Hampton v. Keating ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 16 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
STEPHANIE RACHELLE
HAMPTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 02-6168
v. (D.C. No. 00-CV-2061-C)
(W.D. Okla.)
CATHY KEATING; LARRY FIELDS;
DOMINION VENTURE
CORPORATION OF AMERICA;
DEBORAH GRAUMAN, Medical
Director; CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION OF AMERICA;
CENTRAL OKLAHOMA
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY;
HOWARD RAY, Warden; BARBARA
LANGTHORNE, Physician’s
Assistant; VIVIAN VIERA,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, HARTZ , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment in favor
of multiple defendants on her action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She
claimed that she received constitutionally inadequate medical treatment while a
state prisoner at the Central Oklahoma Correctional Facility (COCF), i.e., that the
medical staff displayed deliberate indifference to her need for treatment,
specifically recurrent ear infections which resulted in loss of hearing in one ear.
She further contended that despite repeated requests for treatment, the care that
was provided was inadequate.
The magistrate judge to whom the case was initially assigned recused
himself after issuing a report and recommendation. The cause was reassigned to a
new magistrate judge who then issued a supplemental report and recommendation,
which the district court ultimately adopted. We affirm.
The magistrate judge recommended dismissal of defendants Keating and
Corrections Corporation of America for failure to effect service of process under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). On appeal plaintiff recites that she has no objection to this
ruling, Aplt. Br. at 5, and we will not consider it further. As to the balance of the
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defendants, the district court accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation that
summary judgment be granted.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court.” Simms v. Okla. ex
rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th
Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriately granted “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c).
Defendants Grauman, Langthorne, and Viera filed a motion to
dismiss/summary judgment, 1
attached to which was a comprehensive report that
reviewed in detail plaintiff’s medical record. Defendants Fields, COCF, and
Dominion Venture Corporation also moved for summary judgment on various
grounds.
It is clear from the medical record that plaintiff sought and received
treatment for recurrent otis externa (inflamation of the external canal) from
shortly after her arrival at COCF through the date of the report. Plaintiff was
seen and treated many times, even though the records reflect that she repeatedly
1
Defendant Ray moved separately for the same relief.
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missed appointments and occasionally left before being seen by medical
personnel. She also was noncompliant with regard to certain treatments and was
finally admitted to the infirmary to promote compliance with her treatment and
healing, in order to resolve her infection. At that point she improved
significantly. Plaintiff has continued to be seen and treated by medical personnel.
Plaintiff filed several responses arguing that she had met the requirements
of Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S. 97 (1976), i.e., deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need. She recited as “uncontroverted” the facts that she has suffered
some hearing loss while at COCF and that certain defendants were responsible for
her medical care. She further suggested that a rational trier of fact could believe
that her medical records might have been altered or their authenticity questioned.
The magistrate judge carefully considered plaintiff’s claims along with the
extensive medical records submitted by defendants, recognizing that there was no
factual dispute as to the number of times she received medical treatment but only
plaintiff’s complaints about the type of treatment received. He determined that
plaintiff had failed to establish defendants disregarded a substantial risk of harm
to her “by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.” R. Doc. 66 at 13. See
Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1995). He accordingly recommended
granting summary judgment to defendants.
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Plaintiff filed an objection alleging that the magistrate judge had
improperly decided material issues of fact and construed the Martinez report as
expert testimony without allowing her to controvert the records with meaningful
expert medical testimony of her own. Upon de novo review, the district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and entered judgment
for defendants.
On appeal plaintiff raises three arguments: (1) the district court
erroneously relied on medical records it knew were tainted; (2) the court abused
its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for appointment of counsel; and (3) the
court’s ruling constituted an “unreasonable application of the ‘deliberate
indifference’ standard.” Aplt. Br. at 9. She also asks this court to consider
applying a standard other than Estelle v. Gamble , which we decline to do. Aplt.
Br. at 10.
First, she argues that the district court erred in relying on her medical
records, which she claims are not “authentic.” Id. at 12. The reason she contends
these records lack authenticity is that they disappeared for several days. She
acknowledges that she was accused of stealing her medical file, although she
claims that it was located in an inmate housing unit “though not in [p]laintiff’s
possession.” Id. at 13 n.1. She does not, however, dispute the fact that the prison
misconduct report states that she admitted taking the file because she needed it
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for her lawsuit. R. Doc. 50, ex. A. Nor, in fact, does she deny borrowing the file.
Most importantly, however, she does not specify how the brief disappearance of
her file compromised the accuracy of the number of times she was treated. This
issue is without merit.
Next she contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying her
motion for appointment of counsel. We disagree. Even though plaintiff was
proceeding pro se, she more than adequately presented her arguments for
consideration by the district court. She has failed to establish abuse of discretion
in the denial of appointed counsel.
Finally, she contends that the district court’s application of the deliberate-
indifference standard was “grossly unreasonable.” Aplt. Br. at 33. We disagree.
There is no question that plaintiff suffered a serious medical condition. But there
is also no question that the defendants provided numerous medical evaluations
and treatments in an effort to resolve her problems. Moreover, “ Estelle
establishes that deliberate indifference entails something more than mere
negligence.” Farmer , 511 U.S. at 835. Plaintiff’s factual allegations fall far
short of the Estelle standard.
Accordingly, for these and substantially the reasons set forth by the
magistrate judge in his Supplemental Report and Recommendation of February 5,
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2002, as adopted by the district court’s order of May 7, 2002, the judgment of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepayment of costs and fees is granted.
She is reminded that she remains obligated to continue making partial payments
until the entire fee has been paid.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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