Bohnett v. Mineta , 68 F. App'x 893 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 17 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DAVID BOHNETT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 02-6057
v. (D.C. No. 01-CV-465-T)
(W.D. Okla.)
NORMAN MINETA, Secretary of
Transportation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , HENRY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
David Bohnett appeals from the district court’s order granting summary
judgment to defendant, his employer, on claims of retaliation. 1
We have
jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review the
district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo. Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of
Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999).
A prima facie case of retaliation requires a showing that “(1) [plaintiff]
engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) he or she was subject to
adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the
protected activity and the adverse action.” Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs.,
Inc. , 220 F.3d 1220, 1234 (10th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff alleged that various actions
by defendant in 1998 constituted adverse employment action, and that they were
motivated by a union grievance he filed prior to 1998 in connection with the denial
of a training opportunity. The district court ruled that only three actions
constituted adverse employment action; plaintiff does not challenge that ruling on
appeal.
The three adverse actions all resulted from a single incident involving the
computer system in plaintiff ’s division at the Federal Aviation Administration.
Before leaving for vacation, plaintiff made changes to the computer system,
1
Plaintiff’s complaint also alleged claims for gender and age discrimination,
but he expressly abandoned those claims before the district court.
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allegedly in an attempt to give another employee access to division files for
backup purposes. As a result of plaintiff ’s actions, none of the division’s
employees could save information to their files, and they had access to other
employees’ confidential files. When the problem was discovered the next day, it
took several hours to remedy the situation, resulting in a loss of productivity.
Upon his return to work, plaintiff was put on administrative leave pending
investigation. After the investigation, plaintiff was suspended for ten days, and
reprimanded. The district court ruled that these three actions were adverse
employment actions, and assumed that plaintiff had made out a prima facie case.
However, the court also concluded that defendant had proffered legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for taking these measures, and that plaintiff had not
demonstrated that these reasons were a pretext for retaliation.
On appeal, plaintiff raises only two arguments. First, he contends that
defendant did not raise the issue of pretext with “sufficient particularity to require
a detailed response” as to his suspension and reprimand, Aplt. Br. at 8, and asserts
that the district court sua sponte decided the pretext issue without giving plaintiff
notice. This argument is not persuasive. Under the familiar burden-shifting
framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973), after a
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the defendant has the burden to come
forward with legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment
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action. See Rakity v. Dillon Cos., 302 F.3d 1152, 1164 (10th Cir. 2002). In this
case, defendant expressly argued that its reasons for taking disciplinary action
were legitimate and nondiscriminatory, discussed those reasons in some detail, and
attached affidavits from plaintiff ’s supervisor and manager with further
explanation. And, as the district court noted, the attachments to plaintiff’s own
response brief identified the reasons for plaintiff’s suspension and reprimand.
Once an employer identifies a legitimate reason for its actions, the burden shifts to
the employee to demonstrate pretext. Under these circumstances, we cannot
conclude that plaintiff did not have adequate notice to respond with particularity
regarding pretext as to the suspension and reprimand.
Plaintiff also argues that he has shown pretext by alleging that other
employees had caused computer malfunction without being investigated, that he
was the only employee in his unit who has been suspended and reprimanded, and
that the disciplinary measures were not warranted. Because plaintiff has not
demonstrated that he was similarly situated to the other employees he named or
other employees in his unit who were not disciplined, those allegations do not
demonstrate pretext. See Kendrick , 220 F.3d at 1232 . And his opinion that the
suspension and reprimand were not warranted does not causally connect these
actions to his previous union grievance. See Kelley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
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Co. , 220 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating it is a manager’s perception of
an employee’s conduct that is relevant, not the employee’s subjective evaluation).
We conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment in
this case. The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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