United States v. Mendenhall , 67 F. App'x 565 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 13 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 02-3409
v. (D.C. No. 01-CR-40087-SAC)
BRYANE C. MENDENHALL aka (D. Kansas)
Christopher Bryane Mendenhall,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , HENRY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Defendant Bryane C. Mendenhall pleaded guilty to one count of attempting
to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and one count
of possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). The district court sentenced him under the career-offender
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines, which apply when “the defendant has at
least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled
substance offense.” USSG § 4B1.1(a)(3) (formerly USSG § 4B1.1(3)). The
district court found Defendant eligible for career-offender status in light of his
two prior state-court convictions for (1) burglary of a residence and (2)
possession of cocaine with intent to sell. On appeal Defendant challenges his
classification as a career offender, arguing that his prior offenses were “related”
and therefore should have been treated as a single prior felony conviction under
the Guidelines. See USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2). We exercise jurisdiction under 18
U.S.C. § 3742 and affirm.
The narrow issue presented in this appeal is whether the district court erred
in finding that Defendant’s prior convictions for burglary and for possession of
cocaine with intent to sell were unrelated. Prior felony convictions for a crime of
violence or a controlled-substance offense whose sentences “are counted
separately under the provisions of § 4A1.1(a), (b), or (c)” may be used for career-
offender enhancement. USSG § 4B1.2(c)(2). “Prior sentences imposed in
unrelated cases are to be counted separately.” USSG § 4A1.2(a)(2). But “[p]rior
sentences imposed in related cases are to be treated as one sentence for purposes
of § 4A1.1(a), (b), and (c).” Id. To determine whether prior sentences are
related, application note 3 to § 4A1.2 instructs:
-2-
Prior sentences are not considered related if they were for offenses
that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is
arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense).
Otherwise, prior sentences are considered related if they resulted
from offenses that (A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) were part
of a single common scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for
trial or sentencing.
Id. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.3).
It is undisputed that Defendant’s prior offenses for burglary and for
possession of cocaine with intent to sell were not separated by an intervening
arrest, and Defendant does not contend that the offenses occurred on the same
occasion or were consolidated for trial or sentencing. Instead, he argues that the
offenses are related because they “were part of a single common scheme or plan.”
The district court rejected this argument and so do we.
Although “[t]he meaning of the word ‘related’ is a legal issue that we
review de novo,” we “review the district court’s factual determination that the
cases were unrelated under a clearly erroneous standard.” United States v. Gary,
999 F.2d 474, 479 (10th Cir. 1993). “[I]n considering whether prior convictions
arose from a common scheme or plan, the focus should be on ‘factual
commonality.’” United States v. Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1219 (10th Cir. 1999)
(quoting United States v. Shewmaker, 936 F.2d 1124, 1129 (10th Cir. 1991)).
“Factors such as temporal and geographical proximity as well as common victims
-3-
and a common criminal investigation are dispositive.” Shewmaker, 936 F.2d at
1129.
None of these factors is present with respect to Defendant’s prior offenses.
There is neither temporal nor geographic proximity between the crimes, which
occurred more than three weeks and approximately 50 miles apart, in different
Kansas counties. Cf. United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir.
1996) (two drug offenses occurring one week apart not part of single common
scheme or plan). The two offenses did not have the same victim. And although
Defendant argues that there was a common criminal investigation because “law
enforcement officers were searching [Defendant’s] residence for drugs [when]
they found evidence of the burglary,” Aplt’s Br. at 9, the document upon which
Defendant relies to support this contention indicates that the police found
evidence of the burglary during the search due to happenstance, not a common
investigation. To the extent that Defendant is arguing that the offenses are
related because “the complaints were filed on the same day and one probation
revocation hearing was conducted in both cases,” id. at 5, he does not explain
how these facts are relevant to a determination that the offenses were part of a
single common scheme or plan.
Finally, Defendant asserts that the offenses of burglary and possession of
cocaine with intent to sell were part of a single common scheme or plan because
-4-
they were “animated by the same motive”— “[t]he burglary. . . was committed to
obtain money with which to buy drugs for distribution.” Id. at 9, 10. The
problem with this contention is that it is not supported by the record. Defendant
testified that when he committed the burglary at issue, he was “high on drugs,”
and committed the crime “as a joy thing.” R., Vol. III, Doc. 80, at 14. Two days
later, after police searched his residence, Defendant decided to take the stolen
property from his house to Texas to avoid detection and to sell it in order to
purchase drugs. From this testimony, it appears that Defendant did not formulate
the plan to sell the stolen property to purchase drugs until some time after he
committed the burglary. There is no “single common scheme or plan” under these
circumstances. See Wiseman, 172 F.3d at 1219 (no single common scheme or
plan among escape and robbery offenses, where “defendant has not even alleged
that when he fled the prison in Idaho he was already planning a series of grocery
store robberies in several states. To the contrary, in his confession defendant
related forming the idea with [a companion] some time after the escape.”); cf.
United States v. Kinney, 915 F.2d 1471, 1472 (10th Cir. 1990) (three bank
robberies over three-month period not related where the “only evidence of a
common scheme was defendant’s own testimony about [obtaining money to]
support[] his drug habit”).
-5-
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court’s finding that Defendant’s
prior offenses were unrelated was not clearly erroneous. We AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
-6-