United States v. Morris , 85 F. App'x 117 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 23 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 03-2029
v. (D. New Mexico)
(D. Ct. No. CR-00-1341 MV)
JOHN THOMAS MORRIS,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, MURPHY, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
John Thomas Morris pled guilty to three counts of falsifying hazardous
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
waste manifests in violation of the Resource and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6928(d)(3). On appeal, we review the district court’s failure to apply a four-level
enhancement to Morris’s offense level pursuant to United States Sentencing
Guideline (USSG) § 2Q1.2(b)(4). Our jurisdiction arises under 18 U.S.C. §
3742(b)(2). We reverse and remand for resentencing.
Background
General Waste Corporation (GWC) is a New Mexico solid waste
management business licensed to remove hazardous waste from generating
facilities and transport it to final disposal facilities. A hazardous waste
transporter must obtain a permit to store such waste for more than ten days. 40
C.F.R. §§ 262.30 and 270.1(c)(2)(vi).
On October 4, 2000, a federal grand jury indicted Morris, along with
Emmanuel M. Ohiri, GWC’s chief executive officer, and the GWC corporate
entity, on twenty-five counts of various environmental violations, including
knowingly making false statements on manifests, the illegal transportation of
hazardous waste, the illegal storage of hazardous waste, and conspiracy to commit
these violations. On March 20, 2001, Morris pled guilty to three counts of
knowingly making false material statements and representations on manifests used
for the purpose of compliance with the Resources and Conservation Recovery
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3). The plea included Morris’s agreement that “he
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[would] not seek a downward departure from the applicable sentencing guideline
range as determined by the Court after resolution of any objections by either party
to the presentence report . . . .” In exchange, the government dismissed the
remainder of the charges and agreed to forego bringing additional charges.
The probation officer’s initial presentence report recommended, inter alia,
the court apply USSG § 2Q1.2(b)(4), which provides a four-level enhancement for
an offense involving the “transportation, treatment, storage or disposal [of
hazardous waste] without a permit or in violation of a permit.” The report
justified the recommendation by noting Morris’s relevant conduct “involved
picking up hazardous waste . . . , storing that waste illegally, then falsifying the
manifests for those wastes.” 1 The report also included Morris’s written statement
in which he admits to creating false manifests and forging signatures on those
manifests to disguise the storage of hazardous waste for an “extended amount of
time” without the necessary permits. 2
1
In supplements to the presentence report, the probation officer continued
to maintain that the four-level enhancement under § 2Q1.2(b)(4) was appropriate
due to Morris’s relevant conduct. See § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A).
2
Morris stated:
I was employed at General Waste Corporation (GWC) from July of
1997 to July of 1998. My title was Operations Manager. My
responsibilities entailed over sight of the Hazardous Waste activities,
Construction Debris disposal, and Sales.
*****
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Morris filed various objections to the report, including an objection to the
proposed four-level enhancement. Primarily, he claimed § 2Q1.2(b)(4)’s
enhancement only applies to substantive offenses rather than his offense of conviction
— a “simple recordkeeping offense.” 3
Once the waste in the warehouse was organized, I started to make
sales contacts with hazardous waste accounts I had managed prior to
my employment with GWC. My previous employer . . . had an
authorization granted by the State of New Mexico to store Hazardous
waste . . . up to 180 days [after it was] received . . . [as a]
conditionally exempt small quantity waste generator (CESQG).
Without this type of authorization, a waste management transporter
could only store the waste for no more than 10 days. I personally
made the decision, on my own accord, to operate GWC as if we were
authorized as [a] 180 day storage and accumulation facility. I
created uniform hazardous waste shipping manifests for GWC as the
receiving facility. I then re-manifested the waste containers and had
GWC designated as a generator for outbound waste disposal. I
intentionally did this for building or aggregating larger out bound
shipments of [sic] economical reasons. Manny Ohiri was not
informed of my waste management strategy and techniques in this
particular case.
*****
In order to maintain my waste management accounts and integrity, I
would change dates on various small quantity generator (SQG)
manifests due to the waste facility non-approval status. I would pick
up waste without obtaining disposal facility prior approval and would
hold the waste over an extended amount of time until the approval
was in place. I had recreated waste manifests and forged signatures
to be in compliance and to elude the waste generator and the disposal
facility. Manny Ohiri was not informed of this activity.
3
“‘Simple recordkeeping or reporting violation’ means a recordkeeping or
reporting offense in a situation where the defendant neither knew nor had reason
to believe that the recordkeeping offense would significantly increase the
likelihood of any substantive environmental harm.” USSG § 2Q1.2, comment. (n.
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The government countered that Morris committed his recordkeeping offense for
the purpose of concealing a substantive offense, and therefore his relevant conduct
placed the offense within § 2Q1.2(b)(5), requiring the application of the (b)(4)
enhancement. To support its argument, the government offered copies of the falsified
manifests. It also presented a letter written by Ohiri, Morris’s supervisor, to a
customer at a generating facility. The letter responded to the customer’s complaints
of discrepancies between a manifest received from Morris and the copy from the final
disposal facility.
One of the transactions in question, detailed by three manifests, proves
illustrative. The first manifest notes a November 24 pickup date of hazardous waste
along with the true signature of the generating customer. The second manifest notes
the same pickup date but with delivery to the final disposal facility dated ten days
later (December 5), along with a forged disposal facility signature. And while the
third manifest involves the same transaction, the pickup date has been changed to
January 12, and the delivery date changed to January 21, along with a forged
signature of the generating customer. Ohiri explained in his letter that the
discrepancies between the dates on the manifests were due to Morris’s failure to
2); see also Ch.1, Pt.A4(f), intro. comment. (“[T]he Commission has developed a
system for treating technical recordkeeping and reporting offenses that divides
them into four categories. First, in the simplest of cases, the offender may have
failed to fill out a form intentionally, but without knowledge or intent that
substantive harm would likely follow.”)
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obtain timely approval for transport to an appropriate waste facility: “Mr. Morris
recreated the manifests to meet the 10 day EPA limitation for [the] GWC facility.”
Rejecting the government’s analysis of this evidence, Morris argued that
retention of the waste without a permit “was not relevant conduct as to the offense of
conviction” warranting an enhanced sentence. He further argued that even if the
enhancement was germane, application note 8 to § 2Q1.3 requires the court to weigh
the nature and quality of the hazardous substance involved and the risk associated
with the offender’s conduct before applying the enhancement. 4 Morris concluded that
the evidence, at best, warranted only a two-level enhancement.
Apparently accepting the need to weigh such evidence, the district judge
questioned Morris as to the nature of the waste detailed in the manifests and
determined “the Court [had] not received sufficient evidence, either in the
presentence report or in the presentation of evidence [at the hearing], to permit the
Court to make the findings that are required.” 5 She further stated she did not have
4
Application note 8 actually discusses the possibility of a departure (not an
enhancement) of up to two levels (up or down), should the facts warrant.
5
The district court referred to an unpublished decision, United States v.
Hart, 61 F.3d 917, 1995 WL 445685 (10th Cir. Jul. 28, 1995) (table decision),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1062 (1996), which discussed the findings necessary to
apply relevant conduct under USSG § 1B.1.3(a)(2). We determine this case solely
on the basis of USSG §1B.1.3(a)(1). “[I]f a defendant’s accountability is
established under one provision of this guideline [§ 1B.1.3], it is not necessary to
review alternative provisions under which such accountability might be
established.” § 1B1.3, comment. note 2(a)(1). Therefore, the holding in Hart is
not relevant to this case.
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sufficient evidence to apply application note 8's two-level “enhancement” and
therefore declined to apply any enhancement. She sentenced Morris to three years
probation, on the condition that six months be served in some form of custody. This
appeal followed.
Discussion
We consider whether the district court correctly refused to impose USSG §
2Q1.2(b)(4)’s four-level enhancement. We review de novo the district court’s legal
interpretation of the Guidelines as well as its conclusion that the evidence is
insufficient as a matter of law to warrant the enhancement. See United States v.
Valdez, 225 F.3d 1137, 1142 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Checora, 175
F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 996 (2001).
At the risk of appearing didactic, we begin our analysis by reviewing the
general approach to be used in applying the Guidelines. Once the correct guideline is
identified (the parties agree it is § 2Q1.2) and the base level is established (the parties
agree it is eight) it is necessary to “apply any appropriate specific offense
characteristics, cross references, and special instructions contained in the particular
Guideline . . . in the order listed.” USSG § 1B.1.1(b) (emphasis added); see
generally, USSG §§ 1B.1.1 & 1B.1.2. But those factors are all determined by
reference to what has become known as the offender’s “relevant conduct,” not merely
the offense of conviction. USSG § 1B1.3. Consequently, our review first leads us to
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consider relevant conduct.
Relevant conduct is a shorthand term for the Guideline’s requirement that
offense characteristics and adjustments “shall be determined on the basis of . . . all acts
and omissions committed, . . . induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant
. . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for
that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that
offense . . . .” USSG §1B1.3(a) (emphasis added). “[A] plea agreement that includes
the dismissal of a charge . . . shall not preclude the conduct underlying such charge
from being considered under the provisions of § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in
connection with the count(s) of which the defendant is convicted.” USSG § 6B1.2(a). 6
The presentence report identified Morris’s relevant conduct to be the illegal storage of
hazardous waste without a permit even though a record keeping violation was the
offense of conviction.
When the government seeks to use the defendant’s relevant conduct to increase
his base offense level, “it must show that the relevant conduct occurred by a
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Sapp, 53 F.3d 1100, 1104 (10th Cir.
1995) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1082 (1996). Subsection (b)(4) of §
6
“This paragraph prevents a plea agreement from restricting consideration
of conduct that is within the scope of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) in respect to the
count(s) of which the defendant is convicted; it does not in any way expand or
modify the scope of §1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” USSG §6B1.2, comment.
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2Q1.2 states that a four-level enhancement is required when “the offense involved
transportation, treatment, storage or disposal without a permit or in violation of a
permit.” Morris’s admissions in the presentence report clearly establish his knowledge
that the storage of hazardous waste for more than ten days required a permit and GWC
did not have the required permit. See infra, note 2. Morris also admits that he recreated
manifests and forged signatures to avoid detection of the illegal hazardous waste storage
at GWC. Id. Morris’s admissions are corroborated by the manifests showing the
alteration of dates and signatures. At no time did Morris object to or contradict this
evidence, he merely objected to the enhancement. Thus, the uncontested evidence
demonstrates that the probation report is correct; Morris’s relevant conduct is described
by specific offense characteristic § 2Q1.2(b)(4) because “the offense involved
transportation, treatment, storage, or disposal without a permit or in violation of a
permit . . .”, which demands a four-level enhancement. (Emphasis added.)
In the district court the parties argued at length about the proper application of
§§ 2Q1.2(b)(5) and (6). Those arguments continue here, but are unavailing. 7 Because
they do not inform the debate we will not address them. When specific offense
characteristics are applied sequentially, as the Guidelines require, the exercise is
7
The arguments seem, almost by design, to eschew straightforward analysis
of the issue in order to “obscure it in a legal fog.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 703 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting). A desultory approach, while sometimes
successful, is rarely productive and always inefficient.
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complete upon reaching § 2Q1.2(b)(4). That section properly defines the offense for
sentencing purposes and it is unnecessary to continue down the list. Stated differently,
since relevant conduct necessarily defines the offense otherwise, it cannot be a record
keeping offense (§ 2Q1.2(b)(5)) or a simple record keeping offense (§ 2Q1.2(b)(6)).
Once relevant conduct was established (as stated, the relevant conduct facts are
compelling and undisputed, therefore conclusive), additional fact finding was
unnecessary, except as it might impact a departure decision.
To that end we consider the departure guidance contained in application note 8,
which says:
Subsection (b)(4) applies where the offense involves violation of a permit,
or where there was a failure to obtain a permit when one was required.
Depending upon the nature and the quantity of the substance involved and
the risk associated with the offense, a departure of up to two levels, either
upward or downward may be warranted.
(Emphasis added.) Morris suggests application note 8 is actually an adjustment, not a
departure, because it changes the offense level. (R., Appellee Br. at 16.) He is
mistaken.
The distinction between an adjustment and a departure is critical. United States v.
Smith, 930 F.2d 1450, 1453 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 879 (1991). The district
court may consider a departure only after completing the adjustments required in the
offense guideline. Application note 8 necessarily presumes all adjustments have been
made when it invites departure consideration. USSG § 1B.1.1(h) and (i). Moreover,
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Chapter 1, Part A(4)(b) of the Guidelines states:
It is important to note that the guidelines refer to two different kinds of
departure. The first involves instances in which the guidelines provide
specific guidance for departure by analogy or by other numerical or non-
numerical suggestions. The Commission intends such suggestions as policy
guidance for the courts. The Commission expects that most departures will
reflect the suggestions and that the courts of appeals may prove more likely
to find departures “unreasonable” where they fall outside suggested levels.
A second type of departure will remain unguided. It may rest upon grounds
referred to in Chapter Five, Part K (Departures) or on grounds not
mentioned in the guidelines.
(Emphasis added.) Application note 8 clearly states a departure may be warranted, the
type of departure explicitly described in the introductory comments quoted above. We
will not ignore such express direction, nor will we allow Morris to ignore the terms of
his plea agreement which preclude argument for a downward departure. On remand,
evidence or argument supporting a downward departure is foreclosed.
Conclusion
The uncontroverted evidence presented at the sentencing hearing established
Morris’s relevant conduct as the illegal storage of hazardous waste without a permit.
The district court is required to apply the four-level enhancement found in USSG
§2Q1.2(b)(4). Application Note 8 is not pertinent to Morris’s sentencing, as he has
waived his right to argue for a downward departure in his plea agreement. This case is
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REVERSED and REMANDED for resentencing in accordance with USSG §
2Q1.2(b)(4).
Entered by the Court:
TERRENCE L. O’BRIEN
United States Circuit Judge
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