Christensen v. United States Department of the Interior , 109 F. App'x 373 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
SEP 22 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DEAN H. CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 04-4020
v. (D.C. No. 2:03CV304 PGC)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT (D. Utah)
OF THE INTERIOR,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , McKAY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Dean Christensen brought four claims against the Department of
the Interior (DOI), alleging that its employees provided false information about
him to a grand jury, the Internal Revenue Service, and the bankruptcy court. The
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, holding that three
of the claims were barred by sovereign immunity, and that the limitations period
had expired with respect to the fourth. The district court held, in the alternative,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
that Plaintiff’s fourth claim failed to state a claim for which relief could be
granted. Although Plaintiff was represented by counsel before the district court,
he now appeals pro se. We review de novo a district court’s dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, and we accept findings of fact pertaining to jurisdiction unless
clearly erroneous. See Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir. 2003).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We assume the truth of the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint. See
Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2002). In 1993 a
grand jury was convened to investigate Plaintiff’s operation of oil wells and
payment of royalties. Several DOI employees knowingly gave false testimony
that he had not paid certain royalties. In 1996 two DOI employees released their
testimony to the IRS, which filed a $500,000 claim against Plaintiff. Plaintiff
subsequently refuted this testimony, and the IRS claim was reduced to zero.
Plaintiff subsequently filed a tort action against the DOI employees in Utah
state court. The United States was substituted as a defendant and the action
removed to federal court. The federal court dismissed the complaint, directing
Plaintiff to pursue administrative remedies through the DOI. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2675(a) (under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), claimant must exhaust
administrative remedies before pursuing claims in federal court). After his claims
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were denied on October 7, 2002, Plaintiff filed suit in federal district court. His
complaint alleged federal question jurisdiction based on (1) disclosure of grand
jury testimony in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e); (2)
knowing disclosure of false information to a federal bankruptcy court and grand
jury under 16 U.S.C. § 1623; (3) filing a false claim with a bankruptcy court
under 18 U.S.C. § 152; and (4) disclosure of information in violation of the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
Plaintiff conceded in the district court that the first three claims were
barred by sovereign immunity, but argued that the Privacy Act claim waived
sovereign immunity with respect to the other three claims. The district court did
not address the argument because it found the Privacy Act claim to be barred by
the statute of limitations. In response to Plaintiff’s argument that the limitations
period should have been tolled while he pursued administrative remedies, the
court found that the matter pursued administratively “involved different claims
and does not create any basis for tolling the Privacy Act statute of limitations.”
R. Doc. 15 at 6.
II. DISCUSSION
The Privacy Act bars a federal agency from disclosing records unless
certain conditions are met. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). An action arising under the
Privacy Act may be brought “within two years from the date on which the cause
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of action arises.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(5). A Privacy Act cause of action arises
when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know of the violation. See Bergman v.
United States, 751 F.2d 314, 316 (10th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff claims that the DOI employees wrongfully disclosed information
to the IRS in December 1996 and admits that he learned of the disclosures by
June 1999. Thus, the limitations period expired no later than two years later, in
June 2001. Plaintiff filed his complaint in federal district court on March 31,
2003. Although Plaintiff’s appellate brief is less than clear, he seems to argue
that he met the limitations deadline because he filed his administrative claim in
May 2001.
The filing of Plaintiff’s administrative claim is irrelevant to the Privacy Act
limitations period, which applies to filing in federal court. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(5) (“[a]n action to enforce any liability created under this section may
be brought in the district court of the United States . . . within two years from the
date on which the cause of action arises. . . .”) (emphasis added). Furthermore,
there is no basis for tolling the limitations period while Plaintiff pursued his
administrative claim, because there is no administrative exhaustion requirement
when a plaintiff seeks damages under the Privacy Act, see, e.g., Quinn v. Stone,
978 F.2d 126, 137 & n.22 (3d Cir. 1992); Diedrich v. Department of Army, 878
F.2d 646, 647-48 (2d Cir. 1989), and thus, there was no impediment to raising
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Privacy Act claims in federal court while Plaintiff’s administrative claims were
pending.
III. CONCLUSION
We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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