Bernard v. Ray ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 27, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
CHARLES F. BERNARD,
Petitioner-A ppellant, No. 07-7017
v. Eastern District of Oklahoma
C HA RLES R AY , (D.C. No. CIV-05-507-FHS)
Respondent-Appellee.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before BR ISC OE, M cKA Y, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Charles F. Bernard, Sr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) that would allow him to appeal from the
district court’s order denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). Because w e conclude that M r. Bernard has failed
to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” we deny
his request for a COA, and dismiss the appeal. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
Background
On January 24, 2001, a M cAlester, Oklahoma, police officer pulled over
M r. Bernard’s El Cameno after observing a traffic violation— namely, a seatbelt
hanging out the car door. The officer had been on the lookout for the car because
he had previously received from the FBI a tip that an individual named Chuck
Bernard would be traveling through M cAlester in an off-W hite El Cameno w ith a
large amount of marijuana. The FBI had acquired this information from a
confidential informant.
After issuing M r. Bernard a citation for the seatbelt violation, the officer
asked if he could search the vehicle. M r. Bernard consented. The search revealed
a false compartment which held clear plastic bags containing a brown, leafy
substance. At this point, the police obtained a search warrant and impounded the
vehicle. The subsequent search revealed that the car contained 84.5 pounds of
marijuana.
An Oklahoma jury convicted M r. Bernard of trafficking in marijuana and
recommended thirty years imprisonment, a sentence which the judge subsequently
imposed. After losing challenges on direct appeal and in state collateral
proceedings, M r. Bernard challenged the execution of his sentence by filing a
habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States D istrict Court
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. He alleged that the search of his vehicle
violated the Fourth Amendment, that his appellate counsel was ineffective for
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failing to argue that the confidential informant did not actually exist, and that
failure to allow discovery on the issue of the informant denied him a fair trial.
The district court denied his petition and M r. Bernard now applies for a COA.
Discussion
The denial of a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may be appealed
only if the district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). In order to
make such a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could
debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner
or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
M r. Bernard raises tw o claims in his COA petition: (1) that appellate
counsel was ineffective because he failed to raise on appeal the issue concerning
the existence of the confidential informant and, (2) that the trial court did not
hold a full and fair Franks hearing on the issue of the existence of the same
informant. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978).
A. Ineffectiveness of Appellate Counsel Claim
M r. Bernard argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise on
appeal the issue of whether the trial court erred in its “refusal . . . to confirm the
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existence of a confidential informant.” Appellant’s Br. 1. 1 To show
ineffectiveness of counsel a petitioner must show that counsel’s performance was
both deficient and prejudicial to his defense. Strickland v. W ashington, 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984). The Strickland standard applies to appellate as well as trial
counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 393–400 (1985); United States v. Cook,
45 F.3d 388, 392 (10th Cir. 1995). In analyzing the strategic decision to omit an
issue on appeal, we grant deference to the professional judgment of the appellate
attorney. Cargle v. M ullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2003). “W e examine
the merits of the omitted issue,” and if it “is w ithout merit, counsel’s failure to
raise it does not constitute constitutionally ineffective assistance.” Cook, 45 F.3d
at 392–93 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
The government has long had the authority to withhold the identity of
informants in “the furtherance and protection of the public interest in effective
law enforcement.” Rovario v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59 (1957). This
authority was granted to recognize the civic duty citizens have to inform the
police of illegal activity, and to encourage that cooperation by shielding
informants’ identities. Id. at 59. W hile this ability to prevent the accused from
confronting an informant is not unlimited, see id. at 60, “[d]isclosure of an
1
In his petition below, M r. Bernard further explains this claim: “[Counsel]
refused to present the claim that there was never an informant and that fact could
have been used to impeach the credibility of all of the State’s w itnesses.” R. Vol.
I, Doc. 1, at 7.
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informant is not required where the information sought from him or her would be
merely cumulative, or where the informant is not a participant in or a witness to
the crime charged.” United States v. M oralez, 908 F.2d 565, 567 (10th Cir.
1990). Seemingly in recognition of the wide latitude we give the government on
this issue, M r. Bernard is not challenging the concealment of the informant’s
identity. Rather, he challenges the actual existence of the informant. Essentially,
he asks us to overrule the trial court’s determination that the informant was a real
person.
Paul W atson, an F.B.I. Agent, testified as to the existence of the
confidential informant in this case. Based on this testimony, the trial judge found
that the confidential informant was real. In order to obtain a further evidentiary
hearing on this issue at trial, M r. Bernard would have had to make a “substantial .
. . showing” that a statement in the affidavit supporting the search warrant was (1)
false, (2) made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the
truth, and (3) necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at155–56, 171–72. M r. Bernard has not satisfied these requirements. He has
offered no evidence to show that anyone lied about the existence of the
confidential informant. Any hearing on the matter would be based on rank
speculation. “Nothing in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a state court judge . . . to assume the arresting officers are committing
perjury.” M cCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 313 (1967). Additionally, even if the
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FBI invented the informant from whole cloth, the seatbelt violation furnished the
M cAlster police with independent reasonable suspicion to stop M r. Bernard. See
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–14, 819 (1996). M r. Bernard’s
consent to the search and the subsequent uncovering of a false compartment
containing what appeared to be marijuana then furnished the police with
independent grounds to support a search warrant. Consequently, the informant
issue had no potential merit on appeal and counsel’s failure to raise it did not
constitute deficient performance. No reasonable jurist could dispute the district
court’s resolution of this issue and M r. Bernard’s application for a COA on this
ground fails.
B. Disclosing the Existence of a Confidential Inform ant
In a similar vein, M r. Bernard argues that the trial court erred by not
holding a hearing or allowing discovery on the issue of the existence of the
informant. M r. Bernard failed to present this argument on direct appeal to the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Consequently, the state court refused to
entertain the argument in M r. Bernard’s state post-conviction relief proceedings.
Claims that are defaulted in state court on adequate and independent state
procedural grounds will not be considered by a habeas court unless the petitioner
can show cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Smith v.
M ullin, 379 F.3d 919, 925 (10th Cir. 2004). In this case, the default rule is an
adequate and independent procedural ground, and M r. Bernard cannot
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demonstrate cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. To the
extent M r. Bernard attempts to show cause by pinning the failure to raise the
issue on the ineffective assistance of his counsel, we have already concluded that
the omission of this meritless claim on appeal did not constitute faulty
performance. Again, no reasonable jurist could dispute the district court’s
resolution of this issue.
Accordingly, we D EN Y M r. Bernard’s request for a COA and DISM ISS
this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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