Hayes v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc. , 249 F. App'x 709 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
    September 27, 2007
    FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    PA T H. HAYES, Restricted Indian,
    Heir in Interest to the Restricted Estate
    of Leona James Hayes, deceased,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                    No. 07-6025
    (D.C. No. CIV-06-627-W )
    CHESAPEAKE OPERATIN G, IN C.,                         (W .D. Okla.)
    a/k/a Chesapeake Energy Corporation,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
    Before HO LM ES, HOL LOW A Y, and SEYM OUR, Circuit Judges.
    Pat H. Hayes, proceeding pro se as an heir to the estate of his mother,
    Leona James Hayes, filed a civil complaint requesting damages from defendant
    Chesapeake Operating, Inc. The district court entered summary judgment in favor
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
    not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
    and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    of defendant. M r. H ayes appeals and, construing his filings liberally, see Haines
    v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972), we affirm.
    M r. Hayes’s mother was the owner of restricted Indian lands regulated by
    the United States Department of Interior. 1 M r. Hayes believes that, in dealing
    with the oil and gas leases covering the estate’s lands, defendant Chesapeake
    violated the lease terms and applicable regulations. Based on his reading of
    25 C.F.R. § § 213.1 and 213.37, he asked the central regional director of the
    United States Geological Survey (USG S, a bureau of the United States
    Department of the Interior), to schedule a hearing at the Anadarko Agency of the
    Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA, another bureau of the Interior Department) on the
    alleged violations and his claims for $26,520,000 in damages. 2
    1
    Title 25, part 213 of the Code of Federal Regulations governs the leasing of
    restricted lands of members of the Five Civilized Tribes of Oklahoma for mining
    purposes.
    2
    Section 213.37 provides, in pertinent part:
    Failure of the lessee to comply with any provisions of the lease [of
    restricted lands] [or] the regulations . . . shall subject the . . . lessee
    to a penalty of not more than $500 per day for each day the terms of
    the lease, [or] the regulations . . . are violated. . . . Provided, That
    the lessee shall be entitled to notice and hearing, within 30 days after
    such notice, with respect to the terms of the lease, regulations, or
    orders violated, which hearing shall be held by the supervisor. . . .
    Section 213.1 defines “supervisor” as a “representative of the Secretary of
    the Interior under direction of the Director of the U.S. Geological Survey.” The
    Department of Interior, however, has twice reorganized without changing the
    applicable regulations. According to the Department, “onshore minerals
    (continued...)
    -2-
    M r. Hayes did not await agency action. On his own, he obtained
    permission to use the conference room at the Andarko agency and scheduled a
    hearing for M arch 22, 2006. In a written response to M r. Hayes’s “hearing”
    notification, the Interior Department Solicitor advised him that the references in
    the regulations to USG S w ere no longer accurate and that the Chickasaw Agency
    had jurisdiction over his concerns. The Solicitor’s letter made it clear that
    M r. Hayes himself could not schedule or conduct a hearing, that no Interior
    Department representative would appear at the purported hearing, and that the
    Anadarko conference room would not be available for M r. H ayes’s purposes.
    M r. Hayes then filed an “appeal” with the Secretary of the Interior
    Department, asserting that he w as entitled to damages due to C hesapeake’s
    default for failing to attend the M arch 22 “hearing” he had scheduled. The
    Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA) observed that M r. Hayes’s appeal did not
    identify an official action or inaction which it could review. It therefore
    dismissed the matter for lack of jurisdiction and referred the matter to the BIA
    Eastern Oklahoma Regional Director and the Chickasaw Agency Superintendent.
    2
    (...continued)
    management functions, with the exception of royalty management” are currently
    performed by the Bureau of Land M anagement, and not the USGS. Hayes v.
    Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 2006 W L 1743217, **1 n.2, 43 I.B.I.A. 54, 55 n.2.
    (2006).
    -3-
    Rather than pursuing his claims with the Regional Director or the
    Chickasaw Agency, M r. Hayes filed a district court lawsuit seeking enforcement
    of his so-called “default judgment.” H e sought $102,522,000 in compensatory
    damages and fines, along with $205,104,000 in punitive damages. The district
    court determined that M r. Hayes failed to exhaust his administrative remedies,
    granted Chesapeake’s summary judgment motion, and denied M r. Hayes’s cross-
    motion for summary judgment.
    In spite of his failure to follow agency procedures, M r. Hayes maintains on
    appeal that he is entitled to default judgment against Chesapeake. “W e review a
    district court’s dismissal on exhaustion grounds for an abuse of discretion,”
    though we examine “[q]uestions regarding the applicability and construction of
    federal law . . . de novo.” Quarles v. United States ex rel. Bureau of Indian
    Affairs, 
    372 F.3d 1169
    , 1171 (10th Cir. 2004).
    As this court has explained, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
    remedies provides that:
    no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury
    until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted. A
    party must exhaust administrative remedies when a statute or agency
    rule dictates that exhaustion is required. Under Department of
    Interior regulations, if an agency decision is subject to appeal within
    the agency, a party must appeal the decision to the highest authority
    within the agency before judicial review is available.
    Coosewoon v. M eridian Oil Co., 
    25 F.3d 920
    , 924 (10th Cir. 1994) (citations
    omitted). Application of the doctrine permits an administrative agency to develop
    -4-
    a factual record and apply its expertise to that record. M cKart v. United States,
    
    395 U.S. 185
    , 193-94 (1969).
    M r. Hayes’s claims were never addressed in prescribed Interior Department
    proceedings. Accordingly, we see neither abuse of discretion nor legal error in
    the district court’s determination that M r. Hayes failed to exhaust administrative
    remedies and was therefore not entitled to judicial review.
    The judgment of the district court is A FFIRM ED. M r. Hayes’s motion to
    dismiss his appeal and motion to file for dismissal out of time are DENIED. See
    10th Cir. R. 27.2(A)(3) (requiring a motion to dismiss to be filed within 15 days
    after filing of notice of appeal, unless good cause is shown). His motion to
    proceed in forma pauperis is D ENIED.
    Entered for the Court
    Stephanie K. Seymour
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-6025

Citation Numbers: 249 F. App'x 709

Judges: Holmes, Holloway, Seymour

Filed Date: 9/27/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024