Lundahl v. Fireman's Fund Insurance , 129 F. App'x 479 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                    F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                  APR 28 2005
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT               PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    HOLLI LUNDAHL,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.                                                No. 04-4243
    (D.C. No. 2:04-CV-87-PGC)
    FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE                             (D. Utah)
    COMPANY, also known as Source
    One Mortgage Services; FOUR ACES
    MOBILE HOME ESTATES; SAFETY
    INVESTMENT CORPORATION;
    COMMUNITY ASSET
    MANAGEMENT; CNA FINANCIAL
    CORPORATION, also known as CNA
    Insurance, also known as Loes
    Corporation; W. RHODES, Riverside
    County Sheriff; TOM SLESCH;
    MICHAEL SLESCH; RALPH
    BETTY; DAVID BOYCE; MICHAEL
    MIHELICH; CITIGROUP; MICHAEL
    B. FLESCH; ROBERT T. FLESH,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT          *
    Before SEYMOUR , KELLY , and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
    of this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    In this matter, Ms. Holli Lundahl appeals from the district court’s order
    denying her request to withdraw a bankruptcy reference. She also argues that the
    district court’s order, which effectively approved the bankruptcy court’s remand
    of the underlying adversary proceeding back to state court, was improper.
    As an initial proposition, we note, as we did in the Order & Judgment filed
    in appeal number 04-4236 this same day, that Ms. Lundahl’s bankruptcy case was
    dismissed on December 23, 2003. The bankruptcy court then remanded or
    dismissed all related adversary proceedings, including the one underlying this
    appeal. That remand order entered on December 29, 2003. The motion to
    withdraw the bankruptcy reference was filed on January 13, 2004, some two
    weeks after the remand order entered. It was docketed on January 28, 2004.
    Although relying on several grounds to reject the motion to withdraw the
    reference, the district court initially noted that it was moot in light of the
    dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case. We review that determination        de
    novo. Faustin v. City & County of Denver     , 
    268 F.3d 942
    , 947 (10th Cir. 2001).
    On this record, it is clear the district court’s determination was correct. As there
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    was no longer a bankruptcy matter pending at the time the motion to withdraw the
    reference was filed, the issue was moot.
    Moreover, we will not consider Ms. Lundahl’s claims that the bankruptcy
    court’s remand order was suspect. Pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1452
    (b), the remand
    order is not reviewable.    See Hawking v. Ford Motor Credit Co.    , 
    210 F.3d 540
    ,
    550 (5th Cir. 2000); In re United States Brass Corp ., 
    110 F.3d 1261
    , 1265-66 (7th
    Cir. 1997); In re Cathedral of the Incarnation In the Diocese of Long Island    ,
    
    90 F.3d 28
    , 31-32 (2d Cir. 1996).
    As we have noted previously, Ms. Lundahl’s arguments border on specious.
    Her description of the record is inaccurate, at best. We warn her that this pattern
    of vexatious litigation may warrant the imposition of sanctions or other
    restrictions.   See Winslow v. Hunter (In re Winslow)   , 
    17 F.3d 314
    , 315-16 (10th
    Cir. 1994).
    Ms. Lundahl’s request to proceed     in forma pauperis is denied, and this
    matter is DISMISSED.       See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(i).
    Entered for the Court
    Stephanie K. Seymour
    Circuit Judge
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