Ptasynski v. Kinder Morgan G.P., Inc. ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
April 4, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
HARRY PTASYNSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-1231
(D.C. No. 06-cv-651-LTB)
KIN DER M ORGAN G.P., IN C., (D . Colo.)
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before H E N RY, B AL DOC K , and M U RPH Y, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Harry Ptasynski filed this action against defendant Kinder M organ
G.P., Inc., concerning royalty payments for carbon dioxide produced from the
M cElmo Dome Unit in southeastern Colorado. Defendant did not answer but
filed a motion to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas based on the first-to-file rule, alleging that a
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
substantively identical action between the parties was already underway. On
M ay 19, 2006, the district court granted the motion to transfer. W ithin hours of
that order, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). See Docketing Statement at 5. On M ay 22, the district
court issued an order stating that the transferee court would have to rule on the
notice of voluntary dismissal. Plaintiff then filed a notice of appeal to this court
on M ay 23, in which he stated that he was appealing the M ay 19 and M ay 22
orders. On M ay 24, the Colorado court sent the files to the Texas court, and on
M ay 26, the case w as entered on the docket of the Southern District of Texas. O n
June 1, that court entered an order granting the dismissal without prejudice.
This court issued an order to show cause, directing the parties to submit
supplemental briefs on whether the transfer order is an appealable order. Plaintiff
responded that our jurisdiction is based on the M ay 22 order, not the transfer
order, and suggested that his notice of dismissal was necessary to preserve review
because the district court refused to stay the transfer to permit plaintiff to file a
petition for mandamus. Defendant argued that this case is moot because plaintiff
voluntarily dismissed it, that the transfer order is not appealable, and that we
should not treat this appeal as a petition for mandamus. As we explain, we
conclude that this appeal is moot and therefore have no occasion to consider
whether to treat it as a petition for mandamus.
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The entry of the transfer order did not divest the District of Colorado of
jurisdiction over this case. As we have explained, that would have occurred when
the matter w as docketed in the transferee court:
Once the files in a case are transferred physically to the court in the
transferee district, the transferor court loses all jurisdiction over the
case, including the power to review the transfer. The date the papers
in the transferred case are docketed in the transferee court, not the
date of the transfer order, consequently forms the effective date that
jurisdiction in the transferor court is terminated.
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516-17
(10th Cir. 1991) (citations and footnote omitted). W hen plaintiff filed his notice
of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Rule 41(a) on M ay 19, just hours after the
court had entered the transfer order, the District of Colorado still had jurisdiction
because the case was not docketed in the transferee court, the Southern District of
Texas, until M ay 26.
Plaintiff did not state on which subdivision of Rule 41(a) he based his
notice of voluntary dismissal. Rule 41(a) provides:
(a) V oluntary Dismissal: Effect Thereof.
(1) By Plaintiff; by Stipulation. Subject to the provisions of
Rule 23(e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United States, an
action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by
filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever
first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all
parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated in
the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without
prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an
adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
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dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action
based on or including the same claim.
(2) By Order of Court. Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the
plaintiff’s instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms
and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant prior to the service upon the defendant of the
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not be dismissed
against the defendant’s objection unless the counterclaim can remain
pending for independent adjudication by the court. Unless otherwise
specified in the order, a dismissal under this paragraph is without
prejudice.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a). It is clear that (a)(1)(i) is the applicable portion of the rule
because plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, not a
stipulation signed by all of the parties as contemplated by (a)(1)(ii), and
defendant had not served an answer or a summary judgment motion. By its ow n
terms, Rule 41(a)(2) is not applicable because of the exception it carves out for
dismissals that conform to the requirements of Rule 41(a)(1). Furthermore, in his
supplemental brief on appellate jurisdiction, plaintiff asks us to apply Janssen v.
Harris, 321 F.3d 998 (10th Cir. 2003), to his notice of voluntary dismissal, a case
that involved Rule 41(a)(1)(i), which further indicates that plaintiff based his
motion on Rule 41(a)(1)(i).
In Janssen, we explained that “[u]nder Rule 41(a)(1)(i), a plaintiff has an
absolute right to dismiss without prejudice and no action is required on the part
of the court.” 321 F.3d at 1000 (emphasis added). W e then noted the effects of a
Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice of voluntary dismissal without prejudice:
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The effect of the filing of a notice of dismissal pursuant to
Rule 41(a)(1)(i) is to leave the parties as though no action had been
brought. Once the notice of dismissal has been filed, the district
court loses jurisdiction over the dismissed claims and may not
address the merits of such claims or issue further orders pertaining to
them.
Janssen, 321 F.3d at 1000 (quotation omitted). W e also agreed with the
appellee’s argument that an order issued after the notice was filed purporting to
grant the voluntary dismissal was “superfluous, a nullity, and without procedural
effect for purposes of appeal or otherwise.” Id. (quotation omitted).
The reasoning of Janssen applies here. W hen plaintiff filed his notice of
voluntary dismissal without prejudice on M ay 19, it automatically divested the
District of Colorado of jurisdiction and left the parties as though no action had
been brought. It rendered the court’s M ay 22 order a nullity and without
procedural effect. In Janssen, we did not address what effect a notice of
voluntary dismissal without prejudice has on orders that a district court enters
before the notice is filed, but we conclude that the notice in this case rendered the
district court’s M ay 19 transfer order a nullity and the case moot. See Marex
Titanic, Inc. v. Wrecked & Abandoned Vessel, 2 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 1993)
(holding that “the action was terminated and the district court’s interlocutory
orders were vacated” after plaintiff filed its Rule 41(a)(1)(i) notice); Oneida
Indian Nation v. Oneida County, 622 F.2d 624, 629 n.7 (2d Cir. 1980)
(“Voluntary dismissal of a suit . . . vitiat[es] and annul[s] all prior proceedings
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and orders in the case, terminating jurisdiction over it for the reason that the case
has become moot.”) (quotation, brackets, and ellipses omitted); cf. In re Piper
Aircraft Distribution Sys. Antitrust Litig., 551 F.2d 213, 219 (8th Cir. 1977)
(holding that orders preceding a voluntary dismissal without prejudice under
Rule 41(a)(1)(i) could not be given preclusive effect because the dismissal
“carries down with it previous proceedings and orders in the action”) (quotation
omitted). Because the notice of voluntary dismissal annulled the orders of the
district court and mooted the case, this appeal is moot. 1
1
Plaintiff argues that he filed his notice of voluntary dismissal because the
district court did not grant a stay of the transfer, which would have given him
time to file a mandamus petition. W e have endorsed the delay of transfer to
permit a party to seek either mandamus relief or certification of an interlocutory
transfer order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). See Chrysler Credit Corp., 928 F.2d
at 1517, 1520 n.9. To the extent plaintiff is suggesting that the district court
erred in denying a motion for a stay of the transfer, the argument is of no avail
because he did not properly seek a stay in the District of Colorado. The relevant
local rule of that court provides: “A motion shall not be included in a response or
reply to the original motion. A motion shall be made in a separate paper.”
D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1C. Plaintiff’s request for a stay was presented in his
response to the motion to transfer, not in a separate motion, and the district
court’s orders are silent as to the procedurally improper request. Rather than
filing a proper motion to stay the transfer, plaintiff filed his notice of voluntary
dismissal without prejudice, which was the deathblow to his case and to any
chance to seek review in this court.
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W e DISM ISS this appeal as M OOT and therefore have no occasion to
consider whether to treat it as a petition for mandamus.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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