Muhleisen v. Principi ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 16 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SHIRLEY A. MUHLEISEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 02-1447
v. (D.C. No. 00-B-2276 (PAC))
ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI, Secretary of (D. Colo.)
Veterans Affairs,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, McKAY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
This is a pro se appeal of an action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e - 2000e-17. Appellant alleged discrimination
based on her gender and a disability, bipolar disorder. She further alleged that
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this discrimination resulted in a failure to promote, a hostile work environment,
retaliation for complaints, and other disparate treatment. Finally, Appellant
alleged constructive discharge from the Veterans Administration. Reading
Appellant’s brief liberally, she appeals the entry of summary judgment in favor of
Appellee and alleges misconduct on the part of the district court. See Ledbetter
v. Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (2003) (stating that we construe pleadings
by pro se litigants liberally).
We first address Appellant’s claims that the district court deprived her of
her right to object to the recommendations of the magistrate judge. Appellant
alleges that, following the issuance of the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the
district court took less than a week to review her objections–which included a
fifty-page narrative and fifty exhibits–before granting summary judgment. More
precisely, Appellant claims that the district court did not read the objections
before issuing its opinion, thereby depriving her of her right to object.
The only facts that Appellant provides in support of her serious accusation
that the district court failed to read her objections is the length of time that the
district court considered the objections and the fact that the court did not find her
objections persuasive. Without more, she has not demonstrated that she was
denied a right to object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. It is not
necessary for the district court to repeat what is found in the magistrate judge’s
-2-
recommendation if it finds no merit to the objections.
Furthermore, we note that Appellant appears to have included evidence in
her objections and the attached exhibits that was not presented to the magistrate
judge. The district court was under no obligation to consider evidence introduced
for the first time in an objection to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Nevertheless, because the district court appears to have
considered the evidence introduced as exhibits to Appellant’s objections, we take
that evidence into consideration as part of our de novo review.
We also note that this case came to the district court on a motion for
summary judgment and that, therefore, the district court’s responsibility was not
to make findings of fact but rather to determine whether any factual issues
existed. Considering the magistrate judge’s detailed discussion of the allegations
and the supporting evidence, such a determination did not require an additional
detailed explanation. Our obligation on appeal is identical to that of the district
court. While we will discuss each of the issues, we, like the district court, are
under no obligation to do so.
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must determine whether,
viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there
exists any genuine issue of material fact. Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of
Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999);
-3-
Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995).
To prevail on her Title VII claims, Appellant bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). The district court, in adopting the
magistrate judge’s recommendations, held that Ms. Muhleisen had failed to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination with respect to the claims of failure
to promote, disparate treatment, hostile work environment, and retaliation. We
address these claims in turn.
With respect to the failure-to-promote claim, the district court, in adopting
the magistrate judge’s recommendation, held that Appellant had failed to provide
evidence that any similarly-situated male employee was promoted while she was
not. “An employee is similarly situated to the plaintiff if the employee deals with
the same supervisor and is subject to the ‘same standards governing performance
evaluation and discipline.’” Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d
1220, 1232 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398,
1404 (10th Cir. 1997)).
In her objections, Appellant argues that she was similarly situated with
every nurse in the hospital. See Objection to Recommendation, R., Vol. II, at 3.
She explains that since all nurses in the hospital were subject to temporary
assignment anywhere in the hospital and corresponding temporary changes in
-4-
“first line” supervisor, all nurses in the hospital are similarly situated.
However, in examining claims of failure to promote, we must look to the
supervisor with responsibility for promoting or recommending promotion. In
Appellant’s case, during the relevant period, she appears to have had two
supervisors. The record indicates that Dr. Thomas Meyer was the supervisor with
ultimate authority over Appellant’s employment status and that Ms. Fletcher was
her “first line” supervisor. The only male employee supervised by Dr. Meyer
during the relevant time period was Mr. Roth. Therefore, as the magistrate judge
concluded, Mr. Roth was the only similarly-situated male nurse for purposes of
the failure-to-promote claim.
Appellant argues that she had a different “first line” supervisor than Mr.
Roth, but Appellant has not shown that her “first line” supervisor, Ms. Fletcher,
was involved in the denial of Appellant’s promotion. Furthermore, Appellant has
provided no evidence of any male nurse other than Mr. Roth who was supervised
by Dr. Meyer during the relevant period. Likewise, Appellant has not alleged that
Mr. Roth was promoted while she was not. Therefore, we agree with the district
court and the magistrate judge that Appellant failed to establish a prima facie case
of failure to promote.
Appellant’s claim of disparate treatment involves similar issues. Appellant
argues that she was treated differently (i.e. given less desirable assignments than
-5-
nurses with the same or less qualifications, demoted from a position of “charge
nurse,” denied assignments befitting her level of experience and education) than
similarly situated male nurses. With respect to this claim, Appellant is again
required to show that she was treated differently than a similarly situated male
nurse. During the relevant time period for this claim, Mr. Roth is again the only
nurse with the same supervisor. Therefore, Appellant must show that she was
treated differently than Mr. Roth.
In her objections and the accompanying exhibits, Appellant provides many
examples of the menial assignments she was given as well as descriptions of her
accomplishments and abilities. These facts indicate that Appellant was often
assigned tasks that could be accomplished by less qualified personnel.
Appellant’s exhibits also suggest that she was transferred to a position that
involved less managerial and supervisory responsibilities than she had previously
been given.
Nevertheless, as the magistrate judge observed, the record clearly indicates
that Mr. Roth was given similar assignments and was occasionally required to
perform tasks that could have been performed by less qualified personnel.
Likewise, Appellant has not shown that she was given less desirable assignments
than, or that she was demoted and then replaced by, a similarly-situated male
employee. Therefore, we agree with the district court’s adoption of the magistrate
-6-
judge’s conclusion that there was no evidence of disparate-treatment gender
discrimination.
Appellant also alleged that the hospital fostered a hostile work
environment. Throughout her objections, Appellant points to evidence that she
was treated poorly by some supervisors and co-workers. In particular, on pages
38 and 39 of her objections, she alleges pranks, theft, vandalism, slander, and
other mistreatment by co-workers and supervisors. While many of these
allegations are unsupported by evidence in the record, for summary judgment
purposes, we will assume the validity of Appellant’s claims. Nevertheless, even
assuming the truth of Appellant’s claims, Appellant has produced no
evidence–either in the form of statements, comments, or conduct–from which we
can infer hostility based on gender. As the magistrate judge explained, Ms.
Muhleisen must submit evidence of a work environment hostile to women because
of their gender. She has failed to do so. Summary judgment on this point was
therefore appropriate.
Appellant also appeals the dismissal of her retaliation claim. Appellant
alleges that she made several complaints, both formal and informal, to her
supervisors and that each complaint was followed shortly by an adverse
employment action.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a
plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in protected opposition to
-7-
discrimination, (2) his employer subjected him to an adverse
employment action subsequent to the protected activity, and (3) a
causal connection exists between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action.
Pastran v. K-Mart Corp., 210 F.3d 1201, 1205 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing McGarry v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs of the County of Pitkin, 175 F.3d 1193, 1201 (10th Cir.
1999)). To qualify as an adverse employment action, the action must “adversely
affect [the employee’s] status as an employee.” See Sanchez v. Denver Pub.
Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1998).
Appellant alleged several instances of retaliation. The magistrate judge
recommended dismissing all of them. The magistrate judge concluded (1) that
some of the alleged instances of retaliation occurred prior to any alleged protected
activity, (2) that some of the alleged actions did not qualify as adverse
employment actions, and (3) that the remaining actions might qualify as adverse
employment actions but Appellant failed to establish a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse actions.
We agree with the district court and the magistrate judge that most of the
alleged retaliatory actions (i.e. general mistreatment, reprimands, and derogatory
comments) do not qualify as adverse employment actions because they did not
affect Appellant’s employment status or compensation. For the reasons explained
by the magistrate judge, those allegations do not raise factual inferences of
retaliation.
-8-
However, the magistrate judge concluded that Appellant’s claims that she
was denied a two-step pay raise and 300 hours of leave in 1999 do qualify as
adverse employment actions because they affect her compensation. Nevertheless,
the magistrate judge also concluded that Appellant had failed to establish a
genuine issue of material fact of a causal connection between the adverse
employment action and her complaints.
“A causal connection is established where the plaintiff presents evidence
sufficient to raise the inference that her protected activity was the likely reason
for the adverse action.” Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 76 F.3d 1498,
1507 (10th Cir. 1996) (internal citation and quotation omitted). A plaintiff need
only establish a circumstantial case “that justif[ies] an inference of retaliatory
motive.” Burrus v. United Tel. Co. of Kan., Inc., 683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.
1982).
With respect to her claims that she was denied a two-step pay raise and 300
hours of leave, Appellant has supplied no new evidence in her objections that was
not considered by the magistrate judge. Therefore, there is no reason to repeat the
exhaustive discussion of these issues provided by the magistrate judge in the
Recommendation. For the reasons given by the magistrate judge, we conclude
that Appellant has failed to establish, even by circumstantial evidence, a genuine
issue of causation with respect to the denied pay raise and leave.
-9-
Finally, the magistrate judge recognized two other alleged retaliatory
actions that could qualify as adverse employment actions but which occurred prior
to any protected activity by Appellant. These two actions include a delay in
promotion and the denial of performance reviews for 1996-97. In reaching this
conclusion, the magistrate judge determined that Appellant had not demonstrated
that she had complained to her supervisors on any specific occasion prior to her
first EEO charge on September 12, 1997.
In her objections, Appellant provided new evidence not given to the
magistrate judge, which she characterizes as three instances of protected activity
prior to the September 12, 1997, EEO charge. The first alleged instance is an
EEO charge that she filed in 1996 but then withdrew prior to any alleged
retaliation. Appellant has alleged no causal connection between this charge and
any retaliatory action.
The second instance includes two worker’s compensation claims filed in
February and May of 1997. Appellant alleges that these claims led to the denial
of a promotion several months later–an action which would qualify as an adverse
employment action. However, Appellant has failed to identify which individuals
were involved in the processing of the worker’s compensation claim prior to the
denial of the promotion or even which supervisors might be aware of the claims.
Furthermore, as discussed by the magistrate judge, Appellant has failed to
-10-
establish that her supervisors made any effort to withhold the promotion from her.
The final alleged instance of protected activity prior to September 1997,
was an e-mail to her supervisors on July 21, 1997, in which she expresses her
concern that her skills as a nurse are being underutilized. See Objection to
Recommendation, R., Vol. II, at 43, and Exhibit 29. Appellant has not explained
how this e-mail was related to her delayed promotion or that it was even sent to
anyone involved in the promotion process. Appellant has, therefore, failed to
establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact of a causal connection
between these actions and her prior complaints. We therefore conclude that
summary judgment on the retaliation claim was not in error.
Finally, we turn to Appellant’s claim of constructive discharge. The
magistrate judge concluded that Appellant had failed to provide evidence that her
working conditions were “objectively unreasonable.” Instead, Appellant showed
evidence that her subjective expectations were not met and that she had personal
conflicts with supervisors and co-workers. None of this is sufficient to show
objective unreasonableness. For the reasons articulated by the magistrate judge,
we conclude that the constructive discharge claim was properly dismissed.
Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, the magistrate
judge’s recommendation, and Appellant’s lengthy objections to the magistrate
judge’s recommendation, we conclude that for reasons substantially the same as
-11-
those adopted by the district court in its Order dated September 17, 2002, the
district court did not err in granting Appellee summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
-12-