Willis v. W. H. Braum, Inc. , 80 F. App'x 63 ( 2003 )


Menu:
  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    OCT 28 2003
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    EVA WILLIS,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    No. 02-7038
    v.                                                (D.C. No. 01-CV-353-P)
    (E.D. Okla.)
    W. H. BRAUM, INC., f/k/a Braum’s
    Ice Cream Stores, Inc.,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
    OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
    Plaintiff,
    No. 02-7039
    v.                                                (D.C. No. 01-CV-215-P)
    (E.D. Okla.)
    W. H. BRAUM, INC., d/b/a Braum’s
    Ice Cream and Dairy Store, an
    Oklahoma corporation,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    EVA WILLIS,
    Movant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
    Before EBEL, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    Eva Willis sued W.H. Braum, Inc. (“Braum”) in Oklahoma state court
    alleging state claims of employment discrimination based on disability and
    intentional infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Willis’s claims were
    subsequently removed to federal court and consolidated with a suit brought on her
    behalf by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) against
    Braum for violations of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
    The district court dismissed Ms. Willis’s claims after determining they were time-
    barred under the applicable statute of limitations. The court also denied Ms.
    Willis’s motion to intervene in the EEOC’s case. We affirm the dismissal of Ms.
    Willis’s state claims and remand for further consideration of Ms. Willis’s motion
    to intervene.
    Background
    Eva Willis claims she applied for a position at Braum’s store in Madill,
    Oklahoma on December 1, 1997, and was told it was not hiring. Aplt. App. at 20.
    On December 4, 1997, Ms. Willis alleges she saw a fellow female high school
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    -2-
    student interviewed and hired by Braum while she was in the store. Id. Ms.
    Willis was born with a cleft palate and cleft lip which has caused a cosmetic
    disfigurement and a speech impediment, and she alleges this disability is the basis
    for Braum’s actions. Id. at 96. Ms. Willis subsequently contacted the Oklahoma
    Human Rights Commission (“OHRC”), id. at 94, and filed a charge of
    discrimination with the EEOC on or before August 3, 1998, id. at 56.
    On November 29, 1999, while the EEOC was still reviewing Ms. Willis’s
    claim, she filed suit against Braum in federal district court, asserting three claims:
    a claim for employment discrimination based on disability under the ADA, a state
    employment discrimination claim, and a state intentional infliction of emotional
    distress claim. Id. at 19-22. Before Braum filed an answer, on December 27,
    1999, Ms. Willis filed a pleading entitled “Dismissal Without Prejudice” with the
    court. Id. at 57. The court construed it as a motion for dismissal and filed an
    Order on January 5, 2000, dismissing the action without prejudice. Id. at 23.
    On April 16, 2001, the EEOC brought suit against Braum on Ms. Willis’s
    behalf alleging violations of the ADA. Id. at 28-32. Ms. Willis again filed suit in
    state court on January 2, 2001, re-asserting only her state law claims of
    discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 24-27.
    Braum removed the state case to federal court where it was consolidated with the
    EEOC action on July 17, 2001. Id. at 41.
    -3-
    On December 31, 2001, the district court dismissed Ms. Willis’s claims as
    time-barred under the Oklahoma state statute of limitations. Id. at 116. The court
    alternately found Ms. Willis’s state employment discrimination claim barred due
    to Ms. Willis’s failure to timely file a charge of discrimination with the OHRC or
    the EEOC. Id. at 118 n.1. In the same order, the court concluded that because
    Ms. Willis was time-barred from re-asserting her federal ADA claim, the EEOC
    was barred from seeking individual relief on her behalf. The court therefore
    limited the EEOC to injunctive relief. Id. at 119. In a contemporaneous opinion,
    we have reversed those determinations and held neither Ms. Willis nor the EEOC
    is time-barred because it is inappropriate to import a state statute of limitations to
    apply to federal ADA claims. See EEOC v. W.H. Braum, Inc., ____ F.3d ____
    (2003) (No. 02-7046).
    Following dismissal of her state claims, Ms. Willis moved to intervene in
    the EEOC’s action as a matter of right on January 24, 2002. Aplt. App. at 144-
    51. The court denied intervention, stating in a subsequent order that “[t]his court
    denied the motion . . . based on the December 31, 2001 order . . . and Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 24(a) as intervention at this late date in the proceedings would cause undue
    delay and prejudice.” Id. at 158 n.3.
    -4-
    Discussion
    Appellant contends that she is not time-barred under the applicable statute
    of limitations and that she filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC and
    OHRC in a timely manner. In addition, appellant claims the district court
    incorrectly denied her right to intervene in the EEOC’s suit. Whether Ms. Willis
    is precluded under the statute of limitations from bringing her claim is a question
    of law which we review de novo. United States v. Hurst, 
    322 F.3d 1256
    , 1259
    (10th Cir. 2003). We review a district court’s rulings on motions to intervene as
    of right de novo, Alameda Water & Sanitation Dist. v. Browner, 
    9 F.3d 88
    , 90
    (10th Cir. 1993), but we review the district court’s determinations regarding
    timeliness under an abuse of discretion standard. Coalition of Ariz./N.M.
    Counties for Stable Econ. Growth v. Dep’t of Interior, 
    100 F.3d 837
    , 840 (10th
    Cir. 1996).
    I. Limitations
    Under Oklahoma state law, the statute of limitations for a state
    discrimination claim is “two (2) years after a timely filing of a charge with the
    Oklahoma Human Rights Commission.” 
    Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 25, § 1901
    (E);
    Duncan v. City of Nichols Hills, 
    913 P.2d 1303
    , 1310 (Okla. 1996). Likewise, a
    two year statute of limitations applies to Ms. Willis’s intentional infliction of
    emotional distress claim. 
    Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 95
    (3); Williams v. Lee Way
    -5-
    Motor Freight, Inc., 
    688 P.2d 1294
    , 1297-98 (Okla. 1984). The parties agree that
    Ms. Willis’s state claims, filed on November 29, 1999, were timely because they
    were filed within the required two year period. However, Ms. Willis dismissed
    those claims without prejudice and did not file the present suit until January 2,
    2001, after the two year statute of limitations had expired on each of the claims.
    Ms. Willis claims that the Oklahoma savings statute applies in this case to
    save her claims. The Oklahoma savings statute provides that:
    If any action is commenced within due time, and . . . the plaintiff fail
    in such action otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff . . . may
    commence a new action within one (1) year after the reversal or
    failure although the time limit for commencing the action shall have
    expired before the new action is filed.
    
    Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 100
    . Ms. Willis contends that her claim was dismissed
    without prejudice as of January 5, 2000, the date of the court’s order of dismissal,
    and therefore she had until January 5, 2001, to refile under the savings statute.
    We disagree.
    Ms. Willis filed a voluntary “Dismissal Without Prejudice” 1 on December
    27, 1999, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). Rule 41(a) provides that a plaintiff may
    dismiss an action by “filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the
    1
    The Dismissal stated in full:
    COMES NOW Eva Willis by and through her attorney, Dan Little,
    and hereby dismisses the above entitled cause without prejudice.
    Aplt. App. at 57.
    -6-
    adverse party of an answer.’” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i). When the plaintiff files
    a notice under Rule 41(a)(1), it terminates the action automatically and “no order
    of the court is needed.” Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 
    388 F.2d 501
    , 507
    (10th Cir. 1968). Plaintiff’s Dismissal Without Prejudice was filed prior to the
    filing of an answer by Braum, and therefore it is appropriately characterized as a
    notice of dismissal by plaintiff under Rule 41(a)(1)(i). Under Oklahoma’s
    savings statute, therefore, Ms. Willis had until December 27, 2000, to refile her
    claims. Because she did not refile until January 2, 2001, the district court
    correctly held that her claims should be dismissed as time-barred under the
    applicable statute of limitations.
    Ms. Willis urges this court to apply the savings statute as of the date of the
    court’s order (January 5, 2000) rather than the date of her dismissal (December
    27,1999). But it is well settled that when a plaintiff files a voluntary dismissal
    under Rule 41(a)(1)(i), the dismissal is self-executing and the filing itself
    dismisses the matter. See Hyde, 
    388 F.2d at 507
    ; see also Commercial Space
    Mgmt. Co. v. Boeing Co., 
    193 F.3d 1074
    , 1078 (9th Cir. 1999) (“[I]t is beyond
    debate that a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1) is effective on filing, no court order is
    required, the parties are left as though no action had been brought, the defendant
    can’t complain, and the district court lacks jurisdiction to do anything about it.”);
    Marex Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 
    2 F.3d 544
    , 546 (4th Cir.
    -7-
    1993) (concluding the dismissal is “self-executing . . . and no judicial approval is
    required”); Am. Cyanamid Co. v. McGhee, 
    317 F.2d 295
    , 297 (5th Cir. 1963)
    (The notice “itself closes the file. There is nothing the defendant can do to fan
    the ashes of that action into life and the court has no role to play. This is a matter
    of right running to the plaintiff and may not be extinguished or circumscribed by
    adversary or court.”). Once Ms. Willis filed her voluntary dismissal her case was
    automatically terminated and the court’s order was unnecessary. The action was
    dismissed as a matter of law as of December 27, 1999, and not on January 5,
    2000, the date of the court’s order.
    Because the claims were dismissed as of December 27, 1999, Ms. Willis
    was required under the savings clause to refile by December 27, 2000. Because
    she failed to refile her claims until January 2, 2001, her claims are barred by the
    statute of limitations. In addition, in light of the plain language of the rule and
    the clear precedent interpreting Rule 41(a)(1), we decline to equitably toll the
    statute of limitations based on reliance on the court’s erroneous January 5 order.
    Because Ms. Willis’s claims were correctly dismissed as time-barred by the
    district court, it is unnecessary to determine whether she filed her charge with the
    OHRC within the statutorily required time period.
    II. Intervention
    Finally, Ms. Willis challenges the denial of her motion to intervene in the
    -8-
    EEOC’s suit. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), “[u]pon timely application anyone
    shall be permitted to intervene in an action . . . when a statute of the United States
    confers an unconditional right to intervene.” The statutory language of Title VII,
    42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), which has been incorporated into the ADA, grants the
    charging employee an unconditional right to intervene in cases brought by the
    EEOC. EEOC v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 
    493 F.2d 71
    , 74 (8th Cir. 1974). However,
    Rule 24 does include a limitation on this right–the motion must be timely.
    Nevilles v. EEOC, 
    511 F.2d 303
    , 305 (8th Cir. 1975).
    The district court denied Ms. Willis’s application for intervention in a
    Minute Order on February 19, 2002, “based on the December 31, 2001 order . . .
    and Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) as intervention at this late date in the proceedings would
    cause undue delay and prejudice.” Aplt. App. at 158. In the court’s December
    31, 2001 order, in addition to dismissing Ms. Willis’s personal claims, the court
    also limited the EEOC to injunctive relief. Based on the court’s order that the
    EEOC could no longer pursue individual relief on Ms. Willis’s behalf and the
    posture of the case at that time, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny
    intervention. However, this court has reversed the district court’s December 31,
    2001 order and held the EEOC is not barred from asserting individual relief on
    Ms. Willis’s behalf. See EEOC v. W.H. Braum, Inc., ____ F.3d ____ (2003) (No.
    02-7046). Based on these changed circumstances and the strong precedent in
    -9-
    favor of intervention, see Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 
    446 U.S. 318
    , 331 (1980) (the individual aggrieved party is given the right to intervene to
    protect their personal interests, which may at times be in conflict with those of the
    EEOC); Utah Ass’n of Counties v. Clinton, 
    255 F.3d 1246
    , 1249 (10th Cir. 2001)
    (“This circuit takes a somewhat liberal line in allowing intervention.”) (citations
    omitted)); Winbush v. State of Iowa By Glenwood State Hosp., 
    66 F.3d 1471
    ,
    1478-79 (8th Cir. 1995) (permitting intervention ten years after complaint was
    filed and after conclusion of the bench trial); Nat’l Farm Lines v. I.C.C., 
    564 F.2d 381
    , 383-84 (10th Cir. 1977), we reverse and remand on the issue of intervention.
    Upon remand, the district court should determine whether the motion to intervene
    should be denied solely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) on the basis that the
    intervention would have caused undue delay and prejudice.
    We AFFIRM the dismissal of plaintiff’s state law claims, REVERSE the
    denial of intervention, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    - 10 -