United States v. Aispuro-Medina , 256 F. App'x 215 ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
November 29, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
No. 07-8017
v.
(D.C. No. 06-CR-158-B)
(D. Wyo.)
LUIZ AISPURO-MEDINA, a/k/a
TADEO LOAIZA-AISPURO,
Defendant–Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Luis Aispuro-Medina appeals his conviction for possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(A), to
which he pled guilty after denial of a suppression motion, on Fourth Amendment
grounds. He also appeals the denial of several sentencing reductions and
application of an obstruction of justice enhancement in the calculation of his
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and
judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
advisory Guidelines sentencing range. We AFFIRM Aispuro-Medina’s
conviction but REVERSE the sentence and REMAND to the district court with
instruction to VACATE the sentence and resentence defendant.
I
Aispuro-Medina was pulled over for speeding by Wyoming Highway Patrol
Trooper Joe Ryle on Interstate 25 near Douglas, Wyoming on May 23, 2006. He
was driving a Ford Explorer. Ryle began to question Aispuro-Medina, asking
three times if he had a “green card.” Aispuro-Medina initially answered Ryle’s
questions in Spanish and indicated that he spoke no English, but he answered
“no” in English each time Ryle asked about a green card. This answer led Ryle to
suspect that Aispuro-Medina might be an undocumented immigrant.
During the questioning, Aispuro-Medina gave Ryle a Wisconsin
probationary driver’s license bearing the name of “Tadeo Loaiza-Aispuro” and a
five-day-old California registration for his vehicle, which had California plates.
The two documents listed different residential addresses. When Ryle asked
Aispuro-Medina about his destination, Aispuro-Medina answered “Milwaukee,”
but looking into the Explorer, Ryle noticed only a small overnight bag in the
cargo area. Ryle found the small amount of luggage to be inconsistent with the
length of a trip from California to Milwaukee. When he was able to examine
Aispuro-Medina’s documents, his suspicions were further aroused by the
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inconsistency between a driver’s license indicating residence in Wisconsin, and
plates indicating residence in California.
Next, Ryle asked Aispuro-Medina to join him in his patrol car. From the
car, Ryle called a dispatcher to verify the plates and license. He then called an
interpreter available to him through AT&T. Through the interpreter, Ryle asked
Aispuro-Medina a series of questions about his residence, travel plans, and place
of birth. He also asked again whether Aispuro-Medina “is an illegal alien.” The
interpreter reported, “He says that he is getting his papers but right now he
doesn’t have [inaudible], just his license.” Ryle asked for a specific reply to his
question and the interpreter said, “He says right now he does not have any
papers.”
At some point the dispatcher reported that Aispuro-Medina’s plates and
license were valid, but the parties dispute whether the alienage questions were
asked before or after this report. Ryle testified that it took four or five minutes to
run the license, and his dashboard video of the stop shows that the alienage
questions took place about four and a half minutes after the call to the dispatcher.
However, the video does not indicate when the license check was completed.
After learning that Aispuro-Medina did not have papers, Ryle called
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) to check Aispuro-Medina’s
immigration status. While waiting for an answer, he left his patrol car to visually
inspect Aispuro-Medina’s vehicle. He testified that his intent was to check for
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any luggage that he might have missed. In doing so, he noticed a secret
compartment visible behind the Explorer’s rear wheel well. Ryle then utilized a
narcotics-trained police dog, which accompanied him in his patrol car, to sniff the
vehicle. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs near its rear wheels. Ryle
returned to his patrol car, called for backup, and contacted a Spanish-speaking
trooper. At Ryle’s request, this trooper advised Aispuro-Medina that he was
being detained because the dog had alerted to the presence of drugs, and asked
Aispuro-Medina further questions about his identity and travel plans. Aispuro-
Medina was neither handcuffed nor placed under arrest. While waiting for a
backup officer to arrive, Ryle used the dog to inspect the interior of the vehicle,
and the dog also alerted near the rear seat. After the second officer arrived, the
two troopers inspected Aispuro-Medina’s vehicle and found that the secret
compartment contained 9.94 kilograms of cocaine. During their inspection,
Aispuro-Medina fled from the front seat of the patrol car on foot and was arrested
the next day while hitchhiking.
After his indictment on July 19, 2006, Aispuro-Medina moved for
suppression of evidence obtained during this incident on the ground that he was
unreasonably stopped in violation of the Fourth Amendment. After the district
court denied this motion, he filed a conditional guilty plea. 1 During interviews
1
A conditional guilty plea allows a defendant to appeal an adverse
determination (here, the district court’s suppression ruling) and withdraw the plea
(continued...)
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with the government, Aispuro-Medina admitted making three prior trips as a drug
courier, for which he was paid $10,000 per trip. On February 16, 2007, the
district court sentenced Aispuro-Medina to 151 months’ imprisonment. He now
appeals the denial of the suppression motion, the denial of several sentence
reductions, and the application of an obstruction of justice sentence enhancement.
II
In reviewing the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review
the court’s factual findings for clear error and view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. See United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1203
(10th Cir. 2001). We review de novo the reasonableness of a search or seizure
under the Fourth Amendment. Id.Aispuro-Medina argues that his stop was unreasonable under Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), for four reasons: (1) Ryle asked questions through the AT&T
interpreter that were outside the permissible scope of the stop; (2) Ryle prolonged
the stop by continuing to question Aispuro-Medina after his license was cleared;
(3) Ryle further prolonged the stop by inspecting the interior and exterior of
Aispuro-Medina’s vehicle; and (4) Ryle prolonged the stop by detaining
Aispuro-Medina after the dog alerted to the presence of drugs. Aispuro-Medina
also argues that Ryle illegally searched his vehicle.
1
(...continued)
if the appeal is successful. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2).
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In assessing the Fourth Amendment constitutionality of a traffic stop, we
first ask whether the stop was justified at its inception. United States v. Wallace,
429 F.3d 969, 974 (10th Cir. 2005). We next ask whether the officer’s action was
reasonably related to the scope of that stop. Id. This second inquiry “depends on
both the length of the detention and the manner in which it is carried out.”
United States v. Alcarez-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1258 (10th Cir. 2006)
(quotation omitted). Aispuro-Medina does not contest that he was stopped
legally. Thus, we only consider whether Ryle’s actions were reasonable.
Aispuro-Medina challenges both the content of Ryle’s questions regarding
his immigration status, and the length of the stop. Mere questioning does not
implicate the Fourth Amendment, however, so long as the questioning does not
extend the length of the stop. Wallace, 429 F.3d at 974; see also Muehler v.
Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 100-01 (2005) (holding that police questioning about
immigration status did not constitute a separate Fourth Amendment event).
Accordingly, we reject Aispuro-Medina’s argument that the content of Ryle’s
questions exceeded the scope of the stop.
As to the length of the stop, Aispuro-Medina contends that Ryle’s questions
through the AT&T interpreter prolonged the stop because the dispatcher had
finished checking his driver’s license before the end of the AT&T call. Based on
the evidence before it, however, the district court concluded that the license check
was completed at the end of the call. In reaching this factual conclusion, the
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court relied on Ryle’s testimony that the license check took four to five minutes
and on Ryle’s dashboard video recording. Because the video showed that the call
to the AT&T interpreter ended about four and a half minutes after the call to the
dispatcher, the court concluded that the license check was completed around the
same time the AT&T call ended. This finding is not clearly erroneous, and
Aispuro-Medina’s second argument thus fails.
Similarly, Aispuro-Medina asserts that Ryle impermissibly extended the
length of the stop by calling ICE after the conversation with the AT&T
interpreter. He is correct that once his license had been checked, the original
reason for the stop had terminated, and Ryle could only continue the stop based
on a reasonable suspicion of some other crime, or with Aispuro-Medina’s consent.
See Wallace, 429 F.3d at 974. However, if Ryle had a reasonable suspicion of
undocumented immigration status by the end of the AT&T call, his actions would
indeed be reasonable.
In evaluating the existence of reasonable suspicion, we “consider the
totality of the circumstances to see if [an] officer[] ha[s] a minimal level of
objective justification, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch.” United States v. Moore, 22 F.3d 241, 243 (10th Cir. 1994)
(quotations omitted). By the end of the AT&T call, Aispuro-Medina had (1)
repeatedly responded “no” in English to Ryle’s question “Do you have a green
card?”, and (2) answered a Spanish translation of Ryle’s question “Is he an illegal
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alien right now?” with a response translated as “He says right now he does not
have any papers.” His responses were more than sufficient to give rise to a
reasonable suspicion of undocumented immigration status. Therefore, it was not
unconstitutional for Ryle to extend the stop in order to investigate this new
suspicion by calling ICE.
We turn next to the contention that Ryle unconstitutionally searched
Aispuro-Medina’s vehicle by walking around it and looking into its windows and
wheel wells while waiting for a response from ICE. Because Ryle inspected only
parts of the vehicle visible to the public, there was no reasonable expectation of
privacy in these areas. Ryle’s conduct thus did not constitute a search. See
United States v. Rascon-Ortiz, 994 F.2d 749, 754 (10th Cir. 1993) (“The
undercarriage is part of the car’s exterior, and as such, is not afforded a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
Finally, Ryle did not impermissibly extend the length of the stop by
continuing to detain Aispuro-Medina without consent after the dog alerted to
drugs in Aispuro-Medina’s vehicle. The alert, combined with the discovery of the
secret compartment, was sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that
Aispuro-Medina was transporting drugs. Thus, it was reasonable for Ryle to
continue the stop and he was not required to seek consent to do so. See Wallace,
429 F.3d at 974.
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For these reasons, Aispuro-Medina’s arguments that Ryle violated his
Fourth Amendment rights fail, and the district court did not err in denying his
suppression motion.
III
We now consider the assertion that the district court incorrectly applied the
United States Sentencing Guidelines to this case. Aispuro-Medina argues that the
court erred in: (1) denying a departure for substantial assistance to the
government pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1; (2) denying a “safety valve” reduction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and U.S.S.G. §§ 5C1.2(a) & 2D1.1(b)(9);
(3) denying a reduction to his offense level because of his minimal, or alternately,
minor role pursuant to § 3B1.2; and (4) increasing his offense level based on
obstruction of justice pursuant to § 3C1.1.
Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory after United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), district courts are still required to begin the
sentencing process by consulting them, id. at 259-60. Therefore, we have held
that in order to apply a reasonable sentence, a district court must begin by
arriving at a properly calculated advisory Guidelines sentencing range. United
States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054-55 (10th Cir. 2006). “[I]n analyzing a
district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines, we continue [after
Booker] to review legal questions de novo and factual findings for clear error.”
United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1210 (10th Cir. 2006).
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We have no jurisdiction to review a district court’s decision to deny a
departure under § 5K of the Guidelines, unless the court erroneously interpreted
the Guidelines to deprive it of the legal authority to allow the departure. United
States v. Fonseca, 473 F.3d 1109, 1112 (10th Cir. 2007). Because Aispuro-
Medina has made no such allegation, we lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a
“substantial assistance” departure in his case.
The next argument asserted on appeal is that the district court incorrectly
found that Aispuro-Medina did not fulfill the five criteria for a “safety valve”
reduction, which would make him eligible for a sentence below the statutory
minimum. See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a). After hearing argument, the district court
concluded that Aispuro-Medina failed to truthfully provide the government with
all information he had about the offense at issue and related offenses. The court
stated: “[I]t seems to me that you [Aispuro-Medina] have a lot more to tell the
United States than you have up to now.” On careful review of the record, we
cannot say that the court clearly erred.
Defendants who are “minimal” or “minor” participants in an offense may
be accorded a role reduction. We have declined to hold that drug couriers are
minor or minimal participants in drug offenses where they transport particularly
large amounts of drugs or money and make repeated trips. See, e.g., United
States v. Mendoza, 468 F.3d 1256, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) (role reduction denied
to courier who transported a large quantity of methamphetamine, was paid $5,000
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per trip, and made several trips in a vehicle that he owned). Aispuro-Medina
admitted making three prior trips and receiving compensation of $10,000 per trip.
In addition, he owned a vehicle altered for this purpose and was transporting
nearly 10 kilograms of cocaine. Based on these facts, we affirm the district
court’s decision to deny a role reduction.
This leaves Aispuro-Medina’s claim that the district court incorrectly
interpreted § 3C1.1, which provides for a two-level offense level enhancement for
willful obstruction of justice. The Application Notes to § 3C1.1 list “escaping or
attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing” as conduct
constituting obstruction, § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(e), but they also list “avoiding or
fleeing from arrest” as conduct not generally rising to the level of obstruction, id.
cmt. n.5(d). Application Notes are authoritative interpretations of the Guidelines.
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1993). Aispuro-Medina argues that
he merely fled arrest, and thus did not merit the enhancement.
This district court did not reach this issue because it apparently misread the
Application Notes. Mistakenly believing “avoiding or fleeing from arrest” to be a
basis for enhancement, the court stated:
I think that the conduct of the defendant at the time he was stopped
by the patrolman on the highway is—indicates that he was avoiding
or fleeing from what looked like a certain arrest. . . . [A]s soon as the
secret compartment was discovered, that’s when he took out and left.
I think that’s as obvious an avoidance or fleeing from arrest, which is
what the guideline says, that’s a factor, and it does indeed warrant an
obstruction of justice two-level increase
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(emphasis added).
We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusion that “avoiding or
fleeing from arrest” is a basis for an enhancement. Apperson, 441 F.3d at 1210.
Note 5(d) specifies that such conduct is generally not a basis for an enhancement,
and the district court did not provide any interpretation explaining why it would
be a basis in Aispuro-Medina’s case. Accordingly, the court’s legal interpretation
of Note 5(d) was erroneous. Because the obstruction of justice enhancement must
be correctly calculated under Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054-55, we remand for
determination of whether § 3C1.1 applies to Aispuro-Medina’s conduct.
IV
Finally, although not raised by Aispuro-Medina, the government concedes a
separate procedural error in his sentencing. Aispuro-Medina’s PSR mistakenly
stated a Guidelines sentencing range of 121-151 months for an offense with a
level of 31 and a criminal history category of I. In fact, the sentencing range for
this offense level and criminal history category is only 108-135 months. See
U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A (Sentencing Table). Relying on this error, the district court
sentenced Aispuro-Medina to 151 months, a sentence at the upper end of the
range provided in the PSR but outside the correct range.
Because we have already determined that Aispuro-Medina’s sentence must
be vacated and remanded, we need not decide whether this unchallenged
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miscalculation of the Guidelines range constitutes reversible error. We simply
reiterate that on remand, the district court must impose a procedurally reasonable
sentence, and one component of procedural reasonableness is correct calculation
of the Guidelines range. Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054-55.
V
For the forgoing reasons, we AFFIRM Aispuro-Medina’s conviction but
REVERSE the sentence and REMAND to the district court with instruction to
VACATE the sentence and resentence defendant.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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