Short v. Calbone ( 2007 )

F IL E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
U N IT E D ST A T E S C O U R T O F A PP E A L S
August 31, 2007
T E N T H C IR C U IT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JAM ES ELLIS SHO RT,
Petitioner-A ppellant, No. 07-6091
v. (W .D. of Okla.)
JUSTIN JONES, Director, (D.C. No. CV -06-582-HE)
Respondent-Appellee.
O R D E R D E N Y IN G C E R T IF IC A T E O F A PP E A L A B IL IT Y *
Before H E N R Y , T Y M K O V IC H , and H O L M E S, Circuit Judges. * *
James Ellis Short is an Oklahoma state prisoner serving a total of 70 years
for convictions on charges of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon,
possession of a firearm, and aggravated attempt to elude a police officer,
following a former conviction of two or more felonies. He seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
§ 2254 petition for habeas corpus. The district court adopted the report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge, who concluded Short’s state court
adjudications had not violated the governing standard under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
For substantially the same reasons as set forth by the magistrate judge, w e
conclude Short is not entitled to relief under § 2254 and DENY his request for a
COA.
I. Background
On June 21, 2001, Short was involved in a dispute w ith his brother, Eddie
Bourne, at the salvage yard where they both lived. Bourne testified at trial that he
confronted Short about a battery missing from his car. Short admitted to taking
the battery and allegedly brandished a gun at Bourne, at w hich time Bourne told
him to leave the salvage yard. Bourne went to his trailer and retrieved a 9
millimeter handgun, walked back towards Short, and fired a warning shot in the
air. Short said he was leaving so Bourne retreated and put his gun back in his
trailer. Short got in his car and left the salvage yard.
Bourne began to do some work around the salvage yard but within five to
ten minutes, Short returned in his car. Bourne testified that Short opened the
door, raised up out of the car, and shot Bourne. Bourne was hit in the arm and
stomach. Bourne then ran for his trailer, retrieved a sawed off shotgun, and
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headed back towards the driveway. Short told him to get in his car so he could
drive Bourne to the hospital. Bourne did not leave with Short, and Short drove
off. Police arrested Short five days later.
Bourne’s girlfriend corroborated Bourne’s story, testifying that she saw
Short leave the yard in his car and return a short time later “screeching, the tires
squalling.” R. Vol. 3 at 256. Bourne then came to the trailer where they lived
“holding his side and . . . bleeding.” Id. at 258. She said he asked her to hand
him the shotgun at that time, which she did, and that he walked back outside. She
further testified that she heard Short tell Bourne to get in his car so he could drive
him to the hospital.
At trial and on appeal, Short asserted that he acted in self-defense, that
Bourne had already retrieved his shotgun and was holding it w hen Short shot him.
In support of his position, Short pointed to the fact the shotgun was covered in
blood when it was recovered, and to the testimony of a detective who interviewed
Bourne after the incident. The detective said Bourne told him he had the shotgun
with him when he was shot. But Bourne also told police that he did not point the
shotgun or the handgun at Short.
The trial court concluded there was no evidence to support a self-defense
instruction under Oklahoma law. Short was convicted by jury and sentenced to a
total of 70 years (the term exacerbated by his prior convictions for two or more
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felonies). Short appealed his conviction to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (OCCA), which affirmed the conviction and the trial court’s rejection of
the self-defense instruction. Short sought additional relief in state court through
post-conviction proceedings but that was denied as well.
In his federal petition for habeas corpus, Short asserted ten grounds for
relief. 1 Short previously had raised issues one through six on direct appeal. The
remaining four were asserted in state post-conviction proceedings but had been
rejected by the OCCA as procedurally barred. The magistrate judge applied the
1
The ten grounds included:
(1) the trial court’s denial of self-defense instructions violated Short’s
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights;
(2) the trial court’s refusal to sever Count 1 from the remaining charges
violated his due process rights;
(3) insufficient evidence supported his conviction for Aggravated Attempt
to Elude a Police Officer, which violated his due process rights;
(4) the trial court’s failure to instruct on the lesser included offense of
Attempt to Elude a Police Officer violated his due process rights;
(5) the admission of other crimes evidence denied Short a fair trial and
resulted in an excessive sentence;
(6) cumulative error denied him a fair trial;
(7) new ly discovered evidence establishes the state failed to disclose
exculpatory evidence in violation of his due process rights;
(8) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
his Sixth Amendment rights in failing to investigate Short’s alleged mental
disability;
(9) appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of Short’s
Sixth Amendment rights by failing to present the issue of Short’s mental
incompetency on direct appeal; and
(10) Short’s substantive and procedural due process rights were violated
because he was not competent to stand trial.
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deferential AEDPA standard to grounds one through six, which the state courts
had adjudicated on the merits, and recommended they be denied. 2 The magistrate
judge concluded three of the four remaining claims were procedurally barred
under AEDPA. Addressing the final claim on the merits (Short’s competency to
stand trial), the magistrate judge likewise concluded it lacked merit and should be
denied. 3
Short subsequently filed an objection in the district court which failed to
address any of the substantive aspects of the magistrate judge’s Report and
Recommendation. Rather, Short advanced an unrelated argument that “because of
mental disability, he misunderstood the court’s prior order recommending that he
file an amended petition from which he had deleted his unexhausted claims” and
asked the district court for leave to file the amended petition at that time. R. Doc.
34 at 1. The district court denied that request. M oreover, and despite Short’s
failure to raise objections to the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation,
the district court conducted a de novo review of his federal habeas petition but
agreed with the magistrate judge that relief be denied.
2
Short fails to raise grounds one through six in his opening brief before
this court so they are waived.
3
Short’s final claim was that his due process rights were violated because
he was incompetent to stand trial. The magistrate judge, finding that a
substantive due process challenge to competency would not be barred, addressed
the claim on the merits but nevertheless concluded it should be denied.
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II. Standard of R eview
To obtain a COA, a petitioner must make a “substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); M iller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). This standard is satisfied by demonstrating that
“reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000).
III. D iscussion
On appeal, Short makes four claims. He was (1) forced to stand trial w hile
incompetent in violation of due process, (2) denied effective assistance of trial
counsel in violation of due process, and (3) denied effective assistance of
appellate counsel in violation of due process. In addition, he claims (4) the
federal district court erred in rejecting his habeas petition on the basis of a
procedural bar, also in violation of his due process rights.
Short’s first three claims— with the exception of his substantive due
process challenge on competency grounds— are procedurally defaulted. W e
address them together. W e address separately (1) the competency issue, and (2)
the challenge to a lack of due process by the district court.
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A. Short’s First Three Claims are Procedurally Defaulted
Short raised grounds one through three above for the first time in state
post-conviction proceedings. After the state district court denied relief on the
merits, Short appealed the decision to the OCCA. But the O CCA found Short’s
petition for review untimely and declined to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Rule
5.2(C ), O klahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2005).
Rule 5.2(C)(2) is a procedural rule that requires a party appealing the
district court’s order denying post-conviction relief to file a petition with the
OCCA within thirty days from the date the order is filed with the clerk of the
district court. The Rule further provides that failure to timely file said petition
“is jurisdictional and shall constitute a waiver of right to appeal and a procedural
bar for this Court to consider the appeal.” Rule 5.2(C)(5). The OCCA found that
the district court’s order was filed with the court clerk on October 18, 2005 but
that Short’s petition was not filed until November 21, 2005 and was, thereby,
outside the thirty-day appellate window.
Invoking the adequate and independent state ground doctrine, the
government in this case argued that the claims dismissed by the OCCA as subject
to the procedural bar of Rule 5.2(C) were thus defaulted for purposes of federal
habeas review as well. The government’s contention is correct under controlling
Supreme Court precedent:
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In all cases in which a state prisoner has defaulted his federal claims in
state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural
rule, federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner
can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of
the alleged violation of federal law , or demonstrate that failure to
consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.
Coleman v. Thom pson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). See also Rogers v. Gibson, 173
F.3d 1278, 1290 (10th Cir. 1999). M oreover, this circuit has specifically found
Rule 5.2’s procedural bar to be an adequate and independent state ground
sufficient to foreclose federal habeas review. See, e.g., Duvall v. Reynolds, 139
F.3d 768, 797 (10th Cir. 1998).
Because of the procedural bar, therefore, we may only review Short’s
claims if he (a) can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a
result of the alleged violation of federal law, or (b) demonstrate that failure to
consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman,
501 U.S. at 750.
Cause and Prejudice. Short’s only attempt to show cause is a claim he
raised in state court that “his untimely filings resulted from difficulties he faced
obtaining a pauper’s affidavit from prison officials.” 4 Aplt. Br. at 13. But Short
4
W hen the OCCA declined jurisdiction over Short’s appeal of the denial
of state post-conviction relief, it nevertheless advised him he might be eligible to
file an appeal out of time if he could show the original petition was untimely
through no fault of his own. It was at this time, apparently, that Short made his
case regarding wayward prison officials. The state district court denied Short’s
(continued...)
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does nothing to explain these alleged difficulties and how any delay is attributable
to prison officials. W ithout more, we are unable to say Short has shown cause for
his default. See, e.g., M agar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 819–20 (10th Cir. 2007)
(rejecting petitioner’s attempt to excuse default by alleged lack of access to legal
materials while incarcerated because he “failed to identify any act or omission by
prison officials that would have barred his access to the courts”).
M oreover, Short’s oblique reference to an argument made in his filings in
the state courts does not satisfy his duty to demonstrate cause in his federal
habeas petition. As the magistrate judge noted, that petition “does not explain the
reasons for the untimeliness of [Short’s] post-conviction appeals.” M ag.J. R&R,
2/28/07, at 21.
M iscarriage of Justice. Because Short has failed to demonstrate cause for
his procedural default, 5 relief must be denied unless he can show that our failure
to review his claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Coleman,
501 U.S. at 750. “This exception, however, is a markedly narrow one, implicated
only in ‘extraordinary case[s] w here a constitutional violation has probably
4
(...continued)
request for an appeal out of time, unpersuaded that the delay was not his fault.
5
Since Short has failed to show cause, no discussion of whether he has
demonstrated “actual prejudice” is necessary because both are required to satisfy
the first exception to procedural default as announced in Coleman. 501 U.S. at
750.
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resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” M agar, 490 F.3d at
820. Short does not proffer any evidence of actual innocence in his appeal to this
court though he did urge the magistrate judge to recognize new evidence— namely
the post-trial affidavit of the victim stating he was the initial aggressor— that he
acted in self-defense and was therefore innocent in the case of the assault and
battery conviction. Even if we were to consider that argument on appeal, it is
insufficient as a matter of law in the habeas context. We have held that a self
defense claim invokes the defendant’s legal— not factual— innocence (i.e., the
shooting was justified). A claim of legal innocence alone is inadequate to satisfy
the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception. See Ellis v. Hargett, 302 F.3d
1182, 1186 n.1 (10th Cir. 2002) (new evidence showing conduct justified by
doctrine of self defense not sufficient to show factual innocence). In any event,
we are satisfied that the trial court did not err by failing to submit a self defense
instruction to the jury.
Because Short has failed to satisfy either the cause and prejudice or the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exceptions to procedural default, his claims
must be denied.
B. Short’s Substantive Due Process Claim Lacks M erit
The magistrate judge properly concluded that Short’s due process claim
based on mental competency to stand trial had both procedural and substantive
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components. Short’s procedural due process challenge is barred as discussed
above. In contrast to a procedural due process challenge, however, a substantive
due process challenge is not subject to procedural default. Rogers v. Gibson, 173
F.3d 1278, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999). See also Sena v. New M exico State Prison, 109
F.3d 652, 654 (10th Cir. 1997) (“W hile competency claims can involve both
procedural and substantive due process, competence to stand trial is an aspect of
substantive due process. Because of the conflation of cause (here incompetence)
and prejudice in the substantive due process claim presented in this case,
procedural default does not apply.”) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in
original). Nevertheless, we conclude that Short’s substantive due process
challenge on competency grounds must likewise be rejected.
Short claims his substantive due process rights were violated because he
was made to stand trial despite significant questions regarding his mental
competency. “A criminal defendant [cannot] be tried unless he is competent.”
M aynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 672 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Godinez v.
M oran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993)). Short says the trial court was on notice that
his competency was at issue, and was thus required to order a competency hearing
but did not.
In order to state a substantive due process claim on competency, a
petitioner must present clear and convincing evidence that a “real, substantial,
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and legitimate doubt” existed regarding his competency to stand trial. Smith v.
M ullin, 379 F.3d 919, 932 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Short’s evidence does not satisfy this standard. To support his claim,
Short notes that his brother was his guardian and “appointed to handle [his]
financial affairs.” Aplt. Br. at 5. M ore specifically, his brother “was to receive
and manage [his] ‘Disability Supplemental Security Income’ payments for the use
and benefit of M r. Short, because of the government’s determination that M r.
Short was not capable of functioning on his own.” Id. at 7.
Short previously presented two letters from the Social Security
Administration addressing his eligibility for benefits. But as the magistrate judge
noted, “[t]hese letters do not disclose the basis for the disability determination.”
See M ag.J. R& R, 2/28/07, at 24. Likew ise, an affidavit submitted by Short’s
brother to support Short’s competency claims failed to disclose any medical basis
for the alleged disability. Id. Nor does Short make any attempt to explain why
the need for assistance with one’s finances is a reasonable proxy for mental
illness grave enough to preclude trial.
In summary, Short’s evidence is simply insufficient to support a “real,
substantial, and legitimate doubt” regarding his competency to stand trial. 6
6
Additionally, Short appended a letter to this court with his opening brief
stating that he had requested copies of his mental records from the medical
(continued...)
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C . Procedural D efault D oes Apply to Short’s Claims
Short’s final argument is that the district court committed fundamental
error by rejecting the bulk of his federal habeas petition on procedural grounds.
He asserts that procedural default does not apply because the OCCA, in
summarily rejecting his post-conviction application for an appeal out of time, did
not satisfy the “plain statement rule” of M ichigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983):
Our requirement of a “plain statement” that a decision rests upon
adequate and independent state grounds does not in any way authorize
the rendering of advisory opinions. Rather, in determining, as we must,
w hether w e have jurisdiction to review a case that is alleged to rest on
adequate and independent state grounds, we merely assume that there
are no such grounds when it is not clear from the opinion itself that the
state court relied upon an adequate and independent state ground and
when it fairly appears that the state court rested its decision primarily
on federal law .
Id. at 1042. Short argues that the OCCA’s order denying his appeal out of time
“does not engage in any meaningful discussion fo [sic] the legal principles and
factual analysis that led it to refuse M r. Short’s [appeal].” Thus, he argues, the
order violates the plain statement rule and cannot be the basis of a procedural bar.
6
(...continued)
department at the correctional facility where he resides. “These copies were to be
attached as exhibits in his Opening Brief. However, the [correctional facility]
medical personal [sic] are making him jump through hoops, by waiting for
clearance of a disbursement by trust fund for the requested copies.” Letter,
7/17/07. Short goes on to state that “he will submit his mental exhibits as soon as
he receives them from medical, hopefully by the week of July 23–27, 2007.”
However, no medical records have been filed with this court.
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W hile this argument might have been persuasive if the OCCA’s order
denying the appeal out of time was the basis for the procedural bar, the fact is that
the procedural bar arose from the OCCA’s prior order denying jurisdiction over
Short’s appeal of the trial court’s denial of post-conviction relief. In that order,
the O CCA plainly stated that it was rejecting jurisdiction over that appeal because
Short’s petition was untimely pursuant to Local Rule 5.2. As w e discussed, this
circuit has accepted the procedural bar of Rule 5.2 as an independent and
adequate state ground sufficient to preclude federal habeas review. See Duvall v.
Reynolds, 139 F.3d at 797.
IV . C onclusion
Because we find no jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in denying Short’s petition under § 2254, we deny
Short’s application for a COA and dismiss his appeal.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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