Whitaker v. Arthur Anderson, L.L.P. (In Re Doerner, Saunders, Daniel & Anderson, L.L.P.) , 99 F. App'x 179 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                            F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAY 13 2004
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    In re: DOERNER, SAUNDERS,
    DANIEL & ANDERSON, L.L.P.;
    COMMERCIAL FINANCIAL
    SERVICES, INC., and the CFS                  No. 03-5082
    Liquidating Trustee,                   (D.C. No. 02-CV-483-K)
    (N.D. Okla.)
    Debtors.
    ________________
    LLOYD S. WHITAKER, Trustee of
    the ABS Liquidating Trust; THE
    OFFICIAL COMMITTEE OF
    UNSECURED CREDITORS OF
    COMMERCIAL FINANCIAL
    SERVICES, INC.; OFFICIAL
    COMMITTEE OF ASSET-BACKED
    SECURITYHOLDERS,
    Plaintiffs,
    and
    UNSECURED CREDITORS
    LIQUIDATING TRUST, and its
    Liquidating Trustee,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    ARTHUR ANDERSON, L.L.P.,
    Defendant - Appellee,
    and
    DOERNER, SAUNDERS, DANIEL &
    ANDERSON, L.L.P.; COMMERCIAL
    FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., and
    the CFS Liquidating Trustee,
    Appellees.
    ________________
    ABS LIQUIDATING TRUST;
    BRADLEY D. SHARP, Liquidating
    Trustee,
    Trustees.
    ORDER
    Before EBEL, BARRETT, and KELLY, Circuit Judges. *
    This matter comes on for consideration of Appellee Doerner, Saunders,
    Daniel & Anderson, L.L.P.’s (“DSDA’s”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
    Appellate Jurisdiction. Upon consideration thereof,
    (1) Appellant, the Unsecured Creditors Liquidating Trustee, on behalf of
    the Unsecured Creditors Liquidating Trust (referred to as “UCLT”), seeks to
    appeal from the district court’s order determining that the DSDA law firm would
    not be disqualified from certain proceedings. The district court held that UCLT
    *
    After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
    has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
    assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
    Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    -2-
    lacked standing to disqualify DSDA and then decided the merits of the
    disqualification issue. UCLT does not appeal from the district court’s holding
    that UCLT lacked standing. Aplt. Response to Aplee. Motion to Dismiss at 17.
    (2) DSDA represented the Debtor, Commercial Financial Services, Inc.
    (“CFS”), in labor and employment matters prior to and during the bankruptcy
    proceedings. See 
    11 U.S.C. § 327
    (e) (special purpose representation). That
    representation has ended. UCLT sought to disqualify DSDA from representing
    CFS’s former auditor/accountant, Arthur Andersen, L.L.P. (“AA”), in a federal
    securities fraud action brought against AA by CFS bondholders. Neither CFS nor
    UCLT are parties to the federal securities action. CFS has filed suit against AA,
    but in state court. Although DSDA represents AA in the federal securities action,
    DSDA does not represent AA in the state court action.
    (3) UCLT sought a variety of remedies (including disqualification) against
    DSDA based upon conflict. Concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to afford
    DSDA complete relief, the bankruptcy court asked the district court to withdraw
    the reference to bankruptcy court. The district court withdrew the reference
    solely as to the remedy of disqualification. No court has addressed the other
    remedies sought by UCLT.
    (4) The district court held that UCLT lacked standing in the bankruptcy
    proceeding to pursue disqualification of DSDA in the federal securities matter
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    without having first sought an order requiring CFS to intervene and to seek
    disqualification in those other proceedings. Relying upon an unpublished order
    and judgment, Wind River Multiple Use Advocates v. Espy, No. 94-8031, 
    1996 WL 223925
    , at *1 n.2 (10th Cir. May 3, 1996), that approved of making a merits
    determination even if a plaintiff lacks standing, the district court then decided
    that disqualification was not warranted. 1 The district court declined to remand the
    disqualification issue to the bankruptcy court for findings and conclusions
    because it would not affect the outcome given the district court’s conclusion that
    any rule which might require disqualification would be a new rule that should not
    be applied retroactively. Although declaring its order final, the district court
    remanded the matter to the bankruptcy court, presumably to consider the balance
    of the relief sought by UCLT.
    (5) We lack jurisdiction over this matter. At the outset, it should be noted
    that where a district court’s decision is supported on alternate independent
    grounds (here, standing and the merits), the failure to appeal both of those
    grounds dooms the appeal. Berna v. Chater, 
    101 F.3d 631
    , 633 (10th Cir. 1996);
    Murrell v. Shalala, 
    43 F.3d 1388
    , 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1994); Atwood v. Union
    Carbide Corp., 
    847 F.2d 278
    , 280 (5th Cir. 1988). In this case, any opinion on the
    1
    Wind River was decided before more recent Supreme Court authority
    which disapproved of the use of “hypothetical jurisdiction” and resultant advisory
    opinions. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 
    523 U.S. 83
    , 94-95 (1998).
    -4-
    merits of the conflict of interest question would be wholly advisory and would not
    alter the outcome (no disqualification) of the order from which UCLT appeals.
    See Hall v. U.S. Fiber & Plastics Corp., 
    476 F.2d 418
    , 420-21 (3rd Cir. 1973) (per
    curiam) (dismissing as moot an appeal where plaintiff only appealed district
    court’s finding of patent invalidity and not its finding of defendant’s non-
    infringement). Although UCLT is concerned about the preclusive effect of the
    district court’s order insofar as obtaining other relief in the bankruptcy court, the
    district court’s opinion on the merits of the conflict question was by its own
    admission advisory and made without consideration of all relevant factual and
    legal issues. In the alternative, the bankruptcy court has yet to rule on those
    issues in the context of other relief, let alone have its ruling appealed. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (a); cf. Hall, 
    476 F.2d at 420-21
     (noting any preclusive effect of a
    ruling would have to be determined by court where preclusion is asserted; such
    preclusive effect, if any, would not overcome the necessity of a case or
    controversy and the prohibition on advisory opinions).
    We GRANT DSDA’s motion to dismiss and DISMISS this appeal.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
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