Nicholson v. Jefferson County , 138 F. App'x 76 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 8, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SENECA NICHOLSON, and a class of
African American Employees and
ex-employees of Jefferson County who
have [been] unfairly treated and/or
terminated, and a class of probationary
employees who have been
disadvantage [sic] in violation of the
Fair Labor Standards Act by the
customs and policies of Jefferson
County, including the failure to pay
overtime wages owed, No. 04-1140
(D.C. No. 02-F-2036 (CBS))
Plaintiff - Appellant, (D. Colo.)
v.
JEFFERSON COUNTY; JEFFERSON
COUNTY DIRECTOR OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES;
JEFFERSON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENT, (EPSDT); CHRIS
SCHMIDT,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before HENRY , BRISCOE , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Seneca Nicholson, 1
a former employee of defendant Jefferson
County Department of Health and Environment, appeals from two district court
orders in this suit under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k),
Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and
1985. The district court ruled in the first order that defendant Jefferson County
was not a proper defendant and dismissed it from the proceedings. The second
order disposed of the case on the merits, dismissing some claims under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and granting summary judgment on the rest. We affirm
for the reasons stated below.
Firm Waiver Rule
Defendants argue that plaintiff lost her right to challenge the dispositive
orders issued by the district court by failing to file timely objections to the
magistrate judge’s prior recommendations. We agree as to the second order but
1
Plaintiff initially sought certification for a class action, but this was denied
and the matter has not been pursued on appeal.
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disagree as to the first. Before addressing each specific order, we set out the
general principles that govern the matter.
A. General Legal Principles
“Within ten days after being served with a copy [of the proposed findings
and recommendations of a magistrate judge], any party may serve and file written
objections to such proposed findings and recommendations as provided by rules
of court[, and a] judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those
portions . . . to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The statutory
objection period has significant appellate repercussions: “This court has adopted
a firm waiver rule which provides that a litigant’s failure to file timely objections
to a magistrate’s report and recommendation waives appellate review of both the
factual and legal determinations.” Key Energy Res. Inc. v. Merrill (In re Key
Energy Res. Inc.) , 230 F.3d 1197, 1199-1200 (10 th Cir. 2000) (quotations and
alteration omitted).
The waiver rule applies to pro se litigants, “so long as they were properly
informed of the consequences of their failure to object.” Theede v. United States
Dep’t of Labor , 172 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10 th Cir. 1999) (quotation and alteration
omitted); see, e.g., Trierweiler v. Croxton & Trench Holding Corp. , 90 F.3d 1523,
1533 & n.5 (10 th Cir. 1996); Fottler v. United States , 73 F.3d 1064, 1065 (10 th
Cir. 1996). And a district court’s discretionary election to excuse noncompliance
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with § 636(b)(1) and consider the merits of a matter for purposes of its own
review does not negate the appellate -waiver consequences of the noncompliance.
Key Energy Res. Inc., 230 F.3d at 1201 n.3 (following Vega v. Suthers , 195 F.3d
573, 580 (10 th Cir. 1999)).
The waiver rule is subject to exception “where the interests of justice so
require.” Theede , 172 F.3d at 1268 (quotation omitted). A pro se litigant’s effort
to comply, the force and plausibility of the explanation for her failure to comply,
and the substance of her arguments on the merits are all relevant considerations in
this regard. See generally Wirsching v. Colorado , 360 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (10 th
Cir. 2004); Theede , 172 F.3d at 1268.
B. March 2004 Order
On March 16, 2004, the magistrate judge recommended that the district
court grant pending motions for dismissal/summary judgment filed by defendants
Jefferson County Department of Health and Environment and Chris Schmidt. The
recommendation was mailed the same day, but not stamped filed until March 18.
Calculated from the date of service, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and extended by
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) (excluding weekends and holidays from deadlines of ten days
or less) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (adding three days when relevant period follows
service by mail), the deadline for objections was April 2, 2004. On that date, the
district court entered an order in which it noted that no objections had been filed,
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reviewed the matter de novo nevertheless, and summarily adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation. No objections from plaintiff arrived that day or in the
days that followed. Instead, plaintiff eventually filed this appeal.
Based on the principles set out above, we conclude that plaintiff has waived
her right to appellate review in connection with this order. The only argument
she advances against application of the waiver rule here is unpersuasive, and no
others appear from the record. She argues, based on the March 18 filing date
stamped on the magistrate judge’s recommendation, that she believed (and still
contends) that the deadline for objections was April 5 and, thus, the order was
premature. Aplt. Opening Br. at 8. Actually, as just noted, the deadline properly
determined from the date of mailing was April 2, the day on which the district
court entered its order. And any argument regarding deadline confusion loses its
force in light of plaintiff’s unexplained failure to file objections when she thought
they were due. Finally, given the thorough, reasoned, and authoritatively
supported analysis set out by the magistrate judge and adopted by the district
court after its de novo review, this is not a case where special concerns about the
merits compel us to overlook the other considerations and excuse plaintiff’s
waiver.
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C. January 2004 Order
On January 2, 2004, the magistrate judge recommended granting Jefferson
County’s motion to dismiss, which asserted that Jefferson County Department of
Health and Environment was plaintiff’s employer and that the two entities were
legally distinct. The recommendation was filed and served by mail three days
later. On January 20, 2004, the district court issued an order noting that no
objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation had been filed, reviewing
the matter de novo nonetheless, and summarily adopting the recommendation to
dismiss Jefferson County from the case.
In this instance, the district court did act prematurely. Measured from the
date of service and extended by the pertinent provisions of Rule 6, plaintiff had
until January 23 to file objections. More importantly, plaintiff may have received
the district court’s order granting Jefferson County’s motion to dismiss before the
time for objection expired, in which event she would understandably have been
deterred from filing objections in light of their evident futility. Under these
circumstances, we deem it appropriate to resolve plaintiff’s appeal on the merits.
Review of January 2004 Order on the Merits
The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation to
dismiss Jefferson County from the case because it is an entity distinct from
plaintiff’s employer and, thus, was not a proper defendant here. We agree.
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Plaintiff’s claims relate to her employment with the Jefferson County
Department of Health and Environment (JCDHE). The JCDHE is “a political
subdivision of the state with its own statutory rights and mandate” and, as such,
“is a legal entity, separate and distinct from the board of county commissioners
[i.e., from Jefferson County 2
].” Jefferson County Health Servs. Ass’n v. Feeney ,
974 P.2d 1001, 1004 (Colo. 1998) (en banc). Under the governing statutory
scheme, a county board of health appoints a public health administrator who, as
executive and administrative head of the department, is responsible for hiring,
compensating, and directing department personnel consistent with policies set by
the board of health. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 25-1-505(1), (3). See generally id.§§ 25-1-501 to 516. In Feeney , the Colorado Supreme Court underscored the
independent legal status of the county board of health by holding that when suit is
brought on a claim against the county health department, the notice requirements
of the state governmental immunity act are not satisfied by sending a notice to the
board of county commissioners, but only by sending a notice to the county board
of health, since “the county board of health, not the board of county
commissioners, is the governing body of a county health department.” Feeney ,
974 P.2d at 1002.
2
Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-11-105, actions against the county are brought
against the county board of commissioners. See Calahan v. Jefferson County , 429
P.2d 301, 302 (Colo. 1967) (applying predecessor statute).
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Plaintiff points out that JCDHE follows personnel rules drafted by the
Jefferson County commissioners. But that is only because the board of health
overseeing JCDHE elected to adopt those rules, and such election did not, indeed
could not, effect a relinquishment of its authority over personnel matters to the
county commissioners. See Johnson v. Jefferson County Bd. of Health , 662 P.2d
463, 467, 471 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (noting JCDHE’s adoption of county
personnel rules but holding this did not override health board’s statutory authority
over employment of its administrator, because “[a] county board of health, as a
political subdivision of the state, may not by rule or regulation abdicate the
authority and responsibility delegated to it by the legislature”). Plaintiff also
notes that her wages were paid by checks issued by the county treasurer, but this
likewise does not undermine the district court’s analysis. By statute, the county
treasurer also serves as treasurer of the county health department, Colo. Rev. Stat.
§ 25-1-505(2), and, in the latter role, the treasurer’s issuance of checks to the
department’s employees is entirely consistent with the department’s statutory
responsibility over its own personnel matters.
This court has emphasized the importance of legislative delineations of
administrative responsibility and rejected efforts to extend Title VII liability
beyond the plaintiff’s direct governmental employer, “since such [an extension]
effectively negates what we assume was a state’s conscious choice to create
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distinct organizations.” Sandoval v. City of Boulder , 388 F.3d 1312, 1323 n.3
(10th Cir. 2004); see also Bristol v. Bd. of County Comm’rs , 312 F.3d 1213, 1219
(10th Cir. 2002). “Absent some indication that the state’s decision was motivated
by a desire to circumvent the civil rights laws or other laws, principles of comity
counsel federal courts not to be too quick to erase organizational dividing lines
drawn up by state authorities.” Sandoval , 388 F.3d at 1323 n.3. The district court
properly accorded due effect to the organizational scheme drawn up by the state
legislature here.
Motions to Dismiss Appeal
Before briefing this appeal, defendants moved for summary dismissal on
two grounds, neither of which is cognizable under our local rules. Motions for
summary disposition are limited to: “(a) a motion to dismiss the entire case for
lack of appellate jurisdiction; (b) a motion for summary disposition because of a
supervening change of law or mootness; or (c) a motion to remand for additional
trial court or administrative proceedings.” 10 th Cir. R. 27.2(A)(1). Defendants’
motions for dismissal, based on the waiver rule discussed above and on plaintiff’s
delay in seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, do not fall into any of the
designated categories. Such non-jurisdictional deficiencies relating to the merits
or to matters of procedure are not proper grounds for summary disposition. See,
e.g. , Joseph A. ex rel. Wolfe v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs. , 28 F.3d 1056, 1059
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(10 th Cir. 1994); Braley v. Campbell , 832 F.2d 1504, 1509 (10 th Cir. 1987).
Defendants’ motions are, therefore, denied.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Defendants’ motions for
summary dismissal are DENIED. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis
is GRANTED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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