United States v. Miller , 114 F. App'x 375 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 8 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 04-4047
(D. Ct. No. 02-CR-502-DKW)
SURMAN MILLER, (D. Utah)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, BRISCOE, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in
the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Surman Miller pleaded guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a
minor “within the Indian country” in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2243(a) and
1153(a). On appeal, Mr. Miller challenges the District Court’s finding that it was
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
without authority to depart downward for diminished capacity pursuant to U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5K2.0 (2003) (“U.S.S.G.”) when a downward
departure is not permitted under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. We take jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(2) and AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Miller entered a guilty plea on August 21, 2002 in a one-count
indictment for sexual abuse of a minor within Indian country. Mr. Miller’s prior
convictions placed him in criminal history category VI, which has a sentencing
range of 188 to 235 months. He subsequently filed a motion for downward
departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0 on the grounds that his mental condition
reduced his culpability for the offense and was present to an exceptional degree
not contemplated by the diminished capacity guideline found at U.S.S.G. §
5K2.13. On March 1, 2004, the District Court denied Mr. Miller’s motion to
depart downward and sentenced him to 188 months in prison followed by a 36-
month term of supervised release. Mr. Miller timely appealed the District Court’s
finding that it had no authority to depart downward under § 5K2.0.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction to hear Mr. Miller’s appeal. Generally, “a
district court’s refusal to exercise its discretion and depart downward from the
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sentencing guidelines is not appealable.” United States v. Sheehan , 371 F.3d
1213, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 2004). However, we have jurisdiction in this case
because the District Court unambiguously stated that it lacked discretion to depart
downward, and a District Court’s statement that it lacks the authority to depart
downward is sufficient to permit us to review its decision. See id . (recognizing
that this Court “may exercise jurisdiction . . . in the very rare circumstance that
the district court states that it does not have any authority to depart . . . for the
entire class of circumstances proffered by the defendant”).
B. Standard of Review
The District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines is reviewed
de novo. Sheehan , 371 F.3d at 1216. However, de novo review is only
appropriate if the issue was properly raised below. United States v. Ruiz-Gea ,
340 F.3d 1181, 1185 (10th Cir. 2003). Failure to raise the issue below results in
review for plain error. Id.C. Downward Departures for “Diminished Capacity”
Though mental and emotional conditions are not ordinarily relevant in
determining whether a downward departure is warranted, see U.S.S.G. § 5H1.3,
Chapter 5, Part K, Subpart 2 of the Guidelines provide for certain exceptions, see
id. The relevant portions of the Guideline provisions at issue in this appeal
provide the following: Section 5K2.13 establishes a “Diminished Capacity”
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departure, which allows a downward departure for defendants “suffering from a
significantly reduced mental capacity” that “contributed substantially to the
commission of the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13. Section 5K2.0 states that mental
and emotional conditions of the defendant not otherwise accounted for “may be
relevant to [sentencing] only if such offender characteristic or other circumstance
is present to an exceptional degree.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0.
In Mr. Miller’s motion for downward departure and at the sentencing
hearing, he argued that § 5K2.13 applies to cases where a “significantly reduced
mental capacity” contributed to the commission of the offense, while § 5K2.0
applied to all cases where a reduced mental capacity is “present to an exceptional
degree”–including cases where the condition contributed to the commission of the
offense. Mr. Miller argued that his reduced mental capacity, which contributed to
the commission of the offense, is “not merely ‘significant.’ It is statistically
‘exceptional’” and therefore he is eligible for a downward departure under §
5K2.0.
The District Court rejected Mr. Miller’s argument. Without Tenth Circuit
authority on point, it found that § 5K2.13 and § 5K2.0 are mutually exclusive
provisions – that is, § 5K2.13 governs all cases in which reduced mental capacity,
no matter how severe, contributed to commission of the offense, while § 5K2.0
applies only when the defendant’s mental state is exceptional but it did not
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contribute to the commission of the offense. Therefore, because Mr. Miller
argued that his exceptional condition contributed to the commission of his
offense, the District Court found that it had no authority to grant a departure
under § 5K2.0. 1
Two months after Mr. Miller’s sentencing hearing, we addressed this issue
in Sheehan . We held that “departures pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K2.13 are a subset
of departures allowed under § 5H1.3 based on mental and emotional conditions.
While other departure requests based on mental and emotional conditions may be
governed by § 5K2.0, diminished capacity claims are governed solely by §
5K2.13.” Sheehan, 371 F.3d. at 1218 (emphasis added). We held that a district
court has “no discretion to depart pursuant to § 5K2.0 based on diminished
capacity when such a departure was prohibited by the terms of § 5K2.13.” Id. at
1218-19. In other words, a defendant claiming that his reduced mental capacity
contributed to the commission of his offense may not circumvent the limitations
of § 5K2.13 by invoking § 5K2.0. Id. at 1217. In this case, therefore, the District
Court properly rejected Mr. Miller’s motion for downward departure pursuant to §
5K2.0.
1
The District Court also found that a downward departure was not
warranted under § 5K2.13 because Mr. Miller’s offense involved actual violence
and his criminal history indicated a need to incarcerate him to protect the public.
Mr. Miller has not appealed these findings of fact.
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Contending with this precedent on appeal, Mr. Miller now argues that the
District Court misconstrued his argument below. He claims that his argument was
that his exceptional condition will somehow affect his punishment. Specifically,
he argues that his reduced mental capacity will cause him to be vulnerable to
victimization and that he will likely need to be segregated from the general prison
population. Because this is a proper basis for a downward departure under §
5K2.0, Mr. Miller argues, the District Court erred in finding that it had no
discretion to depart from the Guidelines.
Despite Mr. Miller’s argument to the contrary, he did not raise this
circumstances-of-punishment issue to the District Court. The record reveals that
the only ground presented for Mr. Miller’s motion for downward departure was
the fact that his reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the
offense. In fact, the District Court expressly stated that diminished capacity was
“the only avenue” for downward departure argued by Mr. Miller. At the
sentencing hearing, Mr. Miller emphasized how his mental condition reduced his
culpability and “being able to reason, being able to foresee consequences of your
conduct, goes to the heart of ethical and moral culpability . . . and is directly
related to his commission of this offense.” Thus, the record clearly reflects the
fact that Mr. Miller’s sole argument for downward departure was based on his
diminished capacity in committing the offense.
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Nevertheless, Mr. Miller points to a psychologist’s report that states that
his mental disorders “increase his vulnerability and the likelihood of
victimization.” Again, Mr. Miller did not move for downward departure on this
basis below and the District Court has no duty to infer legal arguments from facts
in the record. Cf. United States v. Chavez-Marquez , 66 F.3d 259, 262 (10th Cir.
1995) (recognizing that a district court has no duty to “propose legal theories sua
sponte and rule on them”).
Because Mr. Miller did not raise his circumstances-of-punishment argument
below, we review the District Court’s failure to consider a departure on these
grounds pursuant to § 5K2.0 for plain error. Ruiz-Gea , 340 F.3d at 1185.
Resolution of whether a downward departure is warranted under § 5K2.0 turns on
factual contentions. A factual dispute concerning the applicability of a particular
guideline not brought to the attention of the district court does not rise to the
level of plain error. United States v. Yarnell , 129 F.3d 1127, 1137-38 (10th Cir.
1997). Accordingly, Mr. Miller is not entitled to relief from the District Court’s
failure to consider a downward departure based on the impact his mental health
conditions might have on the circumstances of his incarceration.
III. CONCLUSION
Finding no plain error, we AFFIRM the District Court’s decision denying
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Mr. Miller’s motion for downward departure.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Chief Circuit Judge
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