United States v. Akers ( 2022 )


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  • Appellate Case: 22-3140       Document: 010110781359     Date Filed: 12/13/2022    Page: 1
    FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                      Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                      December 13, 2022
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    No. 22-3140
    v.                                            (D.C. No. 2:04-CR-20089-KHV-1)
    (D. Kan.)
    MONTGOMERY CARL AKERS,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before TYMKOVICH, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Montgomery Akers, a prisoner committed to the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
    appeals the district court’s order denying his motion for compassionate release.1
    Because the district court did not err in addressing Mr. Akers’s arguments and
    applying the compassionate release standards, we affirm.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
    estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    1
    Mr. Akers also requests to proceed in forma pauperis. We grant the motion.
    Appellate Case: 22-3140     Document: 010110781359        Date Filed: 12/13/2022   Page: 2
    I. Background
    Mr. Akers pled guilty to one count of wire fraud, and the district court
    sentenced him to 327 months of imprisonment. Currently incarcerated, Mr. Akers is
    a 63-year-old man who suffers from asthma, atrial fibrillation, and a prior shingles
    infection. He is concerned that the COVID-19 pandemic and conditions in prison
    present a unique health risk to him. He requested compassionate release because he
    is serving an illegal sentence and the combination of his illnesses and COVID-19
    present a serious health risk.
    The district court denied his motion on multiple grounds. In its order, the
    district court explained that Mr. Akers had not shown extraordinary and compelling
    reasons for release. It continued that even if Mr. Akers satisfied the first
    requirements of 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(1)(A), “the Court would deny relief after
    considering the factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    .” R., Vol. I at 349.
    II. Discussion
    We review a denial of compassionate release for abuse of discretion. See
    United States v. Hemmelgarn, 
    15 F.4th 1027
    , 1031 (10th Cir. 2021). The district
    court exercises broad discretion in determining what constitutes extraordinary and
    compelling reasons for compassionate release. United States v. Maumau, 
    993 F.3d 821
    , 838 (10th Cir. 2021) (Tymkovich, J., concurring). Because Mr. Akers is
    proceeding pro se, we construe his arguments liberally. United States v. Pinson, 584
    2
    Appellate Case: 22-3140     Document: 010110781359         Date Filed: 12/13/2022    Page: 
    3 F.3d 972
    , 974 (10th Cir. 2009). “[T]his rule of liberal construction stops, however, at
    the point at which we begin to serve as his advocate.” 
    Id.
    Mr. Akers’s requested relief—modification of his sentence by a federal
    court—may only occur where Congress has explicitly authorized the court do so. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (b)-(c). Under the 2018 First Step Act, a court may order
    compassionate release for “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” 
    Id.
     at
    § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Mr. Akers must establish that (1) extraordinary and compelling
    reasons warrant a reduced sentence, (2) a reduced sentence is consistent with
    applicable Sentencing Commission policy statements, and (3) § 3553(a) factors
    warrant a reduced sentence. Id. Because the Sentencing Commission has not issued
    a policy statement, we evaluate only the first and third requirements. See Maumau,
    993 F.3d at 831; United States v. McGee, 
    992 F.3d 1035
    , 1042-43 (10th Cir. 2021).
    Mr. Akers makes three main arguments: (1) the district court mischaracterized
    the record and failed to address Mr. Akers’s claim of being denied emergency
    medical care for his atrial fibrillation condition; (2) he was incorrectly sentenced as a
    terrorist; and (3) the district court failed to address the errors in Mr. Akers’s
    sentencing calculation. We are unpersuaded.
    First, the district court did not mischaracterize the record, and it noted Mr.
    Akers’s medical conditions. It discussed the plea agreement and plea colloquy,
    which provided a sufficient basis to establish the elements of wire fraud. It also
    acknowledged Mr. Akers’s medical conditions, including his atrial fibrillation, and
    the risk posed by COVID-19 in his prison setting. The district court analyzed Mr.
    3
    Appellate Case: 22-3140    Document: 010110781359         Date Filed: 12/13/2022    Page: 4
    Akers’s health conditions and referenced the conditions at his prison, but
    nevertheless ruled against him.
    Second, Mr. Akers did not raise his terrorism argument in his initial motion for
    sentence reduction. But even if he had, the district court did not charge Mr. Akers
    for terrorism or any terrorist related activity. Mr. Akers instead pled guilty to and
    was sentenced for wire fraud. The superseding indictment, plea agreement, change
    of plea hearing, and sentencing did not reference terrorism.
    Third, the district court correctly addressed Mr. Akers’s sentencing calculation
    argument. Mr. Akers argues his statutory maximum is five years, but his plea
    agreement explicitly states (and the district court confirmed) that wire fraud carries a
    statutory maximum of 30 years. R., Vol. I at 346-47. Mr. Akers’s challenge to his
    sentencing guideline is an attack on the validity of his sentence and, as the district
    court noted, “ordinarily should be raised in a motion to vacate under [28 U.S.C. §]
    2255.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mata-Soto, 861 F. App’x 251, 255 (10th Cir.
    2021); United States v. Gay, 
    771 F.3d 681
    , 686 (10th Cir. 2014)).
    The district court analyzed Mr. Akers’s health conditions and the threat of
    COVID-19 in his particular circumstances. It also considered the relevant sentencing
    factors under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), which counseled against granting Mr. Akers’s
    motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Akers’s
    motion.
    4
    Appellate Case: 22-3140   Document: 010110781359         Date Filed: 12/13/2022   Page: 5
    III. Conclusion
    We affirm the district court.
    Entered for the Court
    Timothy M. Tymkovich
    Circuit Judge
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 22-3140

Filed Date: 12/13/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2022