United States v. Brunton , 218 F. App'x 816 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
March 1, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 05-6257
v. W .D. of Okla.
M ICHA EL PA TR IC K B RU N TON, (D.C. No. CR-04-223-01-T)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, L UC ER O, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
M ichael Patrick Brunton agreed to plead guilty to one count of mail fraud
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and to forego his right to appellate review as part
of a plea agreement. The district court subsequently sentenced him to 16 months
in prison and ordered him to pay restitution to his victims.
Despite having waived his appellate rights in this case, Brunton claims the
district court erred in calculating the amount of losses to his victims. In doing so,
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
This matter is submitted on the briefs per the court’s order, dated
October 10, 2006, pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
he contends the court wrongfully bumped him into a higher sentencing range than
he deserved. 1
Because we agree with the government that Brunton waived his right to
appeal, we enforce the waiver and dismiss this appeal.
I. Background
Brunton was indicted on 12 counts of mail and wire fraud after being
caught running an on-line auction scheme whereby he would offer up certain
items for sale (e.g., football tickets, Rolex watches), accept payment from the
winning bidder, but not remit any item in return. Brunton’s criminal conduct first
came to light in late 2002, when two users of the Internet auction eBay
complained that they had ordered and paid for a Rolex watch that they never
received. As authorities began investigating the matter, a host of similar
unconsummated deals were uncovered. United States postal authorities, together
with eBay and PayPal staff, ultimately identified Brunton as the source of the
fraudulent offers.
Investigators identified 40 victims who never obtained their winning bids.
Pursuant to Brunton’s guilty plea, the government dropped all but one count
1
Brunton’s brief refers several times to the district court’s loss calculation
as an error in calculating “restitution.” It is clear from the briefs, however, that
Brunton is challenging on appeal the court’s calculation of the length of his
sentence based on the amount of victim loss under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, § 2B1.1. To the extent he challenges restitution, his only concern is
with the accuracy of the district court’s calculation of amount.
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against him. In return, Brunton promised not to appeal his sentence or how it was
determined.
At sentencing, the government attributed the actual losses to Brunton’s
victims as $72,758.91, while intended loss (that which would have resulted but
for cancelled checks, etc.) was $102,126.30. [Gov. Brief at 5.] Brunton
specifically objected to the loss calculations stemming from two victims totaling
$8,765. The district court held a hearing on the amount of loss attributed to the
tw o victims, and then overruled Brunton’s objections.
Finding the actual losses from Brunton’s crime to exceed $70,000, the
district court determined that Brunton’s sentencing range was 12–18 months. See
United States Sentencing Guidelines (U SSG) § 2B1.1. Had Brunton caused losses
under $70,000, he would have been eligible for a lower guideline range than he
received (8–14 months rather than 12–18 months). Nevertheless, causing losses
above $70,000 (but below $120,000) merited a 2-point enhancement under the
Guidelines with a concomitant increase in the applicable sentencing range. See
USSG § 2B1.1(b)(E). The court went on to sentence Brunton to 16 months in
prison and ordered restitution in the amount of $72,758.91.
O n appeal, B runton revives his objections to losses attributed to two
victims in the amount of $8,765 to advance his claim that the actual losses were
below the $70,000 threshold. “The D efendant vehemently denie[s] causing loss
above $70,000 to warrant an enhancement [in offense level score] of eight instead
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of the appropriate enhancement of six. Consequently the trial judge was guided
by the wrong guideline range and imposed an excessive sentence.” Aplt. Brief at
5. The government counters that we are precluded from reaching the merits of
Brunton’s claim because of the explicit appellate waiver contained in his plea
agreement.
II. Analysis
W e have held that if w e find a waiver to be valid and enforceable, w e will
enforce its terms and dismiss an appeal. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315,
1329 (10th Cir. 2004).
A. Enforcing Appellate W aivers
An appellate waiver will be enforced if (1) the disputed appeal falls within
the scope of the waiver; (2) the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily; and
(3) enforcing the waiver w ill not result in a miscarriage of justice. Hahn, 359
F.3d at 1325.
W e interpret the terms of a plea agreement “according to contract principles
and what the defendant reasonably understood when he entered his plea.” United
States v. Arevalo-Jimenez, 372 F.3d 1204, 1206 (10th Cir. 2004). M oreover,
while we construe “any ambiguities in these agreements [] against the
Government,” United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005)
(internal quotation omitted), we start by “examin[ing] the plain language of the
plea agreement.” United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2005).
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B. Brunton’s Appellate W aiver
1. Scope of the W aiver
For economic crimes, the applicable sentencing range is a function of the
pecuniary loss flowing from the defendant’s conduct. To determine the sentence
here, the district court was required by the Guidelines to calculate the “actual
loss” attributable to the crime, i.e., the “reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm
that resulted from the offense.” U SSG, § 2B1.1 cmt. 3(A)(I). 2
Brunton agreed in his appeal waiver not to challenge his sentence or the
manner in w hich it was determined. Specifically, Brunton agreed as follow s:
[D]efendant in exchange for the promises and concessions made by the
United States in this plea agreement, knowingly and voluntarily waives
his right to:
***
(b) Appeal, collaterally challenge, or m ove to modify . . . his
sentence as imposed by the Court and the manner in which the sentence
is determined, provided the sentence is within or below the advisory
guideline range determined by the Court to apply to this case.
Aplt. App. at 18 (emphasis added). The question for us, then, is whether the
instant appeal falls within the scope of this explicit appellate waiver. W e
conclude that it does.
Firstly, Brunton’s appeal falls squarely within the plain meaning of the
waiver. His appeal is a direct challenge to the manner in which his sentence was
determined. The district court conducted a straightforward application of the
2
The restitution award in this case happens to be identical to the loss
calculation used to determine Brunton’s sentencing range under the G uidelines.
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Guidelines in determining the appropriate guideline range, and then, after
determining the amount of loss, exercised its discretion to impose a sentence
within the range.
Secondly, Brunton’s claim that his sentence exceeded the guideline range is
without merit. The district court concluded that Brunton’s total offense level (13)
and criminal history category (I) yielded a sentencing range of 12–18 months
imprisonment. Ultimately receiving a prison term of 16 months, Brunton plainly
received a sentence “within or below the advisory guideline range determined by
the Court to apply to this case.”
Thus, the sentence imposed was within the scope of the appellate waiver.
2. W aiver was Knowing & Voluntary
“W hen determining whether a waiver of appellate rights is knowing and
voluntary, we especially look to two factors. First, we examine whether the
language of the plea agreement states that the defendant entered the agreement
knowingly and voluntarily. Second, we look for an adequate Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325 (internal citations
omitted).
The first component of a knowing, voluntary waiver was clearly satisfied
by the express language in Brunton’s plea agreement providing that:
[D]efendant . . . knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to:
a. Appeal or collaterally challenge his guilty plea and any other
aspect of his conviction, including but not limited to any rulings on
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pretrial suppression motions or any other pretrial disposition of motions
and issues.
b. Appeal, collaterally challenge, or move to modify under 18
U.S.C . § 3582(c)(2) or some other ground, his sentence as imposed by
the Court and the manner in which the sentence is determined, provided
the sentence is within or below the applicable guideline range
determined by the Court to apply to this case. Defendant acknowledges
that this waiver remains in full effect and is enforceable, even if the
Court rejects one or more of the positions of the United States or
defendant set forth in paragraph 7 concerning the application of the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.
c. It is provided that (i) defendant specifically does not waive the
right to appeal an upward departure from the sentencing guideline range
determined by the Court to apply to this case, and (ii) his waiver of
rights to appeal and to bring collateral challenges based on changes in
the law reflected in Tenth Circuit or Supreme Court cases decided after
the date of this agreement that are held by the Tenth Circuit or Supreme
Court to have retroactive effect.
Aplt. App. at 18 (emphasis added). Brunton was represented by counsel and he
supplies no reason to believe he did not know what rights he was waiving.
The transcript of the Rule 11 colloquy reinforces our conclusion that
Brunton’s appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary. At the hearing on M arch
8, 2005, the district court specifically addressed the waiver of appeal referenced
in the plea agreement and asked Brunton if he understood it.
TH E C OU RT: In your plea agreement, you may recall that you have
waived your right to appeal or collaterally challenge any sentence
im posed by the Court, except under limited and specified
circumstances. Do you understand that - -
BRUNTON: Yes.
THE COURT: - - as part of your plea agreement? D o you have any
questions about anything that has taken place in these proceedings?
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BRUNTON: No.
Plea Tr. at 9. W e are satisfied that Brunton knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to bring this appeal.
3. Enforcing the W aiver will not Result in a M iscarriage of Justice
Finally, we consider whether an appellate waiver will result in a
miscarriage of justice. Under Hahn, a defendant must show (1) the district court
relied on an impermissible factor such as race in computing the sentence, (2)
ineffective assistance of counsel rendered the waiver invalid, (3) the sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum, or (4) the waiver w as otherw ise unlawful.
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (internal citation omitted).
Factors one and two are not at issue in this case: Brunton neither argues the
district court relied on an impermissible factor in sentencing, nor does he raise an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This limits our miscarriage of justice
analysis to whether the sentence exceeds the statutory maximum or whether the
waiver is otherw ise unlawful.
Brunton’s prison term of 16 months was far below the statutory maximum
for his offense, which is 20 years. Hahn “refers to the upper limit of punishment
that Congress has legislatively specified for the violation of a given statute.”
United States v. Green, 405 F.3d 1180, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005). The statute under
which Brunton pleaded guilty, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, authorizes a maximum term of
imprisonment of “not more than 20 years” and fines up to $250,000 (pursuant to
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18 U.S.C. § 3571). Brunton’s 16-month prison term obviously falls well below
the statutory maximum for his offense and thus his appellate waiver cannot be
challenged on this basis. And, although the plea agreement does not contain an
expected amount of restitution, Brunton’s challenge is not to the order of
restitution itself, but to the loss calculation under USSG § 2B1.1 and its affect on
the length of his prison sentence.
As to our catch all “otherw ise unlawful” element, under Hahn “the error
[must] seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” 359 F.3d at 1327 (internal quotation marks omitted). Brunton
claims the district court committed such error in establishing the loss calculation
and associated sentencing guideline range.
Brunton misinterprets the miscarriage of justice exception, which looks to
whether “the waiver is otherwise unlawful,” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327, not whether
some other aspect of the proceeding may have involved legal error. His claim
that the appellate waiver should be excused due to alleged errors in establishing
his guideline range entails w hat Hahn called “the logical failing[] of focusing on
the result of the proceeding, rather than on the right relinquished, in analyzing
whether an appeal waiver is [valid].” Id. at 1326 n.12. To allow alleged errors in
computing a defendant’s sentence to render a waiver unlawful would nullify the
waiver based on the very sort of claim it was intended to waive. This circular
argument has been rejected in many cases. See, e.g., United States v. M organ,
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386 F.3d 376, 381–82 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 892
(8th Cir. 2003); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 403–04 (4th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Kratz, 179 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999).
Brunton does not allege that the waiver itself is unenforceable, but attacks
the loss calculations under § 2B1.1. This is precisely the type of attack we sought
to foreclose in Hahn and, therefore, we decline to find Brunton has satisfied the
miscarriage of justice exception. 3
III. Conclusion
Because w e are satisfied that the appeal is within the scope of Brunton’s
appellate waiver and that the district court did not clearly err in calculating the
actual losses, we DISM ISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
3
W e also reject Brunton’s claim that constitutional Booker error plagues
his sentence because but for the district court’s error “the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 733
(10th Cir. 2005). Brunton argues that “with an offense category of 11 [rather than
13] . . . the Court may have been persuaded to grant [him] probation.” Aplt. Brief
at 7. However, the district court dispelled such wishful thinking at sentencing
when it said: “M r. Brunton, I’m going to send you to prison, and I’m going to do
that because punishment is a legitimate goal of sentencing and you deserve it.
And you’ll do this time, and when you come back you can – you can work hard to
make restitution to your victims.” Aplt. A pp. at 50–51.
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