant on that last year.
    The Court: Yes or we could say three years on each count, but
    neither one of them starts to run until he’s off of supervision in
    the Western District of Missouri. But the intent is that he would
    be on supervised release for six years between us and them. 7
    6
    R. vol. 4, at 22 (“But the intent is that he would be on supervised
    release for six years between us and them.”).
    7
    
    Id.
    7
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    From this exchange, the district court unambiguously intended to require
    six years of supervised release between the terms in the Western District of
    Missouri and the District of Kansas.
    After making this unambiguous change, however, the court broached
    the possibility of returning to the initial proposal, stating that “we could
    say” that there would be two terms of three years. 8 This remark created
    ambiguity on whether the terms would be 3 years/3 years or 5 years/1 year.
    Given that ambiguity, the court could use the written judgment to clarify
    the intended sentence. 9
    6.    The defendant hasn’t preserved a challenge to the validity of
    the supervised release terms.
    The defendant argues that the sentencing guidelines prevented the
    District of Kansas from imposing consecutive five-year and one-year terms
    of supervised release on the two Kansas counts. The government agrees
    that the court erred in making the supervised release terms consecutive for
    the two counts. But the error does not entitle the defendant to relief for
    two reasons: (1) He forfeited the argument by omitting it in the motion
    8
    
    Id.
    9
    United States v. Villano, 
    816 F.2d 1448
    , 1450–51 (10th Cir.
    1987).
    8
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    filed in district court, 10 and (2) he does not argue that the illegality would
    have removed the ambiguity. 11
    * * *
    The district court’s oral pronouncement contained an ambiguity by
    discussing two different ways of sentencing the defendant to supervised
    release. Given this ambiguity, the court used the written judgment to
    clarify the terms. This use of the written judgment was appropriate, so we
    affirm.
    Entered for the Court
    Robert E. Bacharach
    Circuit Judge
    10
    The defendant does not argue that the district court committed plain
    error in denying his motion for clerical correction. So we do not consider
    the possibility of a plain error. See United States v. Garcia, 
    936 F.3d 1128
    ,
    1131 (10th Cir. 2018) (stating that arguments not raised before the district
    court are forfeited and that the failure to urge plain error would waive the
    issue).
    11
    The government argues that the defendant cannot obtain relief under
    other provisions, including 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    , 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(1)(B),
    or Fed. R. Crim. P. 35. We need not decide whether the defendant has other
    available remedies because he hasn’t asserted them here. We are reviewing
    a motion for clerical correction of the judgment, not a motion under
    § 2255, § 3582(c)(1)(B), or Rule 35.
    9