Huggins v. United States Postal Service ( 2022 )

Appellate Case: 22-1074 Document: 010110781411 Date Filed: 12/13/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 13, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
PAUL HUGGINS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 22-1074
(D.C. No. 1:21-CV-02708-RMR)
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges.
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Paul Huggins filed a pro se lawsuit against the United States Postal Service in
Colorado state court because the Postal Service had allegedly “inhibited the right of
any persons to receive[] any information that they wished to receive.” R. at 21. This
allegation had something to do with “signature green cards,” id., presumably
referring to certified mail receipts.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-1074 Document: 010110781411 Date Filed: 12/13/2022 Page: 2
The Postal Service removed the lawsuit to federal district court. Its notice of
removal said that Huggins was complaining about the Postal Service’s failure to
return certified mail receipts to him.1 The Postal Service then moved to dismiss,
arguing that the sort of complaint at issue must be brought before the Postal
Regulatory Commission (“Commission”). In support, the Postal Service cited
39 U.S.C. § 3662(a), which reads as follows:
Any interested person (including an officer of the Postal
Regulatory Commission representing the interests of the
general public) who believes the Postal Service is not
operating in conformance with the requirements of the
provisions of sections 101(d), 401(2), 403(c), 404a, or 601,
or this chapter (or regulations promulgated under any of
those provisions) may lodge a complaint with the Postal
Regulatory Commission in such form and manner as the
Commission may prescribe.
In an unpublished decision, we held that an earlier version of this provision
means “a postal customer’s remedy for unsatisfactory service lies with the Postal
Rate Commission,[2] and . . . Congress did not intend to create a private right of
action for service complaints.” Bovard v. U.S. Post Off., No. 94-6360, 1995 WL
74678, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 1995) (construing 39 U.S.C. § 3662 (1994)). Relying
1
We do not know how the Postal Service discerned this meaning. The
sentence at issue is incomprehensible: “Each exhibits of the evidence proof of each
mail items that of each return signs signature green cards.” R. at 21. On appeal,
however, Huggins validates the Postal Service’s interpretation. See Aplt. Opening
Br. at 3 (accusing the Postal Service of “fail[ing] to return certain signature card of
green card”).
2
Congress replaced the Postal Rate Commission with the Postal Regulatory
Commission in 2006. See Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub. L.
No. 109-435, §§ 601, 604, 120 Stat. 3198 (2006).
2
Appellate Case: 22-1074 Document: 010110781411 Date Filed: 12/13/2022 Page: 3
on Bovard, the district court held that the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over
the type of complaint in question, and accordingly granted the Postal Service’s
motion to dismiss. Huggins timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Harms v. IRS, 321 F.3d 1001, 1007 (10th Cir. 2003).
It is not clear that our Bovard decision still has persuasive value, given that
§ 3662 has been significantly amended since then.3 What is clear, however, is that
Huggins’s appellate brief fails to attack the district court’s reliance on Bovard, so we
need not discuss this matter further. See, e.g., Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver,
784 F.3d 1364, 1369 (10th Cir. 2015) (“[W]e affirm the district court’s dismissal . . .
because Nixon’s opening brief contains nary a word to challenge the basis of the
dismissal . . . .”).
Huggins instead seems to focus on the fact that his case was removed from
state court. If he means to argue that removal was improper, he does not explain
why. Still, this court “must satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also of
that of the [district court].” Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 244 (1934). The
3
The version of the statute at issue in Bovard encompassed essentially any
service-related claim one could bring against the Postal Service. See 39 U.S.C.
§ 3662 (1994) (“Interested parties . . . who believe that they are not receiving postal
service in accordance with the policies of this title [i.e., Title 39, governing the Postal
Service] may lodge a complaint with the Postal Rate Commission . . . .”). The
current version, by contrast, applies to complaints that “the Postal Service is not
operating in conformance with the requirements of the provisions of sections 101(d),
401(2), 403(c), 404a, or 601, or this chapter [i.e., chapter 36 of Title 39] (or
regulations promulgated under any of those provisions).” 39 U.S.C. § 3662(a).
3
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Postal Service has a statutory right to remove, so we see no issue with the district
court accepting removal jurisdiction. See 39 U.S.C. § 409(a) (“Any action brought in
a State court to which the Postal Service is a party may be removed to the appropriate
United States district court under the provisions of chapter 89 of title 28 [i.e.,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–55].”).
Because the district court’s removal jurisdiction was proper, and because
Huggins fails to explain why the district court was wrong to conclude that he must
file his complaint before the Commission, we affirm. We grant his motion for leave
to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid
Circuit Judge
4