Jenkins v. Educational Credit Management Corp. , 212 F. App'x 729 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
January 4, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ELIZA BETH JEN KINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 05-2007
(D.C. No. CIV-03-522-ACT/W DS)
EDUCATIONAL CREDIT (D . N.M .)
M A N A G EM EN T C OR PO RA TION,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, L UC ER O, and HA RTZ, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Elizabeth Jenkins sued her former employer, Educational Credit
M anagement Corporation (ECM C), alleging that her supervisor retaliated against
her for complaining of unlaw ful discrimination. She sought damages under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA). The district court dismissed the Title VII claim on the grounds that
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Jenkins failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, and ECM C prevailed in the
trial of the ADEA claim. 1 Jenkins now appeals the district court’s dismissal of
her Title VII claim and its entry of judgment on her ADEA claim in favor of
ECMC. W e take jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
The relevant facts are discussed below in the context of each issue raised
on appeal.
I. Dism issal of the Title VII Claim
ECM C fired Jenkins in February 2002. On June 26, 2002, she filed a
charge of discrimination against ECM C with the New M exico Human Rights
Division and the Equal Employment O pportunity Commission (EEOC Charge).
In the EEOC Charge, Jenkins checked boxes to indicate that her complaint
stemm ed from age discrimination and retaliation. She described the particulars of
her claim as follows:
I. STATEM ENT OF HARM : I was hired on [sic] September 2000.
On February 4, 2002 I was terminated in retaliation for having
opposed a discriminatory act based on age discrimination.
1
Jenkins also brought a claim under the Americans W ith Disabilities Act
(ADA). Shortly after ECM C filed its motion to dismiss, however, she consented
to a dismissal of both her Title VII and ADA claims. Later, she moved to vacate
the order of dismissal with respect to her Title VII claim, arguing that she
consented to its dismissal in error. Accordingly, the parties completed briefing,
and the district court adjudicated ECM C’s motion to dismiss, which by then was
limited to the Title VII claim.
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II. RESPO NDENT’S REASO N FO R ADVERSE ACTION: I was
told that I was being terminated because I did not get along with my
manager and because I didn’t support her.
III. STA TEM EN T O F D ISCRIM INATION: I BELIEVE I HAVE
BEEN DISCRIM INATED AGAINST BECAUSE OF my age 45 and
retaliated against, IN V IO LATION OF THE AGE
DISCRIM INA TION IN EM PLOYM ENT A CT AND THE N EW
M EXICO HU M AN RIGH TS ACT.
Aplt. App. at 45. The EEOC Charge did not include any facts relating to
discrimination prohibited by Title VII. 2 Nonetheless, the Notice of Charge of
Discrimination that the State sent to ECM C stated that Jenkins had filed a charge
under Title VII, the ADEA, and the New M exico Human Rights Act. After
investigating Jenkins’s complaint, the State found insufficient evidence to
conclude that she had been discriminated against on the basis of age. It therefore
dismissed her complaint with prejudice. On M arch 14, 2003, the EEOC adopted
the State’s findings and issued a right-to-sue letter.
Jenkins filed her complaint in this action on M ay 2, 2003. On September 9,
2003, ECM C filed a partial motion to dismiss the Title VII claim under
Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECM C argued
that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claim
because Jenkins had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. It reasoned
2
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise
discriminate against any individual based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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that Jenkins’s EEOC Charge was not sufficient to meet the exhaustion
requirement because the charge did not include any factual allegations relating to
illegal discrimination under Title VII.
In ruling on the motion, the district court allowed ECM C to submit
evidence of Jenkins’s failure to exhaust. In addition to the EEOC Charge, the
court considered other documents generated during the State’s investigation and
concluded that Jenkins had not filed an administrative charge of discrimination
under Title VII. The court declined to read into the EEOC Charge a complaint of
Title VII discrimination because it found that “Plaintiff’s Charge contain[ed] no
factual allegations concerning race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id.
at 119-20. It further found that the allegations in the EEOC Charge were not
reasonably related to any Title VII claim. Since we have held that exhaustion of
administrative remedies is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII
lawsuit, Jones v. Runyon, 91 F.3d 1398, 1399 (10th Cir. 1996), the court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Jenkins’s Title VII claim and dismissed
the claim with prejudice.
Jenkins raises two challenges to the district court’s decision. First, she
argues that she did, in fact, exhaust her administrative remedies. Because the
Title VII box was checked on the Notice of Charge of Discrimination that the
State sent to ECM C, she argues that her former employer was on notice that she
intended to pursue a Title VII claim, and that this satisfied the exhaustion
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requirement. Second, she argues that the district court erred in considering
matters beyond the pleadings. She claims that the court’s consideration of
documents attached to ECM C’s reply brief impermissibly converted ECM C’s
motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment without giving her an
opportunity to submit rebuttal evidence. These challenges raise legal questions,
which we review de novo. Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390 F.3d
1276, 1279 (10th Cir. 2004).
W e turn first to Jenkins’s contention that the district court impermissibly
converted ECM C’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. This
argument was squarely rejected in Davis ex rel. Davis v. United States, 343 F.3d
1282, 1294 (10th Cir. 2003). There, the district court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims
on jurisdictional grounds because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust remedies
provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. 343 F.3d at 1294. In reaching its
decision, the district court considered information beyond the allegations of the
complaint, which the plaintiffs argued was not permissible under Rule 12(b)(1).
W e disagreed, explaining that it is appropriate, particularly in the exhaustion
context, for a district court to consider evidence beyond the pleadings in resolving
a challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction. Davis, 343 F.3d at 1296.
W hen a party challenges the allegations supporting subject-matter
jurisdiction, the court has wide discretion to allow affidavits, other
documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed
jurisdictional facts. In such instances, a court’s reference to
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evidence outside the pleadings does not convert the motion to
dismiss to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
Id. (quotation, citation, and brackets omitted). It is clear in this case that the
district court construed ECM C’s motion under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than Rule 56.
The court cited Rule 12(b)(1) and explained that “‘[e]xhaustion of administrative
remedies is a ‘jurisdictional prerequisite’ to suit under Title VII.’” Aplt. App.
at 118 (quoting Jones 91 F.3d at 1399). Indeed, it would have been improper for
the court to enter judgment under Rule 56 based on lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction. Shikles, 426 F.3d at 1317-18. Under Davis, the district court did not
convert the motion into a Rule 56 motion by considering evidence beyond the
pleadings. M oreover, because Jenkins first agreed to, and then moved to
withdraw, the stipulated dismissal of her Title VII claim, she had over a year to
respond to ECM C’s motion. Thus, even if the district court had construed the
motion pursuant to Rule 56, Jenkins cannot credibly claim that she was robbed of
the opportunity to gather and present evidence in support of her exhaustion
argument. Accordingly, we see no procedural errors or prejudice with respect to
Jenkins in the district court’s disposition of the motion.
W e also agree with the district court’s ultimate conclusion that Jenkins
failed to exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to the Title VII claim.
Jenkins has not pointed to a single factual allegation in any of the State’s
investigative documents that concerns discrimination prohibited by Title VII. The
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EEOC Charge that she filed mentions only age discrimination and retaliation in
violation of the ADEA. The Title VII box was checked in the notice that ECMC
received, but that document was clearly based on, and was meant to be read
alongside, the EEOC Charge itself. As the district court intimated, it was not
unreasonable to assume that an agency employee simply checked the Title VII
box in error. ECM C also submitted additional documentation demonstrating that
the focus of the State’s investigation was solely age discrimination. Based on our
review of the record, there is simply no evidence that Jenkins complained of any
discrimination prohibited by Title VII in any forum. Even at this juncture in the
case, we are mystified as to the factual underpinnings of this elusive Title VII
claim. In short, Jenkins has advanced no colorable argument that would justify
reinstating her Title VII claim. The district court’s order dismissing that claim is
therefore affirmed.
II. The ADEA Claim
A. Jenkins’s M otion for Judgment as a M atter of Law
Jenkins’s ADEA claim was tried to a jury in D ecember 2004. At the close
of evidence, her attorney made an oral motion for judgment as a matter of law,
formerly referred to as a motion for directed verdict, on the issue of Jenkins’s
prima facie case. The transcript of that motion reads as follow s:
At this time, the plaintiff would like to make a motion for a limited
directed verdict with respect to the plaintiff’s prima facie case. I
think it has been clearly established and, in fact, is admitted by the
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defense, that Liz Jenkins made protected disclosures that she opposed
discrimination in the workplace. And it is certainly not contested
that she was fired.
She has therefore established her prima facie case, and the
entirety of the issues to be tried to the jury have to do with the
defense of a neutral nondiscriminatory reason. W e’d ask that the
Court therefore give an instruction that the prima facie case has been
satisfied.
Aplt. App. at 637. The district court denied the motion, and Jenkins claims that
its ruling was in error.
“W e review the denial of a motion for a directed verdict de novo, applying
the same standards used by the district court.” Youren v. Tintic Sch. Dist.,
343 F.3d 1296, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). To obtain a
directed verdict, a party must show that “the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, points but one way and is susceptible to no
reasonable inferences supporting the non-moving party.” Id. (quotation omitted).
Jenkins claims that it was error to deny her request for a directed verdict
because she clearly made out her prima facie case. This argument is a
non-starter. Aside from the fact that her motion was actually a request for a jury
instruction rather than a motion for directed verdict, Jenkins overlooks a more
fundamental flaw. In a discrimination lawsuit, the jury does not apply the
3
M cDonnell Douglas framework in arriving at its verdict. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd.
3
M cDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,715 (1983). “Rather, the issue before the
jury is ‘discrimination vel non.’” Abuan v. Level 3 Commc’ns., Inc., 353 F.3d
1158, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715). Evidently, the
district court agreed with Jenkins that she satisfied her prima facie case under
M cDonnell Douglas, for it permitted her to go to trial on her ADEA claim. That
is all she was entitled to. After a full trial on the merits, the district court
correctly left to the jury “the single overarching issue whether [Jenkins] adduced
sufficient evidence to warrant [its] determination that adverse employment action
was taken against [her].” Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220,
1226 (10th Cir. 2000). As w as its prerogative, the jury answ ered that question in
the negative, and now Jenkins seeks improperly to blame the district court for the
jury’s decision. But the court committed no error in denying her Rule 50(a)
motion. 4
4
ECM C argues that Jenkins w aived her challenge to the district court’s
ruling by failing to renew her motion for judgment as a matter of law after entry
of judgment as provided under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). It contends
that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v.
Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 980 (2006), abrogates Cummings v. GM Corp., 365
F.3d 944, 951 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004), in which this court held that a party need not
renew a Rule 50(a) motion after judgment in order to preserve an issue for appeal.
W hile we find Unitherm ’s affect on the continued vitality of Cummings to be an
interesting question, we leave it for another day and another case. W hether
preserved or not, Jenkins has no legitimate challenge to the court’s denial of her
Rule 50(a) motion.
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B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In another unusual argument, Jenkins – the plaintiff – claims that
insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict, in particular its finding that she
did not engage in activity protected by the ADEA. Jenkins failed to raise this
argument in the district court. She did not raise the issue in her motion for
directed verdict at the close of evidence, and she did not make any post-verdict
motions. Consequently, as she has waived any appellate challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence, we need not address the merits of her argument.
Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1136 (10th Cir. 1999) (“A failure to move for a
directed verdict on a particular issue will bar appellate review of that issue.”) For
the sake of Jenkins’s counsel, however, we reiterate that “[t]he ultimate burden of
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against
the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Texas D ep’t of Cmty. Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Accordingly, any failure of proof
redounded to the benefit of ECM C, not Jenkins.
C. Challenged Jury Instruction
Finally, Jenkins argues that the district court gave an erroneous jury
instruction regarding what constitutes protected activity in the context of a
retaliation claim under the ADEA. And she asserts additional error in the district
court’s refusal to give a curative instruction. The court instructed the jury as
follow s:
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In order for an informal complaint by plaintiff to a superior to be
considered protected activity, plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that, one, she subjectively believed, in
good faith, that defendant subjected other employees to unlawful
discrimination; and two, her belief was objectively reasonable in
light of the facts.
Aplt. App. at 643 (emphasis added). Jenkins contends that this w as tantamount to
instructing the jury that she had to prove the underlying discrimination in order to
show retaliation, which is not required under the ADEA. ECM C counters that
Jenkins w aived any objections to the jury instruction by failing to lodge a timely
objection in the district court.
In order to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51, which
establishes the procedure for objecting to a jury instruction, “a party must both
proffer an instruction and make a timely objection to the refusal to give a
requested instruction.” Abuan, 353 F.3d at 1172. The record before us indicates
that Jenkins did neither. To the contrary, her counsel explicitly agreed to the
exact jury instruction quoted above, first telling the court “I think it’ll work, Your
Honor,” Aplt. App. at 497, and later reaffirming that “Plaintiff [had] no
objections” to the instructions that the court intended to give the jury, id. at 632.
During closing arguments, Jenkins’s counsel objected to ECM C’s
characterization of her burden of proof on the retaliation claim and told the court,
“I think it’s appropriate to ask for a curative instruction.” Id. at 690. He never
proffered such an instruction, however. M oreover, Jenkins never objected to the
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instruction that was actually given, and she cannot rely on the fact that it differed
from the proposed jury instruction that she originally submitted to the court. “A
party does not satisfy the requirements for Rule 51 by merely submitting to the
court a proposed instruction that differs from the instruction ultimately given to
the jury.” Abuan, 353 F.3d at 1172 (quotation omitted). There being no record of
any timely objection to the challenged jury instruction, we simply review it for
plain error. Barber v. T.D. Williamson, Inc., 254 F.3d 1223, 1227 (10th Cir.
2001).
Jenkins is correct, of course, that “[a] meritorious retaliation claim will
stand even if the underlying discrimination claim fails.” Sanchez v. Denver Pub.
Schs., 164 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1998). But we are not convinced that the
court’s instruction was to the contrary. Jenkins objects to the part of the
instruction that required her to show that it was objectively reasonable for her to
believe that discrimination occurred. Contrary to her assertion, this was not the
same as requiring her to prove that discrimination in fact did occur. Under plain
error review, “[w]e may only reverse in an exceptional circumstance, where the
error was patently erroneous and prejudicial and where fundamental injustice
would otherwise occur.” Abuan, 353 F.3d at 1173. Jenkins hasn’t shown patent
error, prejudice, or anything close to fundamental injustice. W e therefore reject
her request for a new trial based on the retaliation jury instruction.
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The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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