United States v. Harris , 579 F. App'x 657 ( 2014 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 12, 2014
TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 13-6123
(D.C. No. 5:08-CR-00094-M-1)
STANLEY REMOND HARRIS, a/k/a (W.D. Okla.)
Stanley Remond Harris, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, HOLMES, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
Stanley Remond Harris, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) so he can appeal from the district court’s
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this matter. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
1
Because Mr. Harris is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings
liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Garza v.
Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010).
denial of his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) motion. He additionally seeks
leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal. For the reasons stated
below, we DENY Mr. Harris’s application for a COA, DENY his request to
proceed IFP, and DISMISS this matter.
I
Mr. Harris pleaded guilty in November 2008 to possession of a firearm by a
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He did so without the benefit of a
written plea agreement. The district court sentenced Mr. Harris to 120 months’
incarceration to be followed by three years’ supervised release and imposed a
$14,000 fine. In a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Mr. Harris sought to
have his sentence vacated, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district
court denied the motion, and we in turn denied Mr. Harris’s request for a COA to
appeal that decision. See United States v. Harris, 404 F. App’x 264, 265 (10th
Cir. 2010).
In March 2012, Mr. Harris filed a “Motion for 60(b) Relief on Unresolved
Claims Alleged in § 2255 Motion” in the district court. R., Vol. I, at 101 (Mot.
for 60(b) Relief, filed Mar. 26, 2012) (capitalization altered). In this motion, Mr.
Harris alleged a “fundamental defect” in his prior § 2255 proceeding—namely:
The Court failed to rule on [Mr. Harris’s] Claim that counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by materially
misinforming [Mr. Harris] regarding the consequences of the
plea, as it related to the use of the suppressed evidence to
enhance his sentence . . . .
2
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found that the motion
“present[ed] a ‘true’ Rule 60(b) claim,” rather than a second or successive habeas
petition, but nevertheless denied relief. Id. at 128 (Order, filed Mar. 14, 2013).
Noting that district courts are not required to address issues that a § 2255 motion
does not “adequately present . . . such that they require[] consideration,” id. at
129 (quoting United States v. Duran, 454 F. App’x 671, 678 (10th Cir. 2012)), the
court found that:
[The] defendant did not adequately develop any argument
regarding a claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
of counsel by misinforming him regarding the consequences of
his plea as it related to the use of the suppressed evidence to
enhance his sentence. Nowhere in the body of defendant’s
motion, brief in support, or reply does defendant mention, let
alone discuss, any claim that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by misinforming him regarding the
consequences of his plea as it related to the use of suppressed
evidence to enhance his sentence. The only place that such a
claim is mentioned is in paragraph 11 of his Affidavit which was
attached to his brief in support.
Id. The district court thus denied Mr. Harris’s Rule 60(b) motion. In a separate
order, the court also denied his request for a COA. Mr. Harris now seeks a COA
from this court to appeal from the district court’s decision.
II
Mr. Harris’s application to this court advances a single argument: that his
Rule 60(b) pleading and affidavit in fact “did state his claim properly when the
affidavits and the pleadings are taken as a whole,” and that in finding otherwise,
3
the district court erred by failing to give his pro se filings a sufficiently liberal
construction. Appl. for COA at 6. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude
that this argument is without merit. And, because reasonable jurists could not
debate the correctness of the district court’s ruling, we are obliged to deny Mr.
Harris’s application for a COA.
A
When a district court has denied a “‘true’ Rule 60(b) motion . . . , we will
require the movant to obtain a certificate of appealability . . . before proceeding
with his or her appeal.” Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006).
We will issue a COA “only if the [movant] has made a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). In cases where the
decision being appealed from was decided on procedural grounds, “a COA may
only issue if ‘the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional
right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.’” Spitznas, 464 F.3d at 1225 (emphasis
added) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). “[G]iven the
typically procedural nature of rulings on Rule 60(b) motions, we ordinarily have
‘applied the two-part COA standard the Supreme Court first articulated’ in Slack
v. McDanel.” Clay v. Smith, 365 F. App’x 98, 102 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Dulworth v. Jones, 496 F.3d 1133, 1137 (10th Cir. 2007)).
4
B
Although the two-part standard set forth in Slack applies to Mr. Harris’s
application for a COA, we need not assay the merits of Mr. Harris’s constitutional
claim under that standard. This is because we conclude that Mr. Harris has failed
to satisfy the procedural component of that standard—viz., we conclude that
jurists of reason would not find debatable the district court’s conclusion that the
issue raised in Mr. Harris’s Rule 60(b) motion was not adequately presented in his
§ 2255 motion. See United States v. Crawford, 564 F. App’x 380, 382 (10th Cir.
2014) (“Because reasonable jurists would not find the correctness of the district
court’s procedural ruling debatable, . . . we need not reach the merits of [the
petitioner’s constitutional] claims.”); Cathey v. Workman, 516 F. App’x 698, 699
(10th Cir. 2013) (declining to consider the merits where petitioner did “not come
close to demonstrating [that] the district judge’s procedural ruling [wa]s
debatable”).
It is beyond debate that, to prevail on a Rule 60(b) motion premised on a
district court’s alleged failure to address a claim raised in his § 2255 motion, a
litigant must demonstrate that the § 2255 motion adequately presented the claim
in question. Here, Mr. Harris contends that, contrary to the district court’s
finding, his § 2255 motion adequately alleged an ineffective-assistance claim
based on his counsel’s failure to “advise[] him how he could be enhanced, under
relevant conduct, for evidence that was suppressed.” Appl. for COA at 8.
5
Mr. Harris does not argue that he expressly asserted this claim. Rather, he
argues that, affording his pleadings the liberal construction to which he is entitled
as a pro se litigant, the court should have concluded that he actually presented the
claim in adequate fashion. In particular, Mr. Harris contends that the court
should have discerned this claim from the combination of three allegations—two
made in Mr. Harris’s brief in support of his § 2255 motion, and one made only in
his affidavit submitted with the motion. First:
[Counsel] rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when he
negotiated the plea, by providing Defendant with fallacious
representation. That is, “misadvising” and “misinforming”
Defendant of the potential sentence he would receive by pleading
guilty.
R., Vol. I, at 50 (Br. in Supp. of § 2255 Mot., filed Jan. 25, 2010). Next:
[Counsel] failed to explain the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (USSG) would be applied to Defendant’s case.
Id. at 53. And finally, Mr. Harris points to the allegation in the affidavit:
At the time of [counsel’s] negotiating the plea he never advised
me that I could be enhanced with relevant conduct on the
evidence that was suppressed and ruled an illegal search and
seizure. Neither did he try to perfect a plea agreement, knowing
that I could be enhanced. Had he explained said ramifications to
me before I pleaded guilty I never would have plead[ed] guilty
without some type of plea agreement.
Id. at 69 (Aff. of Stanley Harris, filed Jan. 25, 2010).
Mr. Harris’s contention that the district court should have construed these
statements together as adequately presenting the suppression-related claim that he
6
highlights in his Rule 60(b) motion is fatally flawed in at least two respects.
First, Mr. Harris fails to recognize that the two cited allegations from his § 2255
motion expressly raised distinct claims that the district court did properly address
and deny in the § 2255 proceeding. We are thus hard-pressed to accept Mr.
Harris’s contention now that these allegations were merely part of a larger distinct
ineffective-assistance argument related to suppression of evidence, which the
district court overlooked because of its failure to employ liberal construction
principles. Specifically, the first cited allegation asserted an ineffective-
assistance claim based on counsel’s purportedly erroneous estimation of Mr.
Harris’s potential sentencing exposure. This claim was rejected on its merits by
the district court in an order that we subsequently affirmed. See Harris, 404 F.
App’x at 266–67. The second cited allegation stated an ineffective-assistance
claim based on counsel’s alleged failure to explain that the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“USSG”) would apply to his case, and in particular that
“the USSG’s provision regarding relevant conduct would apply to his case and
have an impact on his sentence.” 2 R., Vol. I, at 96 (Order, filed July 21, 2010).
2
In his application for a COA, in discussing this second allegation,
Mr. Harris excerpts only the small portion of text set forth in a block quote,
supra. However, by examining the full text of his § 2255 motion, it becomes
clear to us that in this section of the motion he was asserting counsel’s alleged
failure to explain the possibility of a relevant-conduct enhancement generally, as
opposed to counsel’s failure to specifically explain that such an enhancement, if
applicable, could be predicated on previously suppressed evidence. See R. at 53
(“[Counsel] failed to advise Defendant of the true contentions of pleading
(continued...)
7
The district court rejected this claim on its merits, and we affirmed. See Harris,
404 F. App’x at 266–67.
Insofar as Mr. Harris believes that it was enough to preserve the specific
suppression-related ineffective-assistance argument that he highlights now for
him to have raised some ineffective-assistance argument in his § 2255 motion, or
even for him to have presented an ineffective-assistance argument that generally
implicated the relevant-conduct rubric of the USSG, we are constrained to inform
him that our caselaw addressing preservation of issues clearly indicates that his
belief is misguided. See United States v. A.B., 529 F.3d 1275, 1279 n.4 (10th Cir.
2008) (“We have repeatedly declined to allow parties to assert for the first time
on appeal legal theories not raised before the district court, even when they fall
under the same general rubric as an argument presented to the district court.”);
Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 721–22 (10th Cir. 1993) (“While
we have at times given a liberal reading to pleadings and motions in the trial
court, we have consistently turned down the argument that the raising of a related
theory was sufficient.” (citations omitted)).
The second fatal flaw in Mr. Harris’s argument stems from his apparent
belief that the district court was obliged to take the averments found in his
affidavit and combine them with the arguments that he did make in his § 2255
2
(...continued)
guilty[,] i.e., that upon entering a plea [of] guilty, the USSG[]s would have an
impact on his sentence, that is, as here, could be enhanced.”).
8
motion and cobble together the related argument regarding the use of suppressed
evidence that he presented in his Rule 60(b) motion. In this regard, Mr. Harris
maintains that “the District Court erred by considering the affidavit and pleadings
as separate entities.” Appl. for COA at 5. However, Mr. Harris cites no
controlling authority that comes close to directly indicating that the district court
was required to engage in such an alchemic exercise to yield his current
suppression-related ineffective-assistance argument, and we are aware of none.
Mr. Harris falls back on our settled caselaw discussing the liberal
construction that courts afford to pro se litigants’ pleadings. While it is true that,
in the case of pro se litigants, “if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to
state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so despite the
plaintiff’s failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal
theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with
pleading requirements,” we also have made crystal clear that “we do not believe it
is the proper function of the district court to assume the role of advocate for the
pro se litigant.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see, e.g.,
Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“[C]ourt[s] cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney
in constructing arguments and searching the record.”); see also Abdelsamed v.
United States, 13 F. App’x 883, 884 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he parties and the court
are under no obligation to craft legal theories for the plaintiff, nor may they
9
supply factual allegations to support a pro se plaintiff’s claim for relief.”). In our
view, a court ordinarily would be adopting precisely such an advocate’s role,
were it to undertake a searching examination, akin to a scavenger hunt, of all of a
pro se litigant’s filings—including his evidentiary submissions—with the aim of
weaving together a substantive argument for relief that the litigant never made in
his motion or other pleading. Indeed, in Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128 (10th
Cir. 1999), which Mr. Harris himself invoked in his Rule 60(b) motion, see R.,
Vol. I, at 105 (“Movant would ask that the Court apply its liberal pleading
requirements to his § 2255 pleadings as stated in Bar[n]ett . . . .”), we
emphasized that “a district court . . . may ‘not rewrite a petition to include claims
that were never presented,’” Barnett, 174 F.3d at 1133 (quoting Parker v.
Champion, 148 F.3d 1219, 1222 (10th Cir. 1998)). Therefore, even our liberal-
construction cases offer Mr. Harris no succor because they still require a pro se
litigant to actually make the arguments upon which he seeks relief—however
inartfully he may do so—and to present them in an identifiable fashion, which
ordinarily will mean in the body of the motion or other pleading in which the
litigant argues for relief.
In light of the above, we think that it is clear that Mr. Harris’s § 2255
motion did not adequately present an ineffective-assistance claim premised on
counsel’s purported failure to explain that Mr. Harris’s sentence could be subject
to a relevant-conduct enhancement based on previously suppressed evidence. We
10
conclude that reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s conclusion to
this same effect. Accordingly, we deny Mr. Harris’s application for a COA.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Harris’s request for a COA and
DISMISS this matter. We also DENY Mr. Harris’s motion to proceed IFP
because he has not demonstrated “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous
argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.” Watkins
v. Leyba, 543 F.3d 624, 627 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting McIntosh v. U.S. Parole
Comm’n, 115 F.3d 809, 812 (10th Cir. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Entered for the Court
JEROME A. HOLMES
Circuit Judge
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