Curtis v. Sandia Casino , 67 F. App'x 576 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
JUN 17 2003
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
LOIS JEAN CURTIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-2274
(D. N.M.)
SANDIA CASINO; FELIX L. (D.C. No. CIV-02-741-LFG/RLP)
CHAVES; STUWART PAISANO; and
JOHN DOES,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Lois J. Curtis, acting pro se, 1 appeals the district court’s dismissal 2 of her
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2003), we affirm.
Ms. Curtis, a Hispanic woman with a history of physical disability was
employed by the Sandia Casino (“Casino”). The Casino was owned and operated
by the Pueblo of Sandia, a federally recognized Indian tribe located in New
Mexico. On June 26, 2002, Ms. Curtis filed suit in federal court alleging the
Casino, Casino officials, the Governor of the Pueblo of Sandia, and unnamed
John Does forced her to resign her management position at the Casino in
November 2001 because of her race, disability and age. (She was sixty-eight
years old in November 2001.) She asserted federal and state law claims of
employment discrimination 3 and sought damages and injunctive relief.
The district court correctly construed her federal claims as brought against
the Pueblo of Sandia under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 4 42 U.S.C. §
1We liberally construe a pro se appellate brief. Ledbetter v. City of Topeka,
318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003).
2
The parties consented to disposition by a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) (2003); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(b).
3
Ms. Curtis presumably expected the district court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over her state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2003).
4
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, e-3.
-2-
1981, the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 5 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). 6 The magistrate judge concluded in a memorandum
opinion and order filed September 13, 2002, that these enactments do not confer
jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear complaints against sovereign Indian
tribes. 7 We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). King v. United States, 301 F.3d 1270,
1273 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 2003 WL 396176 (U.S. June 16, 2003) (No.
02-1178).
Ms. Curtis’ Title VII claim fails because Title VII precludes jurisdiction
over employment discrimination claims against Indian tribes. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(b)(1); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 545-46 (1974); Duke v. Absentee
Shawnee Tribe of Okla. Hous. Auth., 199 F.3d 1123, 1126 (10th Cir. 1999), cert.
denied, 529 U.S. 1134 (2000). Her § 1981 claim mirrors her Title VII claim. It
fails because the more specific statutory enactment of Title VII controls the
subject matter. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 550-51; Wardle v. Ute Indian Tribe, 623
F.2d 670, 673 (10th Cir. 1980). Her ADA claim fails because the ADA excludes
Indian tribes as employers subject to suit. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(B)(i). Finally,
5
42 U.S.C. § 12112.
6
42 U.S.C. § 623.
With the failure of the federal claims, the district court correctly declined
7
supplemental jurisdiction over the state court claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
-3-
her ADEA claim fails because the ADEA does not apply to Indian tribes. EEOC
v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir. 1989).
Accordingly, we adopt the reasoning of the district court and AFFIRM.
Entered by the Court:
TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN
United States Circuit Judge
-4-