Garcia v. Archuleta ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                           FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    November 8, 2007
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    DAVID J. GARCIA,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    L. ARCHULETA, Warden, and                              No. 07-1376
    JOHN W. SUTHERS, Attorney                      (D.C. No. 07-cv-01574-ZLW)
    General of the State of Colorado,                        (D. Colo)
    Respondents-Appellees.
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
    Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
    David J. Garcia, an inmate proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of
    appealability (“COA”) to review the district court’s dismissal of his petition for
    habeas corpus. Agreeing with the district court that Mr. Garcia’s petition is
    untimely, we deny his request for a COA and dismiss this appeal.
    ***
    In 1997, Mr. Garcia was convicted by a Colorado jury of first degree
    assault with a deadly weapon and felony menacing. He was also adjudicated an
    *
    This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
    the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
    persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    habitual offender and ultimately sentenced to 64 years in prison. See 
    Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 18-1.3-801
    , 18-1.3-401. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. He did
    not file a petition for certiorari from the Colorado Supreme Court, and the
    mandate issued finalizing his sentence on March 31, 1999.
    More than two-and-a-half years later, on October 11, 2001, Mr. Garcia filed
    a pro se motion in state court seeking appointment of counsel to assist him in
    filing a state post-conviction petition. He charged error in the initial criminal
    proceedings and alleged that his counsel was ineffective. In the alternative, Mr.
    Garcia requested that the court consider his motion as one for post-conviction
    relief. The state court honored Mr. Garcia’s alternative request, treated his
    motion as one for post-conviction relief under Colorado Criminal Procedure Rule
    35(c), and summarily denied it. Mr. Garcia did not appeal that order, but filed a
    separate pro se Rule 35(c) motion. That, too, was denied; the court of appeals
    affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari.
    Mr. Garcia sought post-conviction relief from the Colorado state court once
    more in September 2006. This petition was, too, denied. On appeal, the court of
    appeals affirmed, noting that the petition was time-barred and successive; the
    Colorado Supreme Court again denied certiorari.
    Mr. Garcia then shifted his attention to federal court and filed a petition for
    a writ of habeas corpus under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
     in the District of Colorado. In his
    federal petition, Mr. Garcia asserted four claims – ineffective assistance of trial
    -2-
    counsel, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, denial of proportionality
    review of his sentence as an habitual offender, and trial court error in applying
    the habitual criminal sentence enhancement provisions of Colorado law.
    The magistrate judge noted that Mr. Garcia apparently had not pursued the
    second and third of these claims in state court as required by our precedent, see,
    e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 
    526 U.S. 838
    , 844 (1999), Dever v. Kansas State
    Penitentiary, 
    36 F.3d 1532
    , 1534 (10th Cir. 1994), and that all four claims
    appeared to have been filed well outside the one-year limitations period codified
    in 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d). Accordingly, the magistrate judge issued an order to
    show cause why the petition should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust state
    remedies or for failure to file within the limitations period.
    After reviewing Mr. Garcia’s response, the district court dismissed his
    petition as untimely without reaching the question of the exhaustion of state
    remedies. The district court reasoned that, even assuming Mr. Garcia’s initial
    motion for post-conviction relief tolled the statute of limitations, that motion was
    filed after the statutory period expired. The district court further found no
    grounds for equitably tolling Mr. Garcia’s claims. After entering its order, the
    district court denied Mr. Garcia a COA to bring his appeal to this court and
    further denied his petition to proceed in forma pauperis. The district court found
    that Mr. Garcia had not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
    constitutional right, nor presented any non-frivolous argument in support of the
    -3-
    issues raised on appeal.
    ***
    We may issue a COA only if Mr. Garcia has made a substantial showing of
    the denial of a constitutional right. 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2). Where, as here, the
    district court dismissed his petition on procedural grounds, Mr. Garcia must also
    show that “jurists of reason would find it debatable” whether his claim was time-
    barred. Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000). Even viewing Mr. Garcia’s
    application with the generosity due pro se filings, see Andrews v. Heaton, 
    483 F.3d 1070
    , 1076 (10th Cir.2007), we cannot find that he has met that burden.
    Under federal law, a criminal defendant must seek a writ of habeas corpus
    within one year of the date that his conviction became final. See 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d). Even assuming that Mr. Garcia’s October 2001 motion tolled the
    limitations period, that filing was made more than one year after his conviction
    became final in March 1999. Neither has Mr. Garcia offered any meritorious
    reasons for this delay. Simply stating that the error is attributable to justifiable
    excuse or excusable neglect is insufficient to toll the limitations period; Mr.
    Garcia has pointed to no facts indicating that he diligently pursued his claims
    between March 1999 and October 2001 and that the failure to file by March 2000
    was caused by extraordinary circumstances beyond his control. See Marsh v.
    Soares, 
    223 F.3d 1217
    , 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Under these circumstances, no
    reasonable jurist would debate the district court’s determination that Mr. Garcia’s
    -4-
    claims were time-barred.
    ***
    Mr. Garcia’s application for a COA and his request to proceed in forma
    pauperis are denied. This appeal is dismissed.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Neil M. Gorsuch
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-1376

Judges: Lucero, Hartz, Gorsuch

Filed Date: 11/8/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024