United States v. Bailey , 245 F. App'x 768 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 14, 2007
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 07-5062
v. (D.C. Nos. 06-CV-456-HDC and
02-CR-169-HDC)
C ARL B AILEY , (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, M U RPH Y, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Carl Bailey, a federal inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) so that he may challenge the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. A jury
convicted M r. Bailey of conspiring to distribute marijuana, and the district court
sentenced him 236 months’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised
release. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See United States v.
Bailey, 133 F. App’x 534 (10th Cir. 2005). He then sought relief pursuant to §
2255, asserting three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district
court denied relief. Having determined that M r. Bailey has not made a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” see 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2), we deny a COA and dismiss his appeal. See Slack v. M cDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000).
W e recounted the facts underlying M r. Bailey’s case on direct appeal and
need not restate them here. See Bailey, 133 F. App’x at 535-36. The district
court understood M r. Bailey’s § 2255 motion to raise three claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Although the phrasing and order of his arguments has
changed in his application for a COA, the substance of all three issues remains
the same. The applicable law is also unchanged: a criminal defendant asserting
ineffective assistance of trial counsel must show both deficient performance and
prejudice to his defense in order to receive post-conviction relief. Strickland v.
W ashington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). M r. Bailey’s claims are deserving of a
COA only if “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the
issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.”
Slack v. M cD aniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
M r. Bailey first contends that his attorney was ineffective in failing to
object to testimony that evidence found in M r. Bailey’s apartment was marijuana
on the ground that the authorities had not tested the substance. The district court
rejected this argument, explaining:
The record establishes that Bailey’s attorney moved in limine to
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exclude from evidence the officer’s seizure of marijuana from his
apartment. The Court denied the motion. At trial, on cross
examination, Bailey’s attorney addressed the marijuana issue and the
officer who testified admitted that the substance had not been tested
by a lab to confirm it was marijuana.
R. Doc. 91, at 2. Our independent review of the record confirms that the district
court correctly recounted the sequence of events: counsel raised the issue in his
motion in limine, and, following the denial of his motion, mitigated the evidence
with a successful cross-examination at trial. See Tr. Transcript (Oct. 6-7, 2003)
at 6-9 (raising and ruling on objection); id. at 87 (eliciting testimony on cross-
examination that the substance was not tested). Plainly, this could not constitute
deficient performance and the district court’s resolution is not reasonably
debatable.
Next, M r. Bailey argues that his attorney was ineffective in failing to
introduce an allegedly-exculpatory recording of a conversation between one of his
alleged co-conspirators, Jerry Steele, and Oklahoma State Trooper Branson Perry.
The district court rejected this claim after determining that “the subject audio tape
was admitted in evidence at trial.” R. Doc. 91, at 2. Although our review of the
record indicates that the tape itself was not admitted, see Tr. Transcript (Oct. 6-7,
2003) at 140-41, a transcript of the tape was admitted into evidence, id. at 51, and
both the witness and the trooper were cross-examined about the conversation at
issue, id. at 59-62 (testimony of Trooper Perry); id. at 136 (testimony of M r.
Steele). M r. Bailey does not indicate what evidence in the tape was not
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adequately reflected in the transcript or how the introduction of the tape itself
would have affected the jury’s consideration of his case. Having reviewed the
trial transcript and M r. Bailey’s arguments, there is no deficient performance
here. Reasonable jurists therefore could not find the district court’s rejection of
M r. Bailey’s second argument reasonably debatable.
Finally, M r. Bailey contends that his attorney was ineffective in failing to
call him as a witness in his own defense. “A criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to testify in his own behalf at trial. The decision whether to
testify lies squarely with the defendant; it is not counsel’s decision.” Cannon v.
M ullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted). The
district court determined that M r. Bailey did not have credible evidence in support
of his assertion that he wanted to testify, meaning that he could not satisfy either
prong of the Strickland analysis.
In seeking a COA, M r. Bailey contends that the district court erred in
refusing to hold a hearing to determine whether his attorney prevented him from
testifying. Pursuant to § 2255, the court “shall hold a hearing” on a § 2255
motion “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief . . . .” M r. Bailey contends that the
affidavit he submitted in support of his motion–which indicated that he expressed
the desire to testify to counsel, see R. Doc. 76, Att. B–was sufficient to require
the court to hold a hearing.
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However, § 2255 directs the court to consider “the motion and the files and
records of the case,” id. (emphasis added), which together show that M r. Bailey
could not establish an ineffective assistance claim on this basis. W ith respect to
counsel’s performance, M r. Bailey’s general and ambiguous affidavit does not
merit a hearing. Defense counsel submitted a detailed affidavit recounting his
advice that M r. Bailey remain silent and M r. Bailey’s numerous reasons for not
wanting to testify, including the potential problems due to cross-examination. 1 R.
Doc. 85, Att. 2. M oreover, it is significant that M r. Bailey never once suggested
to the court that he wished to testify despite several opportunities to do so.
See Tr. Transcript (O ct. 6-7, 2003) at 10; id. at 323; id. at 343. Furthermore, w e
note that M r. Bailey did not testify in either of his prior trials on this charge.
Be that as it may, M r. Bailey cannot establish prejudice. In the district
court, he gave no suggestion of the content of his testimony or how it would have
affected the jury’s consideration of the evidence. In fact, he admitted, “This is
not an issue where Petitioner is alleging that his testimony would have made a
difference in the outcome of the case.” 2 R. Doc. 88 at 5. W e reject M r. Bailey’s
contention that Strickland prejudice need not be shown when the case involves the
1
M r. Bailey now attempts to refute tw o of the reasons counsel advised him
not to testify. Aplt. Br. at 4.
2
To the extent M r. Bailey now claims prejudice on appeal, the argument is
waived. See Parker v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302, 1307 (10th Cir. 2005) (claims raised
for the first time on appeal are deemed to be waived).
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right to testify. See United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1534 (11th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (requiring a showing of deficient performance and prejudice in
order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on a violation
of the right to testify). Given the lack of evidence or argument presented
regarding prejudice, no reasonable jurist could question the district court’s
rejection of M r. Bailey’s third claim.
W e DENY M r. Bailey’s request for a COA and DISM ISS his appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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