Corley v. Commissioner, SSA ( 2018 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 26, 2018
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
NONA CORLEY, on behalf of C.M.C., a
minor,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 17-5112
(D.C. No. 4:16-CV-00337-JED-FHM)
COMMISSIONER, SSA, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Nona Corley, on behalf of her minor daughter CMC, appeals the district
court’s judgment affirming the denial of supplemental security income benefits to
CMC. Exercising jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
reverse and remand for further consideration by the agency.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment isn’t binding precedent,
except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
Corley filed an application on CMC’s behalf for supplemental security income,
alleging CMC was disabled beginning November 19, 2012. Corley contends CMC, who
was born in 2002, is disabled as a result of a learning disability that limits her ability to
function at school and in her day-to-day activities.
After the agency denied the application initially and on reconsideration, Corley
requested and testified at a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ
found that while CMC’s learning disability was a severe impairment under the agency’s
regulations, she wasn’t disabled because her impairment didn’t meet or medically equal
the severity of any impairment listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P of 20 C.F.R. Part 404 (the
“listings”) or functionally equal the listings. The Appeals Council denied Corley’s
request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the Commissioner’s final decision. See
20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.
On CMC’s behalf, Corley appealed the Commissioner’s decision in federal district
court. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that the district court affirm
the Commissioner’s decision, and Corley filed objections to that recommendation. After
a de novo review of Corley’s objections, the district court accepted the magistrate judge’s
recommendation and affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
“We review the district court’s decision de novo and independently determine
whether the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and supported by substantial
evidence.” Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005). “Substantial
2
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Frantz v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1299, 1300 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “In the course of our review, we may neither reweigh the
evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). But the agency’s “failure to apply the correct legal standard or to
provide this court with a sufficient basis to determine that appropriate legal principles
have been followed is grounds for reversal.” Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1165
(10th Cir. 2005) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
A child under the age of eighteen is “disabled” if she “‘has a medically
determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe
functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.’” Briggs ex
rel. Briggs v. Massanari, 248 F.3d 1235, 1237 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i)). To meet this test, the child’s impairment must meet or functionally
equal an impairment included in the listings. See id. The ALJ found that CMC wasn’t
disabled because her learning disability neither met nor functionally equaled the listings.
Corley challenges both of these determinations, as well as the ALJ’s determination that
statements in the record concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
CMC’s impairment weren’t credible.
A. Functional Equivalence
Corley’s primary argument on appeal is that the ALJ erred in deciding that
CMC’s learning disability doesn’t functionally equal the listings. As relevant here,
3
the Social Security Administration’s regulations provide that a child’s impairment
functionally equals the listings when it results in an “extreme” limitation in at least
one of six specified domains of functioning. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a), (d). A
limitation is extreme if it “interferes very seriously with [the child’s] ability to
independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities,” and may be found when one
or more of the child’s activities is limited to this degree. Id. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i). An
extreme limitation is more than a “marked” limitation (which interferes “seriously”
with the child’s activities, id. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i)), but “does not necessarily mean a
total lack or loss of ability to function.” Id. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i). Of particular
importance here, the regulations provide that the agency “will find that [the child has]
an ‘extreme’ limitation when [the child has] a valid score that is three standard
deviations or more below the mean on a comprehensive standardized test designed to
measure ability or functioning in that domain, and [the child’s] day-to-day
functioning in domain-related activities is consistent with that score.” Id.
§ 416.926a(e)(3)(iii) (emphasis added).
Corley argues that as a result of her learning disability CMC has an extreme
limitation in the domain of Acquiring and Using Information and hence has an
impairment that functionally equals the listings. As the name suggests, this domain
focuses on how well a child learns information and is able to use the information she
learns. Id. § 416.926a(g). The degree of any limitation is determined by comparing
the child’s functioning in this domain to the typical functioning of children of the
same age who do not have impairments. Id. § 416.926a(f)(1). For a school-aged
4
child like CMC (age 6 to 11), the regulations state that a typical child is “able to learn
to read, write, and do math, and discuss history and science,” and to use these skills
in academic and daily living situations by, among other things, “reading about
various subjects.” Id. § 416.926a(g)(2)(iv).
The ALJ found that CMC was limited in the Acquiring and Using Information
domain, but only to a marked degree. In making this determination, the ALJ was
required to consider all evidence in the case record. Id. § 416.926a(f)(1). And while
the ALJ was not required to discuss all such evidence, “in addition to discussing the
evidence supporting his decision, the ALJ also must discuss the uncontroverted
evidence he chooses not rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he
rejects.” Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus, an ALJ
“may not ignore evidence that does not support his decision, especially when that
evidence is significantly probative.” Briggs, 248 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Corley argues the ALJ failed to comply with these requirements, pointing to
both the uncontested record regarding CMC’s limitations in this domain, as well as
her scores on the Woodcock Johnson III standardized test. We agree.
CMC’s scores on the Woodcock Johnson III test show that she is more than
three standard deviations below the mean for her age group in broad reading and
basic reading skills, and almost as limited in reading comprehension and basic
5
writing skills.1 In fact, these scores indicate that CMC is in the 0.4% to less than
0.1% rank in reading in her age group. But rather than discussing this highly
probative evidence and explaining why he chose not to rely on it, the ALJ effectively
ignored it by reporting only that CMC’s Woodcock Johnson III test scores for
reading and writing were “low.” Aplt. App. Vol. II at 24. Nor did the ALJ discuss
whether CMC’s “day-to-day functioning in domain-related activities is consistent
with” the Woodcock Johnson III scores indicating that she was extremely limited in
the domain of Acquiring and Using Information, as relevant to determining whether
she has an extreme limitation under § 416.926a(e)(3)(iii).
The ALJ further ignored or minimized evidence in the record that supported a
finding that CMC’s functioning in this domain was consistent with her Woodcock
Johnson III reading and writing scores.2 For example, in addition to failing to
acknowledge CMC’s extremely low scores in these activities, the ALJ doesn’t
mention that the psychometrist who evaluated these scores concluded that CMC’s
basic reading skills and comprehension were “negligible” and her basic writing skills
“very limited.” Aplt. App. Vol. II at 244. And while the ALJ notes that CMC’s
1
The Commissioner doesn’t dispute that the Woodcock Johnson III test is a
“comprehensive standardized test” for purposes of measuring CMC’s function in the
Acquiring and Using Information domain, that her reading-related scores on this test
are valid, or that at least two of these scores are three standard deviations or more
below the mean as relevant to determining whether she has an extreme limitation
under § 416.926a(e)(3)(iii).
2
We also note that the ALJ doesn’t explain the basis for his “marked”
determination, and instead just recounts the record without analysis.
(continued)
6
4th grade special education teacher reported that her “reading and math skills were
below grade level,” id. at 25, this account was incomplete at minimum because the
record in fact consistently shows that CMC’s reading-related functions are more than
two grade levels below her peers, see, e.g., id. at 225.3
The ALJ also reported several times that testing indicates that CMC’s
intellectual ability and intelligence are average to low average, thereby suggesting
that she isn’t greatly limited in learning and using information. But in doing so, he
failed to mention that the record also consistently reports that as a result of her
learning disability CMC has “significant aptitude/achievement discrepancies in the
areas of reading and writing skills.” Id. at 225; see id. at 196 (same), 213 (same). In
other words, “[w]hen compared to her overall intellectual ability, [CMC’s]
achievement is significantly lower than predicted in the areas of broad reading, basic
reading skills, reading comprehension, and basic writing skills.” Id. at 245
(psychometrist evaluating CMC’s Woodcock Johnson III test scores). This is
significant probative information that undercuts the ALJ’s reliance on CMC’s
aptitude scores and thus warranted discussion. Cf. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(4)(ii)(A)
(recognizing that the agency shouldn’t rely on an IQ score to determine a child’s
degree of limitation when “other evidence shows that [the child’s] impairment(s) causes
3
The record also shows that CMC’s teachers and other school officials
consistently reported that CMC is a hard worker who tries to keep up with her peers
but just can’t do so.
7
[her] to function in school, home, and the community far below [her] expected level of
functioning based on this score”).
The ALJ further recites the good grades CMC received in one year, including a
97% in reading, to suggest that she was not extremely limited in the domain of
Acquiring and Using Information. But he fails to include important context
regarding these grades, which is that CMC was in special education classes for
reading and language arts at this time and received “modified assignments, tests and
grading,” reading assistance, and other program modifications as a result of her
learning disability. Aplt. App. Vol. II at 217 (emphasis added); id. at 229 (same); see
also SSR 09-3p, 2009 WL 396025, at *3 (Feb. 17, 2009) (identifying such
accommodations as “helpful information” in determining the severity of a limitation
in learning and using information); Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 696, 700
(7th Cir. 2009) (concluding ALJ’s reliance on child’s grades was deficient when he
failed to take into account modifications teachers made to the child’s school
assignments in response to his limitations). In addition, the ALJ didn’t mention that
the same Individual Education Plan (IEP) reporting these grades again concluded that
CMC was “severely impair[ed]” in progressing in the general education curriculum
as a result of “significant discrepancies in the areas of reading and writing skills.”
Aplt. App. Vol. II at 213; id. at 225 (same). The ALJ also minimized the
significance of CMC’s later grades, stating only that they showed CMC was “below
average” in reading, language arts, and social studies. Id. at 23. In fact, CMC
received Ds and Fs in these subjects, despite receiving modified assignments, reading
8
assistance, and other program modifications, see id. at 223 (2013-2014 report card),
200 (supplementary assistance and program modifications for this school year). Nor
does the ALJ mention that school officials deemed CMC’s reading skills so limited
that they directed that state and district assessment tests (except for the reading test)
be read to her. See id. at 218, 230; see also id. at 201. This is all significantly
probative evidence the ALJ apparently rejected but without discussion, contrary to
the legal standards stated above.
It also appears the ALJ failed to carefully consider other evidence he cited in
support of his finding that CMC didn’t have an extreme limitation in the domain of
Acquiring and Using Information. In particular, the ALJ reported that he afforded
“significant weight” to the State Agency medical opinions, id. at 23, both of which
found CMC had only “marked” limitations in this domain, id. at 56, 63. But the
agency’s psychologists failed to consider one of the two teacher questionnaires that
was available to them in reaching this conclusion. Compare id. at 54-55, 62
(reporting Feb. 15, 2013 and Nov. 18, 2013 teacher questionnaires in the “evidence
of record”), with id. at 56, 63 (discussing only Nov. 18, 2013 questionnaire in
evaluating CMC’s limitations in Acquiring and Using Information domain). This
omission was significant because CMC’s third grade regular and special education
teachers reported in their February 2013 questionnaire that CMC had “a very serious
problem” (which corresponds to an “extreme” limitation under the regulations) in six
of the ten activities in this domain, including all of those relating to reading and
9
writing.4 Id. at 136. The state psychologists also failed to consider whether CMC
qualified as having an extreme limitation as a result of her Woodcock Johnson III
reading and writing scores and evidence of record consistent with them. There is no
indication in his decision that the ALJ recognized these omissions or took them into
account in determining the weight to be accorded to these opinions.5
The ALJ also doesn’t discuss Corley’s statements in her 2013 function report
regarding CMC’s limitations or her 2014 hearing testimony in concluding that CMC
had only marked limitations in the Acquiring and Using Information domain. See id.
at 24-25. Presumably, the ALJ did so based on his adverse credibility determination,
but this determination was also legally flawed for the reasons we discuss below.
But even without considering Corley’s statements, we conclude the ALJ
ignored or failed to accurately report and discuss significant uncontroverted,
4
The Commissioner speculates that the ALJ may have seen improvement in
CMC’s learning limitations because CMC’s fourth grade special education teacher
didn’t also rate CMC as having a “very serious” problem in these areas, rating them
as “serious” or “obvious” problems instead. Aplt. App. Vol. II at 185. But the ALJ’s
decision doesn’t include this reasoning, and “this court may not create or adopt post-
hoc rationalizations to support the ALJ’s decision that are not apparent from the ALJ’s
decision itself.” Haga v. Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205, 1207-08 (10th Cir. 2007). Moreover,
it’s not clear that CMC’s fourth grade teacher observed the improvement posited by the
Commissioner, because this teacher also commented just below the cited ratings that
CMC’s “written expression skills are significantly below grade level” and that “[s]he
requires much repetition in order to retain new material.” Aplt. App. Vol. II at 185.
5
And even without considering these omissions, it’s unclear from the ALJ’s
decision why he thought these state psychologist opinions were so consistent with the
objective medical evidence of record and the claimant’s alleged activities of daily
living that they should be afforded significant weight. See Aplt. App. Vol. II at 23
(stating opinions deserved significant weight for these reasons).
(continued)
10
probative evidence in the record that didn’t support his decision that CMC’s
limitations in the domain of Acquiring and Learning Information were less than
extreme. This was legal error and requires that we reverse and remand this case for
the ALJ to assess and discuss whether CMC is disabled under the proper standards
based on all of the relevant evidence of record.6
B. Credibility Determination
Corley also argues the ALJ’s credibility determination is legally flawed and
requires remand. We agree.
“In determining whether a child is disabled, the agency will accept a parent’s
statement of a child’s symptoms if the child is unable to adequately describe them.”
Knight ex rel. P.K. v. Colvin, 756 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2014). “In such a case, the
ALJ must make specific findings concerning the credibility of the parent’s testimony, just
as he would if the child were testifying,” Briggs, 248 F.3d at 1239, and “must consider
the entire case record and give specific reasons for the weight given to the
individual’s statements,” SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *4 (July 2, 1996).7 Based
6
This error was not harmless because reasonable factfinders, considering the
evidence discussed above, could find that CMC has an extreme limitation in the
Acquiring and Using Information domain and hence has an impairment that
functionally equals the listings. See Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1145
(10th Cir. 2004) (stating ALJ’s error is harmless “where, based on material the ALJ
did at least consider (just not properly), we could confidently say that no reasonable
administrative factfinder, following the correct analysis, could have resolved the
factual matter in any other way”).
7
SSR 96-7p was in effect at the time of the ALJ’s decision but has since been
superseded by SSR 16-3p. See SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029 (Mar. 16, 2016).
11
on this review “the ALJ may find all, only some, or none of an individual’s
allegations to be credible.” Briggs, 248 F.3d at 1239 (internal quotation marks
omitted). In addition, all credibility findings must be “closely and affirmatively linked to
substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Knight, 756 F.3d
at 1176 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The ALJ’s credibility determination in this case didn’t comply with these legal
standards. The determination in its entirety states only that “the statements concerning
the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [CMC’s] symptoms are not entirely
credible for the reasons explained below.” Aplt. App. Vol. II at 23. At the outset, it
is unclear from the determination which “statements” in the record the ALJ found
“not entirely credible.” Id. He could be referring to all or some of Corley’s
statements in her 2014 hearing testimony, those included in her 2013 written report
regarding her daughter’s functions,8 or even all or some of the statements by CMC’s
teachers and school administrators in the two teacher questionnaires and three IEPs in
the record.
Furthermore, there are no “reasons explained below” for the ALJ’s credibility
determination. All that follows this determination is the ALJ’s report that he
afforded significant weight to the State Agency medical opinions and his seven-page
8
We note that the state psychologists considered Corley’s 2013 function
report in assessing CMC’s functioning and apparently credited her statements there
because they agreed that “the individual’s statements about the intensity, persistence,
and functionally limiting effects of the symptoms [are] substantiated by the objective
medical evidence alone.” Aplt. App. Vol. II at 57, 64.
12
assessment of CMC’s limitations in each of the six domains followed by his
conclusion that CMC isn’t disabled. Thus, we are “left to guess what evidence, if
any, belies” whatever statements the ALJ found weren’t credible. Knight, 756 F.3d
at 1176. To the extent the ALJ’s adverse credibility determination encompassed
Corley’s 2013 and 2014 statements regarding CMC’s limitations in the domain of
Acquiring and Using Knowledge, we also note that a significant portion of the record
evidence appears to support these statements, a circumstance that heightens the need for
the ALJ to explain why he found these statements weren’t credible.9 See Briggs,
248 F.3d at 1239. The boilerplate, non-specific statement the ALJ provided doesn’t
suffice, as it doesn’t allow us to determine if his credibility determination is
supported by substantial evidence.10 We therefore reverse and remand for a proper
credibility determination as well.
9
With respect to CMC’s functioning in this domain, Corley stated in the
2013 function report that CMC could read simple words and print some letters and
her name, but was unable to read capital letters of the alphabet, read capital and small
letters, read and understand simple sentences, read and understand stories in books or
magazines, write in longhand, spell most 3-4 letter words, or write a simple story
with 6-7 sentences. Aplt. App. Vol. II at 156. She also reported that CMC cries
when asked to read out loud because she doesn’t know the words, id., and that she
can’t tell time or make change and doesn’t know the days of the week or months of
the year, id., which are among the bench marks the SSA has set for a school-age child
in the Acquiring and Learning Information domain, see SSR 09-3p at *5. Corley’s
2014 hearing testimony regarding CMC’s limitations in this domain is generally
consistent with her 2013 statements.
10
The ALJ’s error was not harmless because reasonable factfinders could find
Corley’s statements credible and that they support a finding of disability.
13
C. Listing 112.02
Corley also argues that the ALJ committed legal error by failing to properly
consider whether CMC’s impairment met or equaled Listing 112.02 (Organic Mental
Disorders).11 All the ALJ said on this point is that he “carefully compared the
claimant’s signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings with the criteria specified in all
of the Listings of Impairments . . . [with] specific emphasis upon 112.00 Mental
Disorders. Based on this analysis, the undersigned finds the claimant’s impairments
do not meet or equal the criteria established” for any listing. Aplt. App. Vol. II at 20.
This generalized, conclusory treatment is inadequate under our decision in Clifton,
which required the ALJ “to discuss the evidence and explain why he found” CMC did
not meet or equal Listing 112.02 and any other listings he considered, 79 F.3d
at 1009.
The magistrate judge nonetheless recommended that the ALJ’s decision on this
issue be upheld, based on his analysis of Listing 112.02’s requirements. Corley
didn’t address this recommendation in her objections to the magistrate judge’s report
and recommendation. “We have adopted a firm-waiver rule providing that the failure
to make timely objections to a magistrate judge’s recommendations waives appellate
review of both factual and legal questions.” Allman v. Colvin, 813 F.3d 1326, 1329
(10th Cir. 2016) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted). This rule applies in
Social Security appeals, see, e.g., id.; Berna v. Chater, 101 F.3d 631, 632-33
11
The Social Security Administration revised this listing and renamed it
“Neurocognitive Disorders” after the ALJ’s decision.
14
(10th Cir. 1996), and precludes appellate review of this issue in a counseled case
such as this unless “the interests of justice require review,” Allman, 813 F.3d at 1329
(internal quotation marks omitted). This is a high standard, similar to plain error
review. See Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1120, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005).
Corley doesn’t argue this standard is met here and thereby waived this argument for
purposes of this appeal.12 See Allman, 813 F.3d at 1330 (finding waiver where a
counseled party failed to object to a magistrate judge’s recommendation and didn’t
demonstrate that the interests of justice compelled appellate review).
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we conclude the ALJ failed to comply with the relevant legal
standards in determining whether CMC had extreme limitations in the Acquiring and
Using Information domain and in his credibility determination. Accordingly, we reverse
the denial of benefits and remand this action to the district court with directions to
remand it to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
Entered for the Court
Nancy L. Moritz
Circuit Judge
12
“Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which
(3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Morales-Fernandez, 418 F.3d at 1122-23
(internal quotation marks omitted).
15