Esparza v. State of Utah , 258 F. App'x 181 ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 5, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
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GEORGE ESPARZA,
Petitioner-appellant, No. 07-4152
v. (D. Utah)
STATE OF UTAH, (D.C. No. 2:05-CV-600)
Respondent-appellee.
ORDER
_
Before HENRY, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
George Esparza brings a pro se appeal, challenging the district court’s dismissal of
his Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Mr. Esparza failed to appear for
a January 20, 2004 bench trial, which resulted in the issuance of a bench warrant. The
trial was reset for March 30, 2004, and Mr. Esparza again failed to appear. Mr. Esparza
was found guilty in absentia of violating the City of West Valley Municipal Code for
[domestic] battery. He has not been sentenced.
Mr. Esparza filed a § 2254 habeas petition. The district court dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction because Mr. Esparza is not “in custody” as required by §
2254, or in the alternative, for failure to exhaust. On appeal, Mr. Esparza argues that (1)
the bench warrant is illegal under the Eighth Amendment and the Utah Constitution and
should be recalled; (2) the domestic battery charge is unconstitutional because “spitting”
is not an element of the offense; and (3) he is “in custody.”
We construe Mr. Esparza’s brief as a request for a certificate of appealability
(“COA”), deny the application for a COA, and dismiss the matter.
BACKGROUND
The City of West Valley City, Utah charged Mr. Esparza with one count of
battery, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of West Valley City Municipal Code 21-6-
106, which provides:
(1) A person commits battery if he, intentionally or knowingly, without legal
justification and by any means:
(a) Causes bodily injury to a person; or
(b) Makes physical contact of an offensive, insulting, or
provoking nature with a person.
(2) Physical contact in (1)(b) shall include, but is not limited to, spitting,
kissing, pinching, poking, shoving or intimidating touching.
(emphasis added).
Mr. Esparza appeared for an arraignment hearing, entered a not guilty plea, and
signed a notice acknowledging the trial had been set for January 20, 2004. The signed
notice also acknowledged his understanding that if he failed to appear, the trial could be
held in his absence, and a bench warrant could be issued for his arrest. Mr. Esparza did
not appear, and as a result a bench warrant was issued. The trial was reset for March 30,
2004. Mr. Esparza again failed to appear, and was convicted in absentia. He has not yet
been sentenced.
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Mr. Esparza originally filed his § 2254 petition in Montana. That court found that
it did not have jurisdiction, and transferred the action to Utah. The Utah district court
dismissed the action finding that (1) it lacked jurisdiction because Mr. Esparza is not “in
custody” as required by the language of § 2254(a); and (2) alternatively, because he did
not exhaust his state court remedies.
DISCUSSION
In order to obtain a COA, Mr. Esparza must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He may make this showing by
demonstrating that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree
that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] claim can be
debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted
and the case has received full consideration, that [the] petitioner will not prevail.” Id. at
338. Because Mr. Esparza proceeds pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. Cannon
v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2004).
Reasonable jurists could not debate whether Mr. Esparza’s petition should have
been resolved differently. “Federal courts may grant habeas relief to prisoners held by
state authorities only when the habeas petitioner is ‘in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Foster v. Booher, 296 F.3d 947,
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949 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting § 2254). We hold that Mr. Esparza is not “in custody” as
required by the statute and case law, for substantially the same reasons as the district
court.
In order to meet § 2254’s requirements, Mr. Esparza must be “‘in custody’ under
the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng v. Cook,
490 U.S. 488, 490-91 (1989). The bench warrant issued not from his conviction, but
because he failed to appear for the original bench trial. Further, Mr. Esparza has never
been sentenced. Therefore, he is not “in custody” under a conviction or sentence and the
district court did not err in finding that it lacked jurisdiction.
We also agree with the district court that Mr. Esparza failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. Mr. Esparza argues that the state court prevented him from
exhausting his claims because it denied his notice of appeal as premature. “As a general
rule, a[] [Utah] appellate court lacks jurisdiction over an appeal that is not taken from a
final order or judgment.” Anderson v. Wilshire Investments, L.L.C., 123 P.3d 393, 395
(Utah 2005). Because Mr. Esparza has not yet been sentenced, there is no final order the
state court can hear on appeal. Therefore, he has not exhausted his state remedies, and
the district court properly found that it lacked jurisdiction for this alternative reason.
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CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Esparza’s application for a COA and DISMISS this
matter.
Entered for the court,
ELISABETH A. SHUMAKER, Clerk
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