United States v. Jolley ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAR 26 2003
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    No. 02-1360
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                     (D.C. No. 01-CR-250-N)
    (D. Colo.)
    v.
    DARRYLE ANTHONY JOLLEY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, McKAY and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore submitted without
    oral argument.
    An indictment charged Mr. Jolley with four counts of distributing a
    controlled substance and two counts of being a felon in possession of a gun. On
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    December 7, 2001, Defendant pled guilty to one count of violating the Armed
    Career Criminal Act by possessing a firearm subsequent to three previous
    convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e)(1).
    The Government agreed to dismiss the remaining five counts of the indictment at
    sentencing. At the time of the plea, Defendant was represented by counsel.
    On March 13, 2002, two days before the scheduled sentencing hearing,
    Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea pursuant to Federal Rule of
    Criminal Procedure 32(e), arguing that new evidence had come to his attention
    that would support an argument that his confession was procured through false
    promises of leniency. He further claimed that after he entered into the plea
    agreement he learned that a witness to the promises had been intimidated to
    remain silent by one of the agents. He stated that “his decision with regard to his
    plea would be different” in light of this information. Rec., Vol. 6, at 9. The
    district court held a hearing at which Defendant was permitted to testify and to
    produce evidence supporting his claims. Following the hearing, the district court
    denied Defendant’s motion and sentenced him to serve 235 months in prison.
    Defendant appeals to this court.
    On appeal, Defendant claims that the district court erred in denying his
    motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We review the district court’s denial of a
    motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Barker v. United
    -2-
    States, 
    579 F.2d 1219
    , 1223 (10th Cir. 1978). A defendant does not have an
    absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P.
    32(e); see also Mabry v. Johnson, 
    467 U.S. 504
    , 508-09 (1984). The defendant
    has the burden of proving a “fair and just reason” to withdraw his guilty plea
    pursuant to Rule 32(e). United States v. Burger, 
    964 F.2d 1065
    , 1070-71 (10th
    Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
    We have articulated seven factors to be considered in our determination of
    whether a defendant has met the burden of establishing “a fair and just reason”
    for withdrawing his guilty plea. United States v. Black, 
    201 F.3d 1296
    , 1299-
    1300 (10th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Gordon, 
    4 F.3d 1567
    , 1572 (10th
    Cir. 1993). These factors are:
    (1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether the
    government will be prejudiced if the motion is granted; (3) whether the
    defendant has delayed in filing the motion; (4) the inconvenience to the
    court if the motion is granted; (5) the quality of the defendant’s assistance
    of counsel; (6) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; (7) whether
    the granting of the motion would cause a waste of judicial resources.
    Black, 
    201 F.3d at 1299-1300
     (10th Cir. 2000).
    Defendant’s argument that the district court failed to consider his legal
    innocence is unsupported by the record. The district court considered
    Defendant’s allegation that information came to his attention after he entered his
    plea that might have assisted him in suppressing his confession. Our review of
    the record reveals that the district court granted Defendant a hearing to establish
    -3-
    this evidence, considered all of the evidence, and rejected Defendant’s argument
    on the merits. After the hearing, the district court determined that Defendant was
    unable to demonstrate that evidence existed in support of his claim that the
    Government falsely promised leniency. Specifically, the witness to the alleged
    unfilled promises indicated at the hearing that she would invoke the Fifth
    Amendment if called to testify. Additionally, Defendant never asserted his
    innocence. He was represented by counsel when he entered into the plea
    agreement and he entered into the plea agreement freely and voluntarily. We
    cannot find fault with the district court’s analysis of the other factors.
    Therefore, in light of the Gordon factors and the facts of the instant case,
    we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s
    motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
    The conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Monroe G. McKay
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-1360

Judges: Tacha, McKay, Anderson

Filed Date: 3/26/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024