Hernandez v. Addison ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 22, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ALBERTO HERNA ND EZ,
Petitioner-A ppellant, No. 06-6306
v. (W .D. Oklahoma)
M IK E ADDISON, W arden, (D.C. No. 06-CV-141-R)
Respondent-Appellee.
OR DER
Before H E N RY, BR ISC OE, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Alberto Hernandez, proceeding pro se, seeks a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) to enable him to appeal the district court’s denial of the habeas petition
he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that
an appeal may not be taken from the denial of a § 2254 habeas petition unless the
petitioner first obtains a COA). M r. Hernandez also seeks leave to proceed in
form a pauperis (“IFP”). In his § 2254 petition, M r. Hernandez raises nine
contentions: (1) Oklahoma’s construction of the child abuse murder statute, Okla.
Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7(C), which does not require express or implied malice, is a
substantive law violation; (2) the trial court erred when it admitted his videotaped
statement as evidence; (3) the State failed to demonstrate that M r. Hernandez’s
waiver of his M iranda rights was knowing and voluntary; (4) the trial court’s
admission of a presumptive blood test violated his right to due process; (5) the
trial court improperly admitted evidence of other bad acts, denying his right to a
fair trial; (6) the trial court’s failure to instruct on lesser included offenses
deprived him of a fair trial; (7) the trial court erred when it failed to answer a jury
question regarding the length of time served for a life sentence, in violation of his
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; (8) cumulative error deprived him of a
fundamentally fair trial; and (9) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the magistrate judge in
his thorough report and recommendation, we reject M r. Hernandez’s application
for a COA, deny his motion to proceed IFP, and dismiss this matter.
I. BACKGROUND
M r. Hernandez was convicted of child abuse murder in Oklahoma state
court and received a sentence of life without parole. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed his conviction on direct appeal and denied
his application for post-conviction relief. He then filed this § 2254 action. The
magistrate judge, in a 39-page report and recommendation, recommended that the
district court deny the petition. The district court reviewed and rejected M r.
Hernandez’s objections to the report and recommendation, adopted the report and
recommendation, and denied M r. H ernandez’s application for a COA.
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II. DISCUSSION
In order to obtain a COA, M r. Hernandez must make “a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In order to do so,
M r. Hernandez “must show that reasonable jurists could debate whether . . . the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” M iller-El
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). “[A] claim can be debatable even though
every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the case
has received full consideration, that [the] petitioner will not prevail.” Id. at 338.
Here, for substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court’s
order and magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, we conclude that M r.
Hernandez is not entitled to a COA. First, Oklahoma courts have construed
Oklahoma’s child abuse murder statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 21 § 701.7(C), as
analogous to the crime of felony murder. “Felony murder is a crime of general
intent, and proof of the underlying felony is all that is needed to prove to intent
necessary for a felony murder conviction.” Rec. doc. 16, at 6 (M ag. Judge’s
Report and Rec. filed July 31, 2006). Similarly, proof of the underlying child
abuse is required to obtain a child abuse murder conviction. Id. W e also agree
that the child abuse murder statute provides fair warning of the conduct and
mental state require, thus defeating M r. Hernandez’s due process claims.
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W e also reject M r. Hernandez’s second and third contentions that his post-
M iranda videotaped statement resulted from an illegal arrest and that his waiver
of his M iranda rights was not knowing and voluntary. W e hold that the O CCA’s
determination that M r. Hernandez was not unlawfully arrested and that his waiver
of his M iranda rights w as knowing and voluntary were not unreasonable
applications of clearly established federal law.
M r. Hernandez’s fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh challenges raise questions
of state law. See Estelle v. M cGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (“[I]t is not the
province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on
state-law questions.”); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1055 (10th Cir. 2002)
(“Generally speaking, a state court’s misapplication of its own evidentiary rules .
. . is insufficient to grant habeas relief.”). As the magistrate judge observed, the
alleged errors were not so grossly prejudicial that they fatally infected the trial
and denied fundamental fairness; without such fundamental unfairness, alleged or
actual, state law errors cannot implicate federal rights. M r. Hernandez’s eighth
claim of cumulative error also fails, because this analysis “does not apply to the
cumulative effect of non-errors.” M oore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1113 (10th
Cir. 1998). Finally, M r. Hernandez’s ninth claim of ineffective assistance of trial
and appellate counsel, w hich stems from his allegedly illegal arrest, also fails. A s
established above, the OCCA concluded that “regardless of the performance of
his counsel, [M r. Hernandez] has not established that his arrest was unlawful or
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illegal. M oreover, even if counsel had performed as [M r. Hernandez] thinks they
should have, he has not established that the outcome of his trial and appeal would
have or should have been different.” Rec. doc. 14, Ex. E, Order Affirming Denial
of A pplication for Post-C onviction Relief, at 2-3 (filed Jan. 31, 2006). Thus, w e
hold that the OCCA’s conclusion that M r. Hernandez’s trial and appellate counsel
were not ineffective is not reasonably debatable.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on our review of the record, the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, the district court’s order, and M r. Hernandez’s submissions to
this court, we are not persuaded jurists of reason would disagree with the district
court’s disposition of his petition. Accordingly, we DENY his request for a COA ,
DENY his motion to proceed IFP, and DISM ISS the matter.
Entered for the Court,
ELISABETH A. SHUM AKER, Clerk
By:
Deputy Clerk
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