United States v. Thompson , 66 F. App'x 837 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                                  F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    JUN 9 2003
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.                                                            No. 02-7113
    FREDERICK ALLEN THOMPSON,                               (D.C. No. 02-CV-133-S)
    (E.D. Oklahoma)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before KELLY, BRISCOE and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
    appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
    submitted without oral argument.
    Defendant Frederick Allen Thompson, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, sought
    a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion. On February 27, 2003, this court granted Thompson a COA on two
    *
    This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
    res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders
    and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
    conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    issues: (1) whether Thompson received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because
    counsel failed to force the government to turn over exculpatory evidence; and (2) whether
    he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to obtain original
    audio/video tapes of controlled drug buys. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm. We deny a COA on the remaining issues.
    Thompson was convicted of drug conspiracy, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , and
    distribution of cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a), and was sentenced to a
    term of imprisonment of 121 months. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, see
    United States v. Thompson, 
    237 F.3d 1258
     (10th Cir. 2001), and the Supreme Court
    denied certiorari, see Thompson v. United States, 
    532 U.S. 987
     (2001). In his § 2255
    motion, Thompson asserted (1) denial of his constitutional right to a fast and speedy trial;
    (2) selective prosecution; (3) vindictive prosecution; (4) insufficient evidence to prove
    conspiracy; (5) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; and (6) ineffective assistance of
    appellate counsel. The district court denied relief on the first four claims because they
    should have been raised on direct appeal. See United States v. Khan, 
    835 F.2d 749
    , 753-
    54 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding § 2255 is not available to test the legality of matters that
    should have been raised on direct appeal). The district court applied the two-part test
    enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
     (1984), and rejected the ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims.
    Given Thompson’s pro se status, we construe his contentions liberally. See Haines
    2
    v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972). Thompson’s ineffective assistance of counsel
    claims present mixed questions of law and fact which we review de novo. Fisher v.
    Gibson, 
    282 F.3d 1283
    , 1290 (10th Cir. 2002). Under Strickland, Thompson “must show
    that counsel’s performance was deficient . . . . Second, [he] must show that the deficient
    performance prejudiced the defense.” 
    466 U.S. at 687
    . Prejudice is shown by
    demonstrating “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
    errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 
    Id. at 694
    . Our review of
    counsel’s performance is “highly deferential.” 
    Id. at 689
    .
    Thompson argues his trial counsel “failed to force the government to turn over
    ‘exculpatory’ evidence, i.e., statements of ‘all’ parties,” in violation of Brady v.
    Maryland, 
    373 U.S. 83
     (1963). Aplt. Br. at 12. To establish a Brady violation, Thompson
    must demonstrate “(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was
    favorable to the accused; and (3) the evidence was material to the defense.” Scott v.
    Mullin, 
    303 F.3d 1222
    , 1230 (10th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted). Thompson
    fails to identify the evidence the government allegedly withheld or how that evidence was
    favorable to his defense. A mere conclusory allegation does not establish a Brady
    violation and is insufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See
    United States v. Fisher, 
    38 F.3d 1144
    , 1147 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Although we must liberally
    construe Defendant’s pro se petition, we are not required to fashion Defendant’s
    arguments for him where his allegations are merely conclusory in nature and without
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    supporting factual averments.”).
    Thompson also contends his trial counsel was deficient in failing to obtain the
    original audio/video tapes of controlled drug buys to prove the government “doctored”
    the copies of the tapes. Before the tapes were admitted into evidence at trial, a special
    agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified that the tapes were true and
    accurate copies of the originals, but they had been “altered to consolidate down time.”
    ROA VI at 64. The tapes were admitted and played to the jury without objection from
    defense counsel. Thompson does not explain how the tapes were “doctored” or how his
    counsel’s allegedly deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Again, his allegations
    are merely conclusory and are insufficient to support his ineffective assistance claim. See
    Fisher, 
    38 F.3d at 1147
    .
    AFFIRMED. Thompson’s request for a COA on the remaining issues is DENIED.
    Entered for the Court
    Mary Beck Briscoe
    Circuit Judge
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