Setiyaningsih v. United States ( 2022 )

Appellate Case: 22-8066 Document: 010110783009 Date Filed: 12/14/2022 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 14, 2022
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 22-8066
(D.C. Nos. 2:22-CV-00169-NDF &
MEGA LESTARI SETIYANINGSIH, 1:19-CR-00198-NDF-1)
(D. Wyo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before MATHESON, KELLY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Petitioner-Appellant Mega Lestari Setiyaningsih, an inmate proceeding pro se,
seeks to appeal from the district court’s order dismissing her 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion
claiming ineffective assistance of counsel as untimely. Setiyaningsih v. United States,
No. 22-CV-169, 2022 WL 5240203 (D. Wyo. Aug. 30, 2022). A COA is a jurisdictional
prerequisite to our appellate review. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B); Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). We deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Where a district court has denied a § 2255 motion on procedural grounds, a
movant must show that the district court’s procedural ruling would be debatable among
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-8066 Document: 010110783009 Date Filed: 12/14/2022 Page: 2
reasonable jurists and that the underlying constitutional claim is likewise debatable.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Here, we need only address the procedural
ruling.
Background
Ms. Setiyaningsih pled guilty in a written plea agreement to possession with intent
to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (Count Two) and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (Count Three). 2 R. 6. The district court imposed a sentence of 120
months imprisonment on Count Two and 60 months imprisonment on Count Three,
consecutively, and a concurrent term of five years supervised release on both counts. 1
R. 18–20. Ms. Setiyaningsih did not appeal, but later moved for compassionate release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), which the district court denied and this court affirmed.
See United States v. Setiyaningsih, No. 21-8093, 2022 WL 2160001 (10th Cir. June 15,
2022).
On August 1, 2022, Ms. Setiyaningsih filed the instant motion claiming that her
constitutional right was violated by her attorney’s incorrect advice that despite pleading
guilty to the firearm conviction, she would remain eligible for good time credits under the
First Step Act (FSA). 3 R. 3, 6, 17–18; see 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii). The district
court dismissed the § 2255 motion as untimely, given Ms. Setiyaningsih had filed her
motion more than one year after final judgment had been reached and had not set forth
viable facts supporting statutory or equitable tolling. See 3 R. 56–65.
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Discussion
The district court’s holding that the motion was time-barred by the one-year
limitation period under § 2255(f) is not reasonably debatable. Final judgment was
entered on June 1, 2020, and the judgment became final in mid-June 2020 when the time
to appeal expired. 1 R. 18; United States v. Prows, 448 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (10th Cir.
2006). Yet, Ms. Setiyaningsih did not file her motion until August 1, 2022, well after the
one-year limitations period had concluded.
Ms. Setiyaningsih argues nonetheless that the one-year limitations period should
be statutorily tolled because she did not know she was ineligible for FSA credits until she
met with her BOP case team on May 16, 2022. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4). Section
2255(f)(4) applies when new facts not previously discoverable come to light — not when
a movant becomes newly aware of “the legal significance of those facts.” E.g., United
States v. Collins, 364 F. App’x 496, 498 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). Thus, it is not
clear that Ms. Setiyaningsih proffers a fact at all, let alone a new one (the First Step Act,
including the relevant provisions, became law in 2018). First Step Act (2018), Pub. L.
No. 115-391, § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxii), 132 Stat. 5194, 5199; see Ingram v. United States,
932 F.3d 1084, 1089 (8th Cir. 2019) (distinguishing between new facts and
interpretations of law, concluding that the latter do not give rise to § 2255(f)(4) tolling);
United States v. Harrison, 680 F. App’x 678, 680 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (“A
change or clarification of controlling law is not a ‘fact’ within the meaning of
§ 2255(f)(4).”). Even if Ms. Setiyaningsih was unaware of the effect of her guilty plea on
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her eligibility for FSA credits, a lack of knowledge does not equate to an inability to
discover existing law.
To the extent Ms. Setiyaningsih argues that the district court’s ruling would
require inmates to second guess their attorneys’ advice, thus flooding courts with § 2255
motions, no reasonable jurist would be persuaded that such a result is pre-ordained and
would prevent inquiry by an inmate. Likewise, the district court’s rejection of equitable
tolling, which requires a movant to show extraordinary circumstances and diligence, is
not reasonably debatable and waiting years after the fact to inquire about FSA credits is
not diligence. See Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007). This court has
consistently held that newly acquired knowledge of the law does not constitute the type
of extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling. See, e.g., Collins, 364 F.
App’x at 498; Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir. 2000).
We DENY a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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