Yzaguirre v. Barnhart , 58 F. App'x 460 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 27 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JIMMY YZAGUIRRE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 02-6024
(D.C. No. CIV-01-444-R)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (W.D. Oklahoma)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN and PORFILIO , Circuit Judges, and KANE , ** Senior District
Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable John L. Kane, Senior District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Claimant Jimmy Yzaguirre appeals the district court’s affirmance of the
decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying his application for
disability benefits. Because it appears the administrative law judge (ALJ) used an
incorrect standard to determine claimant’s eligibility for benefits, we reverse and
remand to the district court with directions to further remand the case to the
Commissioner for additional proceedings.
Claimant filed for disability benefits alleging an inability to work after
April 1, 1996, due to alcoholism and a mental impairment. After a hearing, the
ALJ held that there was “substantial evidence” to find that the claimant was not
disabled, and concluded that claimant retained the ability to return to his former
work. Aplt. App. at 13, 16. The Appeals Council denied review, making the
ALJ’s determination the final decision of the Commissioner. The district court
affirmed, and this appeal followed.
We review the Commissioner’s decision only to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence and whether legal errors occurred. See
Castellano v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1028 (10th Cir.
1994). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402
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U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (further quotation omitted). We may not reweigh the
evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Casias v. Sec’y of
Health & Human Servs., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991).
Claimant argues that the ALJ erred as a matter of law by using the
“substantial evidence” standard instead of the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard. Aplt. Br. at 19-21. The Commissioner argues that we should not
consider this issue because it was not raised to the district court. In general, we
will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See Crow v. Shalala ,
40 F.3d 323, 324 (10th Cir. 1994). We have been willing to consider such an
issue, however, when it involves a question of law, the resolution of which is
beyond reasonable doubt, and the failure to address the issue would result in a
miscarriage of justice. See Goatcher v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. , 52 F.3d 288, 289-90 n.2 (10th Cir. 1995). We believe the question of
whether the ALJ applied the correct standard of proof meets this criteria, and
therefore elect to consider the issue.
The Social Security Act does not specify what standard of proof the agency
should apply in determining whether a claimant is disabled. The circuits that
have considered this issue have concluded that “the preponderance of the
evidence is the proper standard, as it is the default standard in civil and
administrative proceedings.” Jones ex rel. Jones v. Chater , 101 F.3d 509, 512
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(7th Cir. 1996); see also Gibson v. Heckler , 762 F.2d 1516, 1518 (11th Cir.
1985); Breeden v. Weinberger , 493 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (4th Cir. 1974). We agree
that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies to disability
determinations under the Social Security Act.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question, it has
held that the preponderance of the evidence standard applies in other agency
adjudications, including disability proceedings. See, e.g. , Mullins Coal Co. v.
Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs , 484 U.S. 135, 156-61 & n.35 (1987)
(holding that under black lung disability statute which did not specify quantum of
proof, miners must “establish” the facts entitling them to a statutory presumption
by a preponderance of the evidence); see also Steadman v. SEC , 450 U.S. 91,
98-102 (1981) (holding that standard of proof under Administrative Procedure
Act is “traditional” preponderance standard); Richardson , 402 U.S. at 409 (noting
similarity in administrative procedure between Social Security Act and APA).
In contrast, the “substantial evidence” standard is an appellate standard of
review which requires a reviewing court to defer to agency factual findings if they
are supported by substantial evidence. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of
the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial
evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). The factual findings to which we defer,
however, must result from a weighing of the evidence to decide whether a
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claimant’s disability has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence. See
Steadman , 450 U.S. at 98-100 (describing the difference between an evidentiary
weighing process and judicial review). By stating that there was “substantial
evidence” to support his finding that claimant was not disabled, the ALJ
“confused two legal canons designed to serve entirely distinct purposes” and
sought to engraft a standard of appellate review upon the fact finding process.
Charlton v. FTC , 543 F.2d 903, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
The Commissioner argues that claimant’s challenge should be deemed
waived because claimant cannot show beyond a reasonable doubt that he would
have been found disabled had the correct standard been applied. This argument
misconstrues the exception to the waiver rule, however. It is the resolution of the
purely legal question that must be certain, not the ultimate outcome of the
proceeding. The question of which standard of proof applies is a legal issue that
may be determined with certainty.
The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ’s reference to substantial
evidence does not mean that he used the wrong standard, and that based on the
medical evidence the ALJ’s statement was harmless error. There is no indication
that the ALJ used a standard other than the one he explicitly articulated, however,
which was legally incorrect. By concluding there was “substantial evidence to
find the claimant is not disabled,” Aplt. App. at 13, the ALJ’s decision may rest
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on less than a preponderance of the evidence, or may even rest on claimant’s
inability to negate the existence of substantial evidence. Further, claimant’s
medical evidence is not so lacking as to permit us to hold that he is not disabled
as a matter of law. We conclude that the ALJ committed legal error and that his
decision cannot stand. Because the decision must be reversed, we do not address
claimant’s second argument that the ALJ failed to assess the mental demands of
his former work.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is REVERSED, and the case is REMANDED with directions to further
remand the case to the Commissioner for additional proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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