Wilson v. Barnhart , 68 F. App'x 169 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 20 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RICHARD N. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-6232
(D.C. No. CIV-01-692-T)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (W.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Before TACHA , Chief Judge, HARTZ , and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff-appellant Richard N. Wilson appeals from the district court’s order
affirming the Commissioner’s denial of his applications for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income benefits under the Social Security Act.
We exercise jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We
review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether the factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were
applied.” Barnett v. Apfel , 231 F.3d 687, 689 (10th Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff’s medical records establish that he has a history of alcoholism,
and Plaintiff claims that he is disabled as a result of an organic brain disorder
that has impaired his memory. After Plaintiff’s applications for benefits were
denied initially and on reconsideration, a de novo hearing was held before an
administrative law judge (ALJ). In a decision dated May 25, 2000, the ALJ
determined, at step two of the five-part sequential evaluation process for
determining disability, that Plaintiff’s mental impairment is severe, but that, at
step three, it did not meet or equal a listed impairment. Aplt. App. at 30.
Plaintiff is not challenging the ALJ’s step three determination.
In his decision, the ALJ set forth his conclusions regarding the restrictions
caused by Plaintiff’s mental impairment, both with and independent of his
alcoholism. Id. at 31. The ALJ then concluded, without stating whether he was
considering Plaintiff’s alcoholism, that Plaintiff “retains the following residual
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functional capacity: wide range of medium. The full range of medium is reduced
by inability to understand, remember and carry out complex instructions, good
ability with detailed instructions and unlimited ability with simple instructions.”
Id. Based on these findings and the testimony of the vocational expert (VE) at the
hearing, the ALJ concluded, at step four, that Plaintiff could not perform his past
relevant work as a fork lift operator (at least as it was performed for his past
employer). Id.
For purposes of step five, the ALJ was then required to determine, as a
threshold matter, whether Plaintiff’s mental impairment is disabling, without
considering whether his alcoholism is contributing to the impairment. See
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1535(a) and 416.935(a). If, at this threshold stage, the ALJ
determines that Plaintiff’s mental impairment is not disabling, then the inquiry
ends and benefits are denied. On the other hand, if the ALJ determines that
Plaintiff’s mental impairment is disabling, then the ALJ must determine whether
Plaintiff’s alcoholism is a contributing factor material to his mental impairment.
See id. If it is, then benefits must be denied.
At step five, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is capable of performing
other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Aplt. App.
at 31-32. Specifically, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is capable of working as
a kitchen helper, laundry worker, or hospital cleaner. Id. at 32, 33-34. It is
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unclear, however, whether the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is not disabled at
step five even when considering his alcoholism or whether the ALJ determined
that he is not disabled independent of his alcoholism. On one hand, after
summarizing the alcoholism regulations in the introductory paragraphs in his
decision, and before analyzing the specific evidence in the case, the ALJ set forth
his overall conclusion that Plaintiff “is not disabled within the meaning of the
Social Security Act.” Id. at 29. Given this sweeping statement, it would appear
that the ALJ concluded at step five that Plaintiff is not disabled even when his
alcoholism is considered. On the other hand, because the ALJ went on to analyze
Plaintiff’s mental impairment independent of his alcoholism, id. at 31, an analysis
the ALJ was not required to perform if his threshold finding was that Plaintiff
was not disabled even when considering his alcoholism, the ALJ’s decision is
ambiguous on this point.
When considering Plaintiff’s mental impairment independent of his
alcoholism, the ALJ concluded that his mental impairment has only caused him
“slight” deficiencies in his activities of daily living and social functioning. Id.Plaintiff claims that this determination is not supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ failed to develop an adequate record regarding
his mental impairment, and that the ALJ failed to put forth a hypothetical question
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to the VE that accurately reflected all his mental and physical limitations. These
are the only issues that Plaintiff has raised in this appeal.
With respect to Plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s evaluation of his mental
impairment independent of his alcoholism, both the magistrate judge and the
district judge concluded that the ALJ had found, as a threshold matter, that
Plaintiff is not disabled at step five even when considering his alcoholism.
R., Doc. 13 at 7-8 and Doc. 19 at 3-4. As a result, both the magistrate judge and
the district judge rejected Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ erred in evaluating his
mental impairment independent of his alcoholism, concluding that it was not
necessary to perform such an analysis since the ALJ had made a threshold finding
at step five that Plaintiff is not disabled even when considering his alcoholism.
Id.In this appeal Plaintiff has not addressed, or even acknowledged, the fact
that the district court concluded that the ALJ had determined he was not disabled
at step five even when considering his alcoholism. Rather, Plaintiff only argues
that the ALJ erred in failing to properly evaluate his mental limitations
independent of his alcoholism. Aplt. Br. at 11-14. This is a dispositive omission
because, in Berna v. Chater , 101 F.3d 631, 633 (10th Cir. 1996), a social security
case, we held as follows:
[I]f on appeal a claimant challenges only one of two alternative
rationales [relied on by the district court to] support[] a disposition,
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this choice of litigation strategy necessarily carries with it adverse
consequences for the appeal as a whole. Since the unchallenged
rationale is, by itself, a sufficient basis for the denial of benefits,
claimant’s success on appeal is foreclosed-- regardless of the merits
of the arguments relating to the challenged alternative .
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (emphasis added). Accordingly,
regardless of the merits of Plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s evaluation of his
mental impairment independent of his alcoholism, Plaintiff is foreclosed from
succeeding on that claim in this appeal as a result of his failure to challenge the
dispositive ruling of the district court.
We also conclude that the ALJ did not err by failing to develop an adequate
record or by failing to put forth a proper hypothetical question to the VE. First,
as summarized by the magistrate judge, R., Doc. 13 at 3-5, 7, the administrative
record includes medical records pertaining to Plaintiff’s hospitalization in 1999,
and medical consultants for the Commissioner completed a mental status
examination report, two psychiatric review technique forms, and a mental residual
functional capacity assessment form, Aplt. App. at 263-64, 275-97. In addition,
the ALJ had a consulting psychologist testify at the hearing, id. at 61-64, and the
ALJ also completed a psychiatric review technique form based on the information
provided by the medical consultants, Aplee. Supp. App. at 23-25. Although two
of the Commissioner’s consultants indicated that additional information is needed
to fully evaluate Plaintiff’s mental impairment, Aplt. App. at 61-64, 264, we
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nonetheless conclude that the record before the ALJ contained sufficient
information to evaluate Plaintiff’s mental impairment for purposes of his
disability claim.
Second, because one of the Commissioner’s medical consultants found that
Plaintiff is “markedly limited” in his ability to respond to detailed job
instructions, id. at 283, we agree with Plaintiff that the ALJ may have overstated
Plaintiff’s ability to follow detailed job instructions when he informed the VE that
Plaintiff has an “adequate” ability to respond to detailed job instructions, id. at
67. This error was immaterial, however, since the three jobs identified by the VE
in response to the ALJ’s hypothetical are all unskilled, id. at 67-68, and unskilled
work requires only an ability to understand, carry out, and remember simple
instructions, see Social Security Ruling 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *4. Likewise,
because the Commissioner’s medical consultant found only that Plaintiff’s ability
to respond to simple instructions is “not significantly limited,” Aplt. App. at 283,
the ALJ may also have overstated Plaintiff’s ability to respond to simple
instructions when he informed the VE that Plaintiff has an “unlimited ability” to
respond to simple instructions, id. at 67. This error was also immaterial,
however, because there is no evidence in the record that the jobs identified by the
VE require any sort of heightened ability to respond to simple instructions.
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Finally, the ALJ did not err by failing to include limitations caused by
Plaintiff’s pulmonary problems and his inability to deal with the general public in
his hypothetical question. There is insufficient evidence in the record to support
exertional limitations based on Plaintiff’s pulmonary problems and no evidence
that the jobs identified by the VE at step five require an ability to deal with the
general public.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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