Brown v. Chandler , 111 F. App'x 972 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 6 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
GLEN EDWARD BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-7024
(D.C. No. 02-CV-422-S)
HOLLY CHANDLER; ED (E.D. Okla.)
BULLARD; OKLAHOMA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges, and MARTEN , ** District
Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable J. Thomas Marten, District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, plaintiff-appellant Glen Edward Brown, an
Oklahoma state prisoner appearing pro se, appeals the district court’s entry of
summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Holly Chandler, Ed Bullard,
and the Oklahoma Department of Corrections. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
Brown is serving a thirty-year sentence for rape after former conviction of a
felony. In October 1999, Brown was transferred to the John Lilley Correctional
Center (JLCC). While incarcerated at JLCC, Brown was enrolled in the prison’s
sex offender treatment program (SOTP). At all times relevant to this action,
defendant Chandler was the director of the SOTP, and defendant Bullard was a
counselor/trainer in the SOTP.
In March 2000, prison staff at JLCC removed Brown from the SOTP on the
ground that he had not been fully participating in the program. As a result of his
removal from the program, Brown’s earned credit level was lowered and his
security classification was increased to that of a medium security inmate. In
addition, on April 11, 2000, Brown was transferred to the Dick Conner
Correctional Center, a medium security facility. In May 2000, prison officials
also conducted an audit of Brown’s earned credits, and 2,643 earned credits were
removed from his record. However, according to defendants, in May 2003, the
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earned credits were returned to Brown, and he lost no credits as a result of his
removal from the SOTP. 1
In July 2002, Brown filed his § 1983 complaint against defendants, alleging
that: (1) defendants violated his procedural and substantive due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment and his right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment, as applied to the states under the
Fourteenth Amendment, because the SOTP failed provide him with proper
psychiatric treatment and he was removed from the SOTP without a hearing;
(2) defendants engaged in unlawful retaliation when they prosecuted him for three
separate misconduct offenses after he exercised his right to access the courts and
after his attorney sent a letter to defendant Chandler expressing concern over
certain aspects of the SOTP; and (3) defendants violated his First Amendment
rights by requiring him to recite a “serenity prayer” at the beginning of each
SOTP therapy session and by requiring him to engage in masturbation satiation
sessions as part of his therapy. 2
Based on these alleged constitutional violations,
1
We note that Brown previously filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 concerning his earned credits. See R., Doc. 30, Ex.
A at 1-2. Brown’s habeas petition was dismissed by the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma on the ground that Brown did not
exhaust his administrative remedies. Id. at 3-4. Brown did not appeal the
dismissal of his habeas petition.
2
Brown alleges in his opening brief that defendants have also violated his
equal protection rights by failing to provide him with the same type and quality of
(continued...)
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Brown sought compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive and
declaratory relief.
The district court determined that defendants were entitled to summary
judgment on all of Brown’s claims. First, the court concluded that Brown had
“failed to make any viable argument that he ha[d] exhausted his [prison]
administrative remedies as to any claims except as to the [SOTP and] his
classification level following his removal from the [SOTP].” R., Doc. 32 at 11.
Accordingly, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the district court granted
defendants summary judgment on all of the unexhausted claims.
Second, with respect to the exhausted claims, the district court found that
Brown had “failed to show how his brief enrollment in the [SOTP] violated
his . . . constitutional rights.” R., Doc. 32 at 12. As explained by the court,
Brown “[came] forth with no facts to demonstrate that his enrollment in the
2
(...continued)
psychiatric care that other mentally-ill inmates receive. See Aplt. Opening Br. at
2, 20. Brown has not set forth any specific facts to support his equal protection
claim, however. Likewise, Brown failed to provide any specific facts to the
district court in his summary judgment response brief. As a result, we do not
need to address Brown’s equal protection claim, except to note that it was
properly dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Brown also claims that he has been
subjected to physical attacks from other inmates as a result of his participation in
the SOTP and the failure of the prison officials to keep his status as a sex
offender confidential. We conclude that defendants were entitled to summary
judgment on the latter claim, as it is governed by the Eighth Amendment, and
Brown has failed to set forth sufficient facts to establish that the prison officials
acted with deliberate indifference with respect to his personal safety.
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[SOTP] subjected him to a sufficiently serious deprivation . . . or that
defendant[s] had a culpable state of mind amounting to deliberate indifference to
a risk of serious harm to him.” Id. at 12-13 (quotations omitted).
Finally, after noting that Brown had “alleged that because of his removal
from the [SOTP] his earned credit classification was lowered,” id. at 13, the
district court concluded that “[t]he Oklahoma prison classification system creates
no liberty interest for a particular classification,” id. As a result, the court found
that Brown had “suffered no constitutional violation from his reduced earned
credit classification.” Id.
Although our reasoning differs slightly from that of the district court with
respect to certain aspects of Brown’s claims, we agree with the district court that
defendants were entitled to summary judgment on all of Brown’s claims. See
Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass’n , 14 F.3d 526, 528 (10th Cir. 1994)
(“We review a summary judgment fully and may affirm on grounds other than
those relied on by the district court when the record contains an adequate and
independent basis for that result.”). Thus, we affirm the district court’s summary
judgment order in all respects.
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II.
A. Standard of Review.
We review a summary judgment order de novo, considering the evidence
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. Cooperman v. David , 214 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000).
Summary judgment is proper only when there are no genuinely disputed material
issues of fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). It is also well established that “[a] pro se
litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d
1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Nonetheless, a pro se litigant must “comply with the
fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure,”
Ogden v. San Juan County , 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994), and we will not act
as an advocate for a pro se litigant, Hall , 935 F.2d at 1110.
The parties must also make specific showings to satisfy their respective
burdens under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. We have explained the burden-shifting process
under Rule 56 as follows:
The movant bears the initial burden of making a prima facie
demonstration of the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. In so doing, a movant
that will not bear the burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the
nonmovant’s claim. Such a movant may make its prima facie
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demonstration simply by pointing out to the court a lack of evidence
for the nonmovant on an essential element of the nonmovant’s claim.
If the movant carries this initial burden, the nonmovant that
would bear the burden of persuasion at trial may not simply rest upon
its pleadings; the burden shifts to the nonmovant to go beyond the
pleadings and set forth specific facts that would be admissible in
evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could
find for the nonmovant. To accomplish this, the facts must be
identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or
specific exhibits incorporated therein.
Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation
and citations omitted).
B. Due Process and Eighth Amendment Claims.
We conclude that the district court properly granted defendants summary
judgment on Brown’s due process and Eighth Amendment claims. To begin with,
Brown’s procedural due process claim fails as a matter of law. In order to
establish a protected liberty interest in a benefit under state law, “a person clearly
must have more than an abstract need or desire for [the benefit]. He must have
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim
of entitlement to it.” Montero v. Meyer , 13 F.3d 1444, 1447 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth , 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).
Consequently, while state statutes and prison regulations can grant prisoners
liberty interests that are entitled to procedural due process protections, Meachum
v. Fano , 427 U.S. 215, 223-27 (1976), “[a] liberty interest in the prison context
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must be based upon a specific substantive predicate which restricts the discretion
of prison officials,” Canterino v. Wilson , 869 F.2d 948, 953 (6th Cir. 1989)
(citing Hewitt v. Helms , 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983)); see also Montero , 13 F.3d
at 1447-48 (“It is [the] termination of a right previously afforded by the state and
in which there is a legitimate claim of entitlement which invokes the procedural
guarantees contained in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
In this case, Brown may be correct that Oklahoma law requires the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections to develop and implement treatment
programs for inmates with severe psychiatric problems. See Okla. Stat. tit. 57,
§ 509.4. Nonetheless, Brown has failed to establish that the Oklahoma legislature
has granted him a vested, nondiscretionary, personal entitlement to participate in
the SOTP or otherwise receive psychiatric treatment. Indeed, to the contrary, the
record indicates that the prison officials have broad discretion regarding the
administration of the SOTP, and we believe this discretion extends to all prison
rehabilitation and medical programs.
It is also clear that Brown does not have a vested right to participate in the
SOTP as a matter of federal law. See Battle v. Anderson, 564 F.2d 388, 403
(10th Cir. 1977) (“[A]n inmate does not have a federal constitutional right to
rehabilitation.”). In addition, to the extent Brown is alleging that defendants have
violated his substantive due process rights, the claim is “essentially coextensive
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with Eighth Amendment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment,
and . . . the Eighth Amendment serves as the primary source of protection for
convicted prisoners.” Lunsford v. Bennett , 17 F.3d 1574, 1583 (7th Cir. 1994).
Thus, unless he can demonstrate that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment, Brown cannot show that his substantive due process rights were
violated. Id.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Estelle v. Gamble , 429 U.S.
97, 104-05 (1976), prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when their
conduct demonstrates deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of
prisoners in their charge. Here, Brown has failed to even approach the showing
that is necessary to establish an Eighth Amendment violation under Estelle . Most
importantly, Brown has failed to offer any evidence showing that he suffers from
a serious psychiatric problem, and we decline to infer such a problem based solely
on Brown’s status as a convicted sex offender. Consequently, we do not need to
reach the deliberate indifference issue, although we note that Brown’s proof falls
far short on that issue as well.
Finally, Brown may have been able to establish a procedural due process
violation if he could have shown that defendants permanently revoked and
deprived him of earned credits that he had previously earned. See Taylor v.
Wallace , 931 F.2d 698, 700 (10th Cir. 1991) (addressing inmate’s claim to earned
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good time credits under Oklahoma law and holding that “an inmate’s liberty
interest in his earned good time credits cannot be denied without the minimal
safeguards afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”)
(quotation omitted). As noted above, however, defendants put forth evidence
showing that all of the revoked earned credits were subsequently returned to
Brown, see R., Doc. 24 at 5-6, 14, and Brown never rebutted defendants’
evidence on this point. Thus, any due process claim relating to the revoked
earned credits is moot, and summary judgment was appropriate. 3
C. Retaliation Claims.
“42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) . . . requires that ‘available’ administrative remedies
be exhausted prior to filing an action with respect to prison conditions under
§ 1983.” Jernigan v. Stuchell , 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002). Having
carefully reviewed the record and the prison grievance documents contained
3
To the extent Brown is claiming that his due process rights were violated
because he was deprived of the ability to earn future earned credits as a result of
the change in his security classification following his removal from the SOTP,
that claim also fails as a matter of law. See Searcy v. Simmons, 299 F.3d 1220,
1226 (10th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time
credits for satisfactory behavior while in prison.”) (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell ,
418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974)); see also Templeman v. Gunter , 16 F.3d 367, 369
(10th Cir. 1994) (“Changing an inmate’s prison classification ordinarily does not
deprive him of liberty, because he is not entitled to a particular degree of liberty
in prison.”); Twyman v. Crisp , 584 F.2d 352, 356-57 (10th Cir. 1978) (holding
that change in prisoner’s security classification and transfer to maximum custody
was matter within sphere of prison officials’ authority).
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therein, we agree with the district court that Brown failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies with respect to his retaliation claims. 4
See R., Doc. 32
at 10-12. Accordingly, § 1997e(a) bars Brown from pursuing the claims under
§ 1983.
D. First Amendment Claims.
Brown claims that defendants violated his rights under the First
Amendment by requiring him to recite a “serenity prayer” at the beginning of each
SOTP therapy session and by requiring him to engage in masturbation satiation
sessions. We hold that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on both of
these claims.
With respect to the serenity prayer, defendants asserted in their district
court summary judgment brief that “[SOTP] participants are not required to
participate in a serenity prayer.” R., Doc. 24 at 12. In his response brief,
although Brown addressed defendants’ assertion in terms of the SOTP as a whole,
he failed to address it in the context of his own personal participation in the
4
Specifically, while Brown submitted a “Request to Staff” concerning his
claim that defendants had him removed from the SOTP as retaliation for his
complaints regarding alleged deficiencies in the program, see R., Doc. 23, Ex.
B-1 at 6-7, he failed to raise the retaliation issue in the prison grievances that he
subsequently filed, id. , Ex. B-3 at 1-4. Also, while Brown asserted a retaliation
claim in one of the administrative appeals that he filed regarding his misconduct
offenses, id. , Ex. I-3 at 1-4, he failed to file the appeal in a timely manner, id. ,
Ex. I-3 at 11-12; Ex. N at 2.
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SOTP. Instead, he simply asserted in conclusory fashion that “SOTP directed a
formal religious exercise by reciting the Serenity Prayer to commence each
program group meeting. ODOC & SOTP not only had plenary control but in fact
initiated the Serenity Prayer, which was not inmate initiated.” Id. , Doc. 30 at 12.
This was simply a reformulation of the conclusory allegations that Brown made in
the brief he submitted in support of his complaint, as Brown alleged in his brief
that “the extant Policies and Procedures of the [SOTP] violate[] Federal Laws of
‘Separation of Church and State,’ e.g., 1st Amendment, Establishment Clause by
their initiation of prayer into the alleged [therapeutic program].” Id. , Doc. 4
at 24.
In response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Brown was
required to go beyond his pleadings and “‘set forth specific facts’ that would be
admissible in evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find for [him].”
Adler , 144 F.3d at 671 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). Brown failed to carry this
burden, however, as he failed to provide the district court with specific facts
describing the role of the serenity prayer in the therapy sessions that he personally
attended. As a result, Brown failed to rebut defendants’ assertion that he was not
required to participate in a serenity prayer. He has likewise failed to explain,
with the aid of either specific facts or legal argument, why defendants’ factual
assertion is not dispositive of his Establishment Clause claim. Accordingly, the
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district court acted correctly in entering summary judgment on Brown’s
Establishment Clause claim.
With respect to the alleged masturbation satiation sessions, our review of
the record reveals that Brown failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
concerning this aspect of his First Amendment claim. The claim is therefore
barred by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). 5
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Brown’s motion to
proceed in forma pauperis was granted by the district court. He is reminded that
he is obligated to continue making partial payments toward the balance of the
assessed fees and costs, until they are paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
5
We also note that Brown has conceded in his opening brief that the
masturbation satiation sessions were a part of a sex offender treatment program at
the Joseph Harp Correctional Center (JHCC), where he was initially incarcerated,
and not at JLCC. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 6, 8. As a result, this aspect of
Brown’s First Amendment claim also fails on the merits, because: (1) he has not
asserted claims against any of the prison staff members at JHCC, and he therefore
has no basis to recover money damages; and (2) he is no longer incarcerated at
JHCC, and he therefore has no basis for seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.
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