United States v. Campas ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 2 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff/Appellee, No. 03-8081, 03-8082
v. District of Wyoming
CLAUDIO CAMPAS, (D.C. No. 02-CR-81-D)
Defendant/Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , MURPHY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R.App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore submitted without oral
argument.
Claudio Campas appeals his conviction of possession of methamphetamine
with intent to deliver, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A).
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
The first question is whether the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress evidence resulting from a search of his automobile. The second is
whether the district court abused its discretion in failing to order a mental
evaluation or conduct a hearing when the defendant requested a mental
evaluation. We affirm.
I. The Search
On March 29, 2002, Mr. Campas was driving east on I-80 near Laramie,
Wyoming, in a pickup truck with California license plates. A Wyoming highway
patrolman observed the truck crossing over the center line and fog line, and
stopped him for this apparent violation. The patrolman asked Mr. Campas to
come to the patrol car while he issued a warning citation. While he was there, the
patrolman asked his dispatcher to check Mr. Campas’s drivers license and
criminal history; the patrolman learned that Mr. Campas had a drug-related
criminal history dating back to the 1950s but had no outstanding warrants. The
patrolman completed the warning citation, returned Mr. Campas’s drivers license
and paperwork, and told him he was free to leave. As Mr. Campas walked back
toward his vehicle, and after brief conversation about where to find a good
restaurant, the patrolman asked permission to ask a few more questions, to which
Mr. Campas agreed. The patrolman asked whether he had any guns or illegal
drugs in his vehicle. Mr. Campas said he did not. The patrolman asked for Mr.
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Campas’s consent to search the vehicle, and Mr. Campas consented.
The patrolman examined the underside of the truck, and noticed fresh
scratch marks on the rear gas tank and the nuts and screws that held it in place.
He also found that there was a new “C” clamp holding the spare tire in place, that
the gas tank bolts had been sprayed with lubricant, and that the rear gas tank was
empty. This made the patrolman suspicious that the gas tank had been removed
from the vehicle and fitted for the storage of illegal drugs. The patrolman sent
for his lieutenant, who confirmed his observations. After telling Mr. Campas of
his suspicions, he asked Campas for permission to take the vehicle to the state
garage for further inspection. Mr. Campas consented. There, agents discovered
that an access plate had been cut into the gas tank. They found approximately
sixteen bundles of suspected methamphetamine, weighing over 6,800 grams,
secreted in the gas tank.
After hearing testimony and reviewing a video tape of the encounter, the
district court denied Mr. Campas’s motion to suppress. In a telephonic oral
ruling, the district court held that “in this particular instance, there’s no reason to
question the voluntariness of the search, and the basis for the motion to suppress
does not exist.” The court elaborated:
The traffic stop had ended. The individual was allowed to go on his way.
He volunteered, without any sign of coercion, to a search of the vehicle.
And never at any time that I could see on the tape, from the time he got into
the vehicle when they started heading toward the Wyoming Highway
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Department garage until it arrived, did he ever renege and say, “No, I
changed my mind.”
Defendant contends that his consent to the search was not freely and
voluntarily given. He argues: “The trooper’s testimony that Mr. Campas was free
to leave and the remaining searches were consensual was not based on the facts.”
Def. Br. 10. In particular, he maintains that “he was not allowed to regain
possession of his wallet,” id. at 11, and that the fact that he was kept separate
from his passenger somehow vitiated his consent.
On review of the denial of a motion to suppress, an appellate court must
accept the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and view the
evidence in the light most favorable to those findings. United States v.
Olguin-Rivera, 168 F.3d 1203, 1204 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Little , 60
F.3d 708, 712 (10th Cir. 1995). “The credibility of witnesses, the weight to be
given evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence fall within
the province of the district court.” United States v. Browning, 252 F.3d 1153,
1157 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court
specifically found that Mr. Campas gave consent to the search, and that at the
time he was asked for consent, the traffic stop had ended and he was free to go on
his way.
We have carefully reviewed the record and Defendant’s arguments, and
find no basis for overturning the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Campas
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freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. In particular, we do
not believe that Mr. Campas’s separation from his wallet means that his consent
was nonconsensual. See Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 501 (1983) (holding that
the defendant was effectively “seized” when a government agent retained his
drivers license and airline ticket). Mr. Campas does not claim that the patrolman
retained his wallet; he testified that he left the wallet in his truck when he left the
truck to go to the patrol car. 1
There is no evidence that its presence in the pickup
truck had any effect on his consent to a search. As to his separation from the
passenger, the district court found that after writing the warning citation, the
patrolman told Mr. Campas he was free to go. At that point, he could have
rejoined his passenger. Instead, he consented to the search. His separation from
the passenger was a product of his consent, not his consent a product of the
separation.
II. Mental Evaluation
At the conclusion of testimony on the first day of trial, Mr. Campas told the
district judge, outside the presence of the jury, that he had asked his attorney to
have him mentally evaluated, and that his attorney had declined to do so. He did
not set forth any facts or provide any explanation why a mental evaluation was
1
Mr. Campas did not rely on the wallet problem in his suppression motion
in district court, and the district court made no specific finding regarding it.
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warranted. Defense counsel then addressed the court to explain the
circumstances. He quoted from his letter to Mr. Campas in which he explained
his refusal to obtain a mental evaluation. In that letter, counsel stated:
A review of your last letter to me dated April 3, 2003, reiterates your bad-
faith desire to have a mental examination. You are correct that I, quote,
talked you out of it, unquote, the reason being that you told me you simply
wanted to buy time, delay the trial, which constitutes no valid reason for
the Court to expend time and monies. As an officer of the Court, I cannot
condone such actions and will not participate in same.
The Assistant U.S. Attorney then informed the court that no issue regarding Mr.
Campas’s mental competency had previously been raised by any of the preceding
three lawyers who had represented him. Defense counsel confirmed the
prosecutor’s statement, and added that he had seen “no evidence” of mental
incompetency in his interactions with Mr. Campas. “The man is alert. He is on
top of his game. He is very coy about a lot of things and very articulate about a
lot of things.”
The district court then rejected Mr. Campas’s request, explaining:
I know of no reason, either directly from my own observation of you or
indirectly or from any review of any materials in the files of this Court, that
it’s appropriate for you to have that evaluation at this hour, and I do not
think it is appropriate, and I do not think it is necessary. There’s nothing,
not a scintilla of evidence, to suggest that you’re not competent, now or in
the past.
18 U.S.C. § 4241 provides:
At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and
prior to the sentencing of the defendant, the defendant or the attorney for
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the Government may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental
competency of the defendant. The court shall grant the motion, or shall
order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to
believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease
or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable
to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him
or to assist properly in his defense.
Whether to order a competency examination is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Ramirez , 304 F.3d 1033 (10th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Prince , 938 F.2d 1092, 1095 (10th Cir. 1991). No competency
examination is required when there is minimal or no evidence of incompetency.
United States v. Crews , 781 F.2d 826, 833 (10th Cir. 1986).
Defendant candidly acknowledges that “[t]here are no facts in the record
which support Mr. Campas’s request, nor are there facts which suggest he was
competent to stand trial or that he did not have some mental defect which could
be raised as a defense.” Def. Br. 16. In light of the absence of facts in support of
the request, we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
Finally, to the extent Defendant is arguing that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel in raising this claim at trial, he must assert that claim on
habeas review rather than direct appeal. United States v. Galloway , 56 F.3d 1239,
1240-42 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming is AFFIRMED .
Entered for the Court,
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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