United States v. Scroger , 73 F. App'x 344 ( 2003 )


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  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    AUG 11 2003
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                      No. 02-3388
    v.                                            (D. Kansas)
    JAMES SCROGER,                              (D.C. No. 02-CR-20043-01-JWL)
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before EBEL, HENRY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    James Scroger appeals from his conviction and sentence for attempting to
    manufacture five or more grams of methamphetamine. Mr. Scroger’s counsel
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), and moves for
    leave to withdraw as counsel. For the reasons set out below, we grant counsel’s
    motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.
    Mr. Scroger was charged in a three count indictment with one count of
    attempting to manufacture 5 grams or more of methamphetamine, one count of
    conspiring to manufacture 5 grams or more of methamphetamine, and one count
    of making available for use a building for the unlawful manufacture of
    methamphetamine. Mr. Scroger entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which
    he agreed to plead guilty to Count 1 (attempting to manufacture 5 grams or more
    of methamphetamine) in exchange for the government’s agreement to dismiss the
    two remaining counts and to a sentence of ninety-seven months’ imprisonment.
    The trial court accepted both the guilty plea and the plea agreement.
    Anders holds that if counsel finds a case to be wholly frivolous after
    conscientious examination, he may advise the court and request permission to
    withdraw. Counsel must also submit to both the court and his client a brief
    referring to anything in the record arguably supportive of the appeal. The client
    may then raise any point he chooses, and the court thereafter undertakes a
    complete examination of all proceedings and decides whether the appeal is in fact
    frivolous. If it so finds, it may grant counsel’s request to withdraw and dismiss
    -2-
    the appeal. See Anders, 
    386 U.S. at 744
    . Mr. Scroger has not filed an additional
    appellate brief.
    It is important to note at the outset that Mr. Scroger entered guilty plea on
    Count 1 of the indictment and he has thereby waived his rights to appeal any
    non-jurisdictional issues or antecedent constitutional defects. See, e.g., United
    States v. Dwyer, 
    245 F.3d 1168
    , 1170 (10th Cir. 2001).
    Mr. Scroger did not file a response to the Anders brief and the government
    did not file a reply brief. Counsel also notes that, in his plea agreement, Mr.
    Scroger specifically waived his right to appeal his sentence unless it exceeded the
    statutory maximum. Counsel notes that the sentence did not exceed the statutory
    maximum and that the sentence was not based on the defendant’s race or other
    impermissible factor. See United States v. Cockerham, 
    237 F.3d 1179
    , 1182 (10th
    Cir. 2001). As to a potential ineffective assistance of counsel claim, counsel
    notes he would have a conflict in arguing ineffective assistance. We also note
    that “[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims should be brought in collateral
    proceedings, not on direct appeal.” United States v. Galloway, 
    56 F.3d 1239
    ,
    1240 (10th Cir. 1995).
    To avoid dismissal of his appeal, Mr. Scroger must show why we should
    not enforce the plea agreement. United States v. Rubio, 
    231 F.3d 709
    , 711 (10th
    Cir. 2000). During the plea colloquy, the district court informed Mr. Scroger
    -3-
    about the consequences of entering , and specifically outlined the waiver of the
    right to appeal. Mr. Scroger responded that he understood the plea agreement and
    that he entered into the agreement voluntarily. After careful review of the entire
    proceedings, we agree with counsel that no non-frivolous grounds for appeal
    appear on this record. We see nothing in the record to indicate that Mr. Scroger’s
    guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, nor do we discern any error in the
    district court’s acceptance of the plea or in the terms of the plea agreement.
    Moreover, Mr. Scroger was sentenced within statutory limits. Hence, there are no
    sentencing issues for appeal.
    Accordingly, we GRANT counsel’s request to withdraw and we DISMISS
    the appeal.
    Entered for the Court,
    Robert H. Henry
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 02-3388

Citation Numbers: 73 F. App'x 344

Judges: Ebel, Henry, Hartz

Filed Date: 8/11/2003

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024