United States v. Bell , 159 F. App'x 48 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                                             F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    December 20, 2005
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    Clerk of Court
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    No. 05-6208
    v.                                              (D.C. Nos. 99-CV-00348 and
    CR-96-84-T)
    HAROLD EUGENE BELL,                                    (W.D. Okla.)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER
    DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
    Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
    Harold Eugene Bell, a prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
    appealability (“COA”) to appeal from the district court’s denial of his “Motion
    for Reconsideration and Clarification,” which sought reconsideration of an earlier
    motion to have his initial § 2255 motion reopened. 1 The earlier motion (filed in
    2005) sought reopening on the basis that the district court re-characterized certain
    pleadings (filed in 1999) and did not advise Mr. Bell of the need to raise every
    available constitutional claim so as to avoid the restrictions associated with
    second or successive § 2255 motions. R. Doc. 239. The district court construed
    1
    Mr. Bell also seeks to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
    the motion for reconsideration as arising under Rule 60(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and
    denied it.
    Briefly, by way of background, Mr. Bell was convicted in 1997 of
    conspiracy to distribute cocaine powder and cocaine base (i.e., crack), and
    sentenced to life imprisonment. This court affirmed that conviction in United
    States v. Bell, 
    154 F.3d 1205
     (10th Cir. 1998). Next, Mr. Bell filed a motion for
    judgment of acquittal and/or a new trial on February 22, 1999. The district court
    construed the motion as a request for habeas relief under § 2255, and denied it
    because Mr. Bell failed to present any newly discovered evidence. Mr. Bell
    sought a COA in order to appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2255 motion.
    In an unpublished opinion, we determined that the district court did not err in
    treating the motion as one requesting relief under § 2255, and subsequently
    denied Mr. Bell’s request for a COA. United States v. Bell, 
    1999 WL 713320
     at
    *1 (10th Cir. Sept. 14, 1999) (unpublished).
    We agree with the district court that the present motion to reconsider may
    be characterized as a Rule 60(b) motion. In the § 2254 context, the Supreme
    Court recently held that a Rule 60(b) motion should not be construed as a second
    or successive habeas petition where it does not add a new claim for relief or
    challenge the district court’s resolution of prior claims on the merits. Gonzalez v.
    Crosby, 
    125 S. Ct. 2641
    , 2648 (2005). Where a motion challenges a perceived
    -2-
    “defect in the integrity of the proceedings” under § 2254, a Rule 60(b) motion is
    appropriate. The reasoning of Gonzalez v. Crosby has been extended to § 2255
    motions which implicate similar concerns of successiveness. United States v.
    Scott, 
    414 F.3d 815
    , 816 (7th Cir. 2005).
    With liberal construction, Mr. Bell may be said to be challenging the
    mechanics of the disposition of his prior motion. Mr. Bell needs a COA to
    proceed. Gonzalez, 
    125 S. Ct. at
    2650 n.7. Where the district court dismisses a
    petition on procedural grounds, a COA requires the inmate to demonstrate that it
    is reasonably debatable whether (1) the petition states a valid claim of the denial
    of a constitutional right, and (2) the district court’s procedural ruling is correct.
    Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000); see also Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
    537 U.S. 322
    , 327 (2003).
    The district court’s resolution is not debatable at all. Given an abuse of
    discretion standard of review, no reasonable jurist could conclude that the district
    court abused its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion, which in and of
    itself was successive of the initial motion to reopen. Moreover, we had approved
    of the district court’s handling of the matter as a § 2255 motion previously. Bell,
    
    1999 WL 713320
     at *1.
    We DENY IFP, DENY a COA, and DISMISS the appeal.
    Entered for the Court
    -3-
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-6208

Citation Numbers: 159 F. App'x 48

Judges: Kelly, O'Brien, Tymkovich

Filed Date: 12/20/2005

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024